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ABSTRACT 
 
The microfinance industry provides financial services to the world’s poor in 
hopes of moving individuals and families out of poverty.  This dissertation 
document suggests that information and communication technologies (ICTs) are 
changing the microfinance industry, especially given recent advancements in 
mobile banking, Internet usage and connectivity, and a decreasing digital divide. 
These impacts are discussed in three essays. First, ICTs impact intermediation 
among various players in the microfinance industry. Second, ICTs impact the 
extent to which microfinance institutions (MFIs) extend their outreach to poorer 
or more geographically remote borrowers. Finally, ICTs impact the location of 
decision rights given newly forming peer-to-peer (P2P) social microlending 
organizations. As the microfinance industry increases its adoption and reliance on 
ICTs, new and interesting opportunities abound for researchers in the information 
systems discipline.  
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
1.1. Motivation 
Muhammad Yunus (2007b) founded the Grameen Bank in 1983. Its purpose is to 
make small loans to groups of rural Bangladeshi women. He probably did not 
realize that he started an industry that has a dramatic impact on poverty levels and 
has undergone extensive changes throughout the last 29 years. The characteristics 
of the recipients of microfinance loans remain largely unchanged. These 
borrowers are often rural, poor entrepreneurs who benefit from loans to grow their 
small businesses. The technologies used by borrowers and the microfinance 
institutions (MFIs) that administer these loans are very different than they were in 
the industry’s humble beginnings. Today, a female basket weaver in rural 
Cambodia receives a loan to purchase more long-stem grass materials for 
weaving. This loan is administered by an MFI with its headquarters in the capital 
of Phnom Penh and branches throughout Cambodia’s provinces. Dozens of 
lenders in developed countries fund her loan via a peer-to-peer (P2P) social 
lending website where lenders receive regular updates on her business status and 
loan repayment progress. Since the borrower has little time to travel to the branch 
to make her loan payments or the money for a motodup (motorcycle taxi) fare, 
she repays her loan by making electronic money transfers through her mobile 
phone. Donors and investors are able to analyze the financial performance of the 
loan portfolio, as well as the social impact of the MFI administering her loan and 
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also to compare the outcomes to other MFI in Cambodia and the rest of the world 
by viewing an online transparency promoter’s website. 
The evolving industry described above is microfinance, which Ledgerwood 
(2000, p.1) defines as “the provision of financial services to poor or low-income 
clients.” Microlending or microcredit is a subset of microfinance. By offering 
small loans to poor individuals and groups who would otherwise be unable to 
receive loans through traditional banking institutions, microlending shows great 
promise as an alternative method to charity. Microfinance is proving to be more 
than just the provision of loans. It can also include microsavings, money transfers, 
and insurance provisions. Prior to the onset of microfinance, the only available 
lending channels for the third-world poor were moneylenders. Since 
moneylenders operate in unregulated black markets, they often exhibit a high 
level of corruption and are known to charge high interest rates or threaten 
physical harm on borrowers and their families in the event of non-payment 
(Schreiner 2001). Microloans administered by credible MFIs, however, are a 
legitimate form of loans and have found success in moving individuals out of 
poverty (McKernan 1996, Pitt and Khandker 1998). MFIs come in many varieties 
(e.g. non-government organizations [NGOs], banks, credit unions, rural banks, 
non-bank financial institutions). They exist to administer financial services to 
poor clients and are often located geographically near their clients. 
Besides a unique approach to financial services and poverty reduction, the 
microfinance industry is also marked by a low amount of technological 
advancement (Ivatury 2004, CSFI 2011). Technology use among the world’s 
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poor, however, tells a different story. Mobile phone and Internet users in 
developing countries are growing at a higher rate than in developed countries 
(Shamim 2007). These characteristics of both the nature of the industry and 
technology use lead to interesting research implications and questions, Does 
information and communications technology (ICT) investment and usage 
positively benefit the microfinance industry? If these benefits are found to exist, 
what is their impact on industry players and the structure of the industry? 
Academic literature with respect to microfinance and ICT is nearly absent in 
the information systems (IS) discipline. A Google Scholar1 search in five of the 
top IS journals revealed that no published articles contained the term 
“microfinance.”2 While research does exist on ICT use in the microfinance 
industry, those articles are written by academics and researchers in disciplines 
other than information systems (e.g. economics, finance, management, 
development) or are published in journals specific to development among other 
disciplines. Their content consists of cases where ICTs are used to address a 
problem or need in the industry. 
Despite this gap in academic research, microfinance remains a rapidly 
growing industry. A 2007 survey found that there were 133 million microloan 
recipients, up from 13 million in 1998 (Apps 2007). This growth is expected to 
continue despite a slowing global economy. Dieckmann (2007) predicts that 
private investors will finance $35 billion to MFIs by 2015. Given recent 
                                                 
1www.scholar.google.com 
2MIS Quarterly, Information Systems Research, Management Science, Journal of 
Management Information Systems, and Journal of the Association for Information Systems 
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microfinance industry growth, new electronically-enabled entrants and a banking 
model that differs from traditional banks, the timing is right for a dissertation 
study on ICT and microfinance. 
1.2. Overall Research Questions 
Kauffman and Riggins (2012, p.1) suggest that “ICT may be the instigator…and 
the potential solution to MFI survivability.” Their research paper poses a 
comprehensive list of research questions dealing with the impacts of ICT on the 
microfinance industry in several aspects: the customer level, MFI level, donor 
level, and industry level. Researchers use this multilevel research approach in the 
contexts of ICT adoption (Weber and Kauffman 2011), entrepreneurship 
(Davidsson and Wiklund 2001), and strategic behavior (Schneider and De Meyer 
2006) among others. The impacts of ICT in microfinance are widespread among 
many industry players. In order to achieve a comprehensive analysis, each essay 
in this dissertation focuses on one or more of these stated levels moving from 
general to specific as the chapters progress. The research question encompassing 
this entire dissertation follows. 
What are the impacts of ICTs on the microfinance industry? 
A Western philanthropic-minded lender has no means of funding a loan 
requested by an impoverished individual in a developing country without the use 
of an intermediary to match the borrower and lender, transfer funds, and enforce 
loan repayment. In the same way, a donor has no means of determining which 
MFIs meet their giving criteria without the use of an infomediary to publicly 
share the information. In the first essay, I categorize the various electronic-
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enabled intermediaries in the microfinance industry while classifying the patterns 
that appear into a research framework. The overall research question for this study 
asks: 
What is the impact of ICTs on market structure and intermediation in the 
microfinance industry? 
While the first essay determines the impact of ICTs at the industry level, the 
second essay determines the impact that ICTs have on MFIs, the organizations 
that administer loans to poor individuals and groups. The specific impact of 
interest lies not on their financial or loan portfolio performance, but rather on their 
social performance which includes the ability to lend to individuals that are poorer 
or more geographically hard-to-reach and distant. The overall research question 
for this study asks: 
What is the impact of ICTs on MFI outreach? 
ICTs also increase transparency in the microfinance industry. The final essay 
highlights the new and growing P2P approach to microlending. This new 
approach connects Western lenders to poor third-world entrepreneurs in a lender-
borrower relationship. The Internet technology use among these organizations has 
interesting implications for location of decision rights and its impact on 
microlending efficiency and effectiveness. With the advent of P2P social 
microlenders, loan funding decisions are shifting from MFIs to individual lenders 
in developed countries. This shift produces some interesting ramifications, and 
therefore the overall research question for the final study asks: 
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What is the impact of ICTs on decision-making rights among P2P social 
microlenders? 
To answer these research questions, I employ a range of research 
methodologies including exploratory methods, market structure analysis, 
quantitative methods including logistic regression, and qualitative methods with 
case studies and pattern matching analysis. Using these methods, this dissertation 
contributes to the body of literature on the impact of ICT on microfinance, posits 
new theories, and provides practical advice for various industry players. The 
remaining chapters in this dissertation flow from a broad, industry impact in 
Chapter 2 to a narrower MFI organizational impact in Chapter 3 and finally the 
specific impact of P2P social microlending in Chapter 4. 
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Chapter 2. The Impact of ICT on Intermediation in the Microfinance 
Industry 
2.1. Introduction 
Global poverty and malnourishment rank among the largest humanitarian 
problems in the world today. An estimated 925 million, or 13.6 percent of the 
world’s population, were classified as malnourished in 2010 (Food and 
Agriculture Organization 2011). Children are the primary victims of malnutrition. 
One in three children in developing countries is malnourished and suffers an 
average of 160 days of illness per year. While global malnourishment slowly 
declined from 1969 to 1997, it has since increased to its highest recorded levels. 
Poverty ranks as the principal reason for malnourishment. In 2008, 1.35 billion 
people lived in poverty on $1.25 USD or less per day (Povcalnet 2011). 
ICT has shown some impact on poverty. While this impact is only in an early 
stage, the potential is being demonstrated at the micro, intermediate and macro 
levels (Hanna 2003). Despite this slight improvement, evidence suggests an 
“indisputable link” between poverty and ICT (Flor 2001). Within developing 
countries, ICT offers the following benefits: strengthening social networks, 
challenging norms that prevent socially marginalized people from experiencing 
economic advancement, and providing the poor with access to information and 
knowledge that can improve their economic situation (Slater and Tacchi 2004). 
Countries that experience high poverty rates also have few telephone land lines 
and Internet service providers (ISPs) (Kiiski and Pohjola 2002). Unfortunately, 
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there exists a digital divide, a term referring to the discrepancy of technology 
available to, and used by, the poor versus the wealthy (Dewan and Riggins 2005). 
Microfinance is an approach to alleviate poverty. It is defined as the 
provisioning of financial services to poor or low-income clients, including both 
consumers and entrepreneurs, who would otherwise not be served by traditional 
financial institutions (Ledgerwood 2000). For example, Winifred Neba operates a 
vegetable stand in her rural Cameroon village3. In 2009, she received a microloan 
of $1,050 to purchase a motorbike, registration documents, and fuel so she could 
establish a motorbike transport company. With the profits from her company, she 
plans to provide her daughter with a university education and build a home for her 
family. Winifred has already repaid 33% of her loan. GHAPE (Grounded and 
Holistic Approach to People’s Empowerment), a microfinance institution (MFI) 
in Cameroon, administered this loan. A loan request such as this would have been 
rejected at a traditional lending institution due to either a perceived high risk for 
Winifred’s start-up venture or loan administration costs exceeding the amount of 
potential interest earned. For-profit lending institutions tend to be unwilling to do 
business with a lender whose sole revenue stream comes from a vegetable stand 
in a developing country. The emergence of microfinance in the past three decades 
is viewed as a critical component in the fight against global poverty (Mosley 
2001, Shaw 2004, Khandker 2005). 
Despite numerous microfinance success stories, estimates reveal that 40% to 
80% of the population in developing countries  still do not receive basic financial 
                                                 
3http://www.kiva.org/lend/7616 
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services (Cull et al. 2009). Some microfinance programs have found little success 
in reaching the poorest individuals, which they state are the target of their 
outreach (Hulme and Mosely 1996). Muhammad Yunus, a recognizable name in 
microfinance (founder of the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh), attributes this 
shortcoming to profit-maximizing MFIs, which are less successful in poverty 
reduction than social business MFIs (Yunus 2007a). One of the “promises” of 
microfinance initiatives is self-sustainability (Morduch 1999). This attribute 
makes microfinance a unique approach from most other charitable attempts at 
poverty reduction. Unfortunately, this initiative led many MFIs to favor financial 
performance goals over social performance goals and neglect clientele with the 
greatest need. The pendulum is swinging back toward social performance. The 
industry is responding by introducing tools, methodologies, and assessment 
frameworks to the industry in recent years (Copestake 2007, Bedecarrats et al. 
2009). 
ICT has shown a moderate impact on this industry, but indications reveal that 
it could have large impacts (Kauffman and Riggins 2012). Many of the tasks that 
intermediaries perform are enabled by, or at least improved by, various 
technologies. Intermediaries introduce both benefits and challenges to any 
industry. The microfinance industry possesses unique characteristics that are not 
shared with other industries (outreach-focused, donor-funded, and concentrated in 
developing countries). ICT has been shown to alter the roles of intermediaries and 
marketplaces in industries such as travel (Granados et al. 2003b, 2008), music 
(Bockstedt et al. 2006), and retail (Sarkar et al. 1995). Kauffman and Riggins 
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(2012) recognize that research on the impact of ICT in the microfinance industry 
is limited. As developing countries adopt ICTs and begin to bridge the digital 
divide, the impact of ICTs on the microfinance industry will increase. The 
industry can benefit from the scholarship of applicable academic research. 
I pose research questions in order to determine how ICT impacts 
intermediation in the microfinance industry. My hope is that answering these 
questions can help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of intermediation in 
the microfinance industry so microfinance can indeed reduce poverty. Research 
questions (RQs) include: 
• (RQ1) How has ICT created opportunities for intermediaries in the 
microfinance industry? 
• (RQ2) How are ICTs fueling changes among these intermediaries? 
• (RQ3) Based on the risks facing the microfinance industry and ICTs 
ability to address these risks, What will microfinance industry 
intermediation look like in the future? 
• (RQ4) What are the implications for microfinance market participants 
given these predictions? 
2.2. Theoretical Background 
I draw on elements of intermediation and electronic marketplace theory, 
transparency theory, and e-commerce in my analysis of ICT in the microfinance 
industry. 
Intermediary theory. Spulber (1996) defines an intermediary as an 
“economic agent that purchases from suppliers for resale to buyers that helps 
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them meet and transact.”  Microfinance as an industry uses intermediaries and the 
roles that these intermediaries play are the same as in traditional industries (e.g. 
automotive, financial services, engineering). These roles include (1) price setting 
and market clearing, (2) providing liquidity and immediacy, (3) matching and 
searching, and (4) guaranteeing and monitoring. Intermediaries in the 
microfinance industry play the standard roles that Spulber recognizes. These roles 
are often enabled by technology. Spulber’s definition is limited in that it only 
refers to the transfer of goods, services, and funds. For the purposes of this paper, 
I also include the flow of information in the tasks that intermediaries perform. 
Some intermediaries also function as electronic marketplaces. Bakos (1991, p. 
296) defines an electronic marketplace as an “interorganizational information 
system that allows the participating buyers and sellers to exchange information 
about prices and product offerings.” Bakos (1991) claims electronic marketplaces 
share the following five characteristics: 
(1) Reduces information cost – Costs of obtaining information about 
prices and product offerings are lower in an electronic marketplace. 
(2) Benefits from network externalities – As the number of participants in 
an electronic marketplace increase, the value of the marketplace to 
participants will also increase (Katz and Shapiro 1985). 
(3) Imposes switching costs – The migration from traditional to electronic 
marketplaces requires investments in hardware, software, and staff 
training. 
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(4) Participants benefit from economies of scale – While the initial 
investment to switch is large, the incremental costs for each additional 
transaction are low. 
(5) Uncertainty of actual benefits among participants – Potential 
participants are not aware of electronic marketplace benefits often 
until long after switching. 
Debate exists among researchers as to the effect that electronic marketplaces 
have on product prices. Traditional thought suggests that since high search costs 
allow sellers to maintain high product prices, lower costs should be expected 
among products sold in electronic marketplaces. Lee (1998) argues the converse 
in his study on the Japanese auto auction market and finds that buyers pay a 
premium due to contract costs that counter unknown variance in product quality. 
The argument can be simplified when discussed in terms of asset specificity, 
which is the heterogeneity of an input or how easily the input can be used by 
another firm, and complexity of description, the amount of information required to 
aid in the consumer’s purchase decision (Malone et al. 1987). Goods ranking low 
on asset specificity and complexity of description are more attractive products for 
electronic marketplaces. These goods range from commodities like oil and wheat 
to media products (books, CDs, Blu-ray discs, etc.). Goods that rank high on the 
two dimensions are not as suitable for purchasing and selling in an electronic 
marketplace, exemplified by the automobiles used as the example in Lee (1998). 
In the microfinance industry, example products include loans or savings accounts. 
Both of these rank low on asset specificity, since money, a liquid asset, can be 
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used as an input in all entrepreneurial endeavors. They also rank low in terms of 
the complexity of product description since loans have few defining components 
such as interest rate, compounding method, amount, and loan term. To a 
microfinance institution, a disbursed loan is an asset on their balance sheet, but it 
also carries risk. These factors make microfinance products appropriate for 
buying and selling in electronic marketplaces. 
Much research in the IS discipline aims to determine if ICT diminishes the 
need for the ‘middle man’ (El Sawy et al. 1999). Evidence of this can be found in 
certain industries such as music and print media. Prior to Internet technologies, 
portable electronic book readers, and audio compression formats, many 
intermediaries existed between the artist and the end-consumer including 
producers, record labels, publishers, distributors, and retailers. Beginning in the 
late 1990s, artists could sell their music and media directly to consumers. Those 
who benefit from this change are the artists who receive a greater percentage of 
the final sale and the consumers who pay a lower cost and can deal with the artist 
directly. Those who do not benefit are the other players in the market structure 
between the artist and the consumer who were being disintermediated by these 
advancements (Bockstedt et al. 2006). Since ICT can diminish the distance 
(Cairncross 2001) between lenders and borrowers, less need arises for 
intermediaries to play roles in the microfinance industry. 
Electronic-enabled intermediaries have also impacted businesses and industry. 
Huber and Korn (1997) posit that collaborative coordination of value creation 
increases for business partners who rely on electronic enabled intermediaries. 
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This poses a threat to traditional businesses that rely on brands and distribution 
relationships (Ghosh 1998). While it is true that many traditional intermediaries 
risk extinction due to advances in ICT, some intermediaries maintain relevancy by 
proactively “reinventing their value logic” (El Sawy et al. 1999). Their traditional 
roles of distributing goods to other market players shift to roles of service support, 
transaction processing, and contract enforcement. 
Transparency theory. Transparent markets are characterized by complete 
and unbiased information (Porter 2001). In transparent markets, healthy 
competition flourishes. Consumers benefit from competition through lower 
product pricing, but sellers and producers have an understandable resistance to 
transparency because it often means sacrificing their financial advantage of 
information asymmetry. Less transparent market participants yield financial gains 
although these gains are reduced when more transparent sellers enter the market 
(Wilson et al.1999). The same is true in the microfinance industry; larger profits 
can be made by profit-maximizing MFIs that lend in markets where competitors 
(other MFIs) and their target market (individuals in poverty without access to 
traditional financial services) have limited access to market information. To 
combat this, organizations such as MixMarket and MFTransparency work in the 
industry to promote transparency and healthy competition among market players. 
As evidenced in Wilson et al. (1999) the financial benefits of adopting a non-
transparent strategy among profit-maximizing MFIs decline as other MFIs 
become transparent. Consumers are not the only players that experience benefits 
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from transparency. Sellers also benefit with enhanced electronic representation of 
products and competitive/institutional forces (Granados et al. 2006, 2010). 
Transparency offers many benefits to a marketplace and is used as a means to 
mitigate corruption (Bac 1999, Boehm and Olaya 2006), which is a growing 
concern in the microfinance industry (CSFI 2011). Another benefit of 
transparency is improved liquidity of a product for sale. Examples include an 
airline flight’s empty seats (Granados et al. 2003b) or a donor’s cash reserve for 
funding an NGO MFI. It also leads to a greater transfer of wealth between the 
producers and consumers since product turnover increases, while at the same time 
margins are reduced for intermediaries (Clemons and Weber 1990). Technologies 
like the Internet allow for consumers to determine sellers’ costs or acquire several 
bids. Consumers pay lower prices and effectively increase their consumer surplus. 
In the context of microfinance, a borrower reviews the interest rates and loan 
products of several MFIs before making their borrowing decision. The same 
ramifications exist with consumer surplus – if a borrower is willing to borrow at a 
rate of 25% and finds a loan at a rate of 20%, the difference between the two is a 
surplus gain to the borrower. This discrepancy may lead to an increased 
willingness-to-pay, lowering the elasticity of demand in transparent markets 
(Granados et al. 2003a). 
Another point pertinent to a discussion of transparency is that not all market 
players prefer transparency. Some sellers prefer not to join an electronic 
marketplace with high price transparency since high price transparency increases 
competition, lowers prices, and decreases profit margins. This has further 
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ramifications with consumers, who are less likely to participate in an electronic 
marketplace where fewer sellers are involved (Soh et al. 2006). For example, 
consider an airfare comparison website like Expedia.com. Airlines may be 
unwilling to join due to the reasons stated above. Consumers, in turn, will not 
want to visit a website that only compares airfares for a limited amount of 
airlines. Microfinance institutions may elect not to participate in a transparency-
promoting website or database if they fear that their financial and loan portfolio 
data are unfavorable or if they make themselves a target for competition. 
Based on this discussion, Transparency theory would suggest that 
intermediaries in the microfinance industry should exist to promote efficiency, 
healthy competition, and better interest rates. However, without intermediation 
and regulation, these activities fail to exist (Waterfield 2008). When viewing the 
interest rates charged by different MFIs in geographic regions, it can be 
determined that some MFIs charge interest rates far greater than a normal range. 
If regulated, customers have greater access to loans at repayable rates. Interest 
rates vary significantly relative to loan size, making sharing this information in a 
transparent manner difficult. Non-transparent pricing is common among MFIs and 
creates a market imperfection, generating potential for high profits for MFIs. 
2.3. Research Method 
I employ exploratory research methods, including business mini-cases, to 
determine the structures in traditional, ICT-enabled, and future predicted ICT-
enabled microfinance market intermediation. This analysis views the changing 
industry from the perspectives of several players in the microfinance industry. 
17 
Bockstedt et al. (2006) used a similar approach by analyzing the impacts of ICT 
on the music industry and market structure. They compared the traditional market 
structure with an ICT-enabled market structure. However, I add to my analysis a 
future-predicted model. This additional model appears appropriate in an emerging 
area since the microfinance industry is further from maturity than the music 
industry. 
For the traditional and ICT-enabled structures, I utilize observations of the 
market in its past and current forms. For the future predictive model, I rely on an 
industry risk perceptions report (CSFI 2011). I make an assumption that players in 
the MFI industry will adapt to address these risks and that those adaptations will 
cause changes in intermediation structure. 
2.4. Traditional Microfinance Market Structure 
I discuss in this section what intermediation looked like in the microfinance 
industry prior to advancements in ICT. The traditional microfinance market 
structure in Figure 1 depicts a subset of the microfinance industry microstructure 
proposed in Kauffman and Riggins (2012). Relationships between market players 
are represented by arrows, which denote both the type of good transmitted (funds 
or information) and the direction of the relationship. For example, the double-
sided “loan funds” arrow between MFIs and borrowers shows that loan funds 
travel from the MFI to borrowers and vice versa. 
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Figure 1  Traditional Microfinance Market Structure 
 
Table 1 notes which of Spulber’s (1996) four intermediary roles are satisfied 
by each of the two traditional microfinance industry intermediaries. Not every 
market player is an intermediary. In the traditional structure, only two players 
function as intermediaries, MFIs and relief organizations. MFIs administer 
financial services to clients and relief organizations provide support, training, and 
funds to MFIs with donations received from donors. MFIs and relief organizations 
are intermediaries by definition since they fulfill one or more roles of 
intermediaries. Visually, these are the market players that have arrows going both 
into and out of them and reside between two market players. Donors, for example, 
do not qualify as an intermediary, since they do not fulfill any of the roles, and 
they do not reside between two market players with respect to funds or 
information. 
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Table 1 Traditional Microfinance Intermediary Roles 
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2.4.1. Microfinance Institutions (MFIs) 
Muhammad Yunus is considered the father of microfinance for his ground-
breaking Grameen Bank founded in 1983 in Bangladesh. Yunus was awarded the 
Nobel Peace Prize in 2006 and more recently the Presidential Medal of Freedom 
in 2009 for his pioneering efforts in global poverty reduction. His business idea 
gives poor entrepreneurs an alternative to high-interest local moneylenders. The 
bank employs 23,000 staff at 2,500 branches and services 8 million borrowers. 
The Bank is self-sufficient and accepted no donations since 1998. It generated 
profits in all but 3 of its 30 years as an institution (Yunus 2007a). This model 
continues at Grameen and has since been adopted by NGOs in several other 
developing countries worldwide. On the other hand, the traditional microfinance 
model consists of an MFI business (NGO, bank, credit union, rural bank, or non-
bank financial institution) acquiring capital stock from investors or donors. 
Traditionally, the MFIs were responsible for administration, enforcement, 
providing borrower support, and making loan funding decisions from their pools 
of loan applicants. 
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MFIs perform all four intermediary roles. For example, they set interest rates 
for loan products by gathering supply and demand information as well as 
comparing competitors’ rates. They adjust these rates throughout the course of 
operating their business to clear the market. Since they provide liquidity and 
immediacy, they hold cash on hand ready to lend to potential borrowers. MFIs 
that receive donations from donors fulfill the matching and searching 
intermediary role by lending to individuals that align with the goals of the MFI. 
These goals were likely the reason that the donor chose to give to a particular 
MFI. Finally, MFIs monitor the repayment of loans to their borrowers and 
investments made by investors. They guarantee repayment to the best of their 
ability given market risks. 
2.4.2. Relief Organizations 
Many donations and investments to the microfinance industry prior to ICT 
occurred through relief organizations. Relief organizations were seen as 
intermediaries since many donors did not have knowledge of global MFIs or a 
means of transmitting funds directly to MFIs. Relief organizations like The Bill & 
Melinda Gates Foundation4, CARE International5, Oxfam6, UNCDF7, UNICEF8, 
UNESCO9, and UNIFEM10 possess knowledge of and relationships with global 
MFIs. These relief organizations do not conduct microfinance transactions 
                                                 
4www.gatesfoundation.org 
5www.thecarefoundation.org 
6www.oxfam.org 
7www.uncdf.org 
8www.unicef.org 
9www.unesco.org 
10www.unwomen-usnc.org 
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directly with borrowers, but instead support networks of MFIs worldwide by 
providing funding, training, and other resources. For example, the UK-based 
relief organization, Oxfam, recently partnered with an MFI, Micro Finance 
Fund,in Russia and provided them with funds for loans and training for young 
Russian entrepreneurs11. 
Relief organizations fulfill the matching and searching intermediary role by 
helping donors find MFIs that meet their criteria for donations and by helping 
MFIs locate donors to increase their capital stock. This practice results in a 
mutually beneficial relationship for both donors and MFIs, which are the market 
players that reside on either side of relief organizations. 
2.4.3. Donors and Investors 
Donors donate funds to MFIs so that MFIs will be able to alleviate poverty 
through their financial services or cover their operational expenses. Investors 
invest funds in MFIs with the expectation of earning a profit from a share of the 
MFI’s interest revenue. Prior to ICTs, donors and investors relied on the MFIs 
themselves or relief organizations to determine the extent of an MFI’s financial 
performance (of interest to investors and donors) and social performance (of 
interest to donors). Donors vary in their motivations for charitable giving. An 
extensive literature review of over 500 published articles on philanthropic 
motivation revealed eight different mechanisms that drive charitable giving 
(Bekkers and Wiepking 2010). These motivations consist of (1) awareness of 
                                                 
11http://www.oxfam.org/en/development/russian-federation/supporting-young-entrepreneurs-
microfinance-training 
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need, (2) solicitation and the method people are asked to give, (3) costs and 
benefits as they relate to the impact of giving, (4) altruism and a general interest 
in a cause, (5) reputation enhancement, (6) psychological benefits related to a 
“warm glow,” (7) the desire to see one’s values realized, and (8) efficacy and the 
view that one’s contributions truly matter. 
2.4.4. Borrowers 
The final market participants in the traditional market structure are the borrowers. 
Although I use the term “borrowers,” this group could also be the end-users of 
other financial products such as savings accounts or insurance. In the traditional 
market structure, borrowers have limited knowledge about the market and 
competition since they only interface with MFIs. They accept loan disbursements 
and make loan payments to MFIs and in some instances receive training or other 
services provided to them by MFIs. 
2.5. ICT-Enabled Microfinance Market Structure 
The microfinance industry has experienced a steady adoption of ICT since its 
inception in 1983, albeit at a rate lower than other industries (see Chapter 3). 
These ICTs have created new opportunities for some market players while 
diminishing the need for others. I discuss these changes in the subsections that 
follow. Figure 2 reveals the microfinance market structure in the presence of ICT. 
I use individual rectangles within the MFI intermediary box to depict the 
individual MFIs that make up this intermediary in order to compare it with the 
future predicted structure. Since banking correspondents and mobile service 
providers share the same roles as intermediaries for funds and information 
23 
between borrowers and MFIs, I depict those as a single split intermediary in my 
diagram. A legend for the ICT-enabled changes is shown below the figure. 
Figure 2  ICT-Enabled Microfinance Market Structure 
 
This market structure lists new intermediaries and each plays a different role. 
Table 2 notes which of Spulber’s (1996) four intermediary roles are satisfied by 
each new entrant. 
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Table 2 ICT-Enabled Intermediary Roles 
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2.5.1. Lenders 
The entry of P2P social microlenders discussed in the following section creates a 
new group of individual lenders. It also shifts the role of some market players 
from being donors to being lenders. The difference is that donors give to a cause 
or an organization that will in turn make loans to a poor population. Loan decision 
rights remain with the MFI. P2P social microlenders allow individuals to play a 
direct role as lender to individual loans (or portions of individual loans). Lenders 
make capital funding decisions and accept the risks (and in some cases the 
benefits) of default and interest earnings. Investors, on the other hand, invest 
money and expect interest or a financial return in the future. 
2.5.2. P2P Social Microlenders 
In 2005, Matt Flannery and Jessica Jackley suggested a new P2P approach to 
social microlending. Their idea evolved into Kiva12, an organization that connects 
Western lenders with entrepreneurial borrowers in developing countries. Kiva 
posts loan-funding requests from MFIs on their website for lenders to browse. 
                                                 
12http://www.kiva.org 
25 
Lenders can invest any amount in $25 increments up to the remaining amount of 
the loan to be funded. Once the loan is fully funded, Kiva transfers the funds to 
the MFI who in turn loans the funds to borrowers. The MFI administers the loan 
and enforces loan repayment. As the loan is repaid, principal funds are transferred 
back to Kiva and eventually back to the lender. The MFI retains the interest 
earned on the loan. This P2P approach to microfinance poses a significant change 
the market structure. New market players, namely lenders, are created. Prior to 
technologies like the Internet and electronic funds transfer (EFT), the notion of a 
single loan administered to an entrepreneur in a developing country funded by 
dozens of western borrowers would have only been possible with a significant 
paper trail and administrative effort. Without ICTs, transaction costs would be too 
high to sustain this business model. Investors and donors make general funds 
available to MFIs, but the MFIs retain loan funding decision-making rights. 
There are several other, albeit smaller, organizations with business models 
similar to Kiva, including GlobalGiving13, Wokai14, MicroPlace15, Zidisha16 and 
MyC417. I refer to these players as P2P social microlenders because they are an 
intermediary for loan funds and thus a microlender, even though they lack a direct 
relationship with end-user borrowers. ICT enables these new market 
intermediaries because the model would be extremely difficult without user-
facing interfaces to MFIs and lenders built on Internet platforms. Postal mail 
                                                 
13http://www.globalgiving.org 
14http://en.wokai.org 
15http://microplace.org 
16http://www.zidisha.org 
17http://www.myc4.com 
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would be too risky and slow to process all the loan funding transactions and 
repayments while coordination with checks would be difficult to implement and 
costly. Kiva uses PayPal, an industry standard for transmitting money over the 
Internet. 
Similar to MFIs, P2P social microlenders fulfill all four of Spulber’s (1996) 
intermediary roles. Primarily, they provide liquidity and immediacy to MFIs by 
providing capital stock for funding. They also provide matching and searching 
services to lenders interested in making a loan to individuals that meet their 
criteria for lending. One particular Kiva lender prefers group loans with less than 
12 months of repayment made by MFIs that offer training and insurance18. Web 
platforms like Kiva make it easy for lenders to filter search results to find lenders 
that meet specific criteria such as this. Finally, P2P social microlenders monitor 
MFIs by ranking them according to financial and social performance. 
2.5.3. Transparency Promoters 
Technologies also enable a new way for investors and donors to make investment 
decisions. Microfinance industry transparency promoters like MixMarket19 and 
MFTransparency20 offer a means of consolidating financial and loan portfolio 
information on MFIs, funders, service providers, and networks. Investors and 
donors can use this information to decide which organizations will receive their 
investments and donations. Microfinance industry transparency promoters accept 
                                                 
18http://www.kivafriends.org/index.php/topic,5331.msg79110.html#msg79110 
19http://www.themix.org 
20http://www.mftransparency.org 
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donations, but only to advance their cause of transparency promotion, not to fund 
MFIs. 
Donors and investors can make funding transactions independent of the 
industry transparency promoters and thus transact directly with MFIs. Thus, the 
need for relief organizations diminishes with ICT, and they are shown as 
disintermediated in my ICT-enabled market structure. I also witness this change 
in the industry by observing many relief organizations that have established their 
own MFIs instead of continuing to fund others. Relief organizations founded three 
of the largest MFIs in Cambodia: World Vision established VisionFund in 
Cambodia and Indonesia, World Relief established Kredit Microfinance, and Save 
the Children established Hattha Kaksekar Limited (HKL). Today, relief 
organizations are being forced to shift into a new intermediary role or risk 
disintermediation, which is due to ICT enabling donors to have communication 
channels and information directly with MFIs. 
ICT enables transparency promoters to exist with platforms like the Internet in 
order to provide information to interested parties. Database-driven MIS systems 
and the use of e-mail allow MFIs to generate applicable reports and share them 
with the transparency promoter. 
Transparency promoters fulfill matching and searching intermediary roles in 
the microfinance market while helping investors and donors locate MFIs that 
meet their criteria by allowing users to filter lists of MFIs. Similar to a P2P social 
microlender, they monitor MFIs by ranking MFIs transparency with a diamond 
rating and by making social performance reports publicly available for download. 
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2.5.4. Banking Correspondents 
Banking correspondents are commercial entities like post offices, general stores, 
or Internet cafes that partner with a microfinance institution to administer loans to 
and collect payments from borrowers (Kauffman and Riggins 2012). Banking 
correspondents allow MFIs to expand their geographic outreach to remote villages 
without having to open branches. Since borrowers have less distance to travel to 
conduct banking transactions, banking correspondents benefit MFI customers. 
The banking correspondent already has an established place of business. Banking 
correspondents can supplement their primary source of revenue by receiving a fee 
from each transaction they process. As long as the banking correspondent is 
connected to a central MFI via phone or the Internet, MFIs require infrequent 
visits to banking correspondents to collect aggregated payments. The fees that 
MFIs pay to banking correspondents are lower than the costs of establishing a 
local branch with a facility, infrastructure, and staff. Safety is also improved since 
currency travels a lesser distance by both borrowers and MFIs. 
Brazil has been an exemplary country for its adoption of correspondent 
banking. Brazil had 38,000 recognized banking correspondents in 2004 and over 
90,000 in 2005 (Kumar 2006). Caixa Economica, an MFI in Brazil, works with a 
banking correspondent location that handles over 8,000 transactions per month. 
ICT enables the correspondent banking model since it allows MFIs to coordinate 
with their correspondents in real-time and at a low cost, providing that certain 
technologies are in place. These technologies might include point-of-sale (POS) 
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devices, pin pads, teller machines, computer terminals, and an Internet 
connection. 
Banking correspondents fulfill the liquidity and immediacy intermediary role 
since they can obtain loan funds to borrowers more quickly and receive loan 
payments from borrowers faster than if the borrower transacted with the MFI 
directly at their branch or headquarter office location. They also fulfill the 
monitoring role by tracking loan payment transaction history. 
2.5.5. Mobile Service Provider 
Another type of technology being used by MFIs are mobile payments. Mobile 
payments enable borrowers to receive loan disbursements and make loan 
payments using their mobile devices. There were 5.9 billion mobile subscribers at 
the end of 2011, which equates to servicing 87 percent of the world’s 
population21,22. Mobile service coverage areas have grown accordingly as have 
data speeds and 3g service areas. Mobile phones provide an affordable way for 
the poor to share some of the same connectivity benefits as the wealthy. Mobile 
phone users outnumber banked people in most developing countries (Porteous 
2006). M-pesa is the name given to the mobile payment capability of Safaricom, 
an African mobile service provider23. Several African MFIs use M-pesa to 
disburse loan funds to borrowers and accept loan payments from borrowers. 
This particular technology enables MFIs to lend to individuals that are too 
geographically distant to coordinate with profitably. It also saves borrowers the 
                                                 
21http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/facts/2011/material/ICTFactsFigures2011.pdf 
22
 This statistic is not adjusted for individuals who possess multiple mobile phones, which is 
common in the developed world and in Asian countries. 
23http://www.safaricom.co.ke/index.php?id=250 
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costs of travelling to an MFI branch to conduct a transaction or check a balance 
(Donner and Tellez 2008). Since MFIs do not provide mobile services or lease 
phone traffic on cell towers, they rely on mobile service providers to fill this gap. 
Most mobile service providers already have capabilities for fund transfer, so the 
option cost (Dos Santos 1991) of coordination with MFIs is minimal. Mobile 
service providers collect a transaction fee from the sender or receiver of 
payments. Vodaphone, Safaricom, and Zantel constitute some of the larger mobile 
service providers working with MFIs to process transactions. Adoption has been 
more rapid in East Asia, Africa, and the Philippines. 
FrontlineSMS (formerly CreditSMS) has developed free and open source 
tracking software for use by MFIs. They claim that an MFI using their software 
can start conducting business with a small capital investment: 
“The hardware necessary to run [FrontlineSMS] includes a laptop computer, 
one cell phone for every microloan officer and recipient, and one solar panel for 
each cell phone. With low-energy LINUX-based netbooks available for less than 
US$400.00, used cell phones available for US$10.00, and reliable solar panels 
available for as little as US$6.50, it is feasible for a small MFI to buy all the 
inputs necessary to become self-sufficient for approximately US$1,000.00.”24 
Mobile service providers fulfill two intermediary roles. First, they provide 
liquidity and immediacy to borrowers and MFIs by allowing transactions to occur 
immediately without lags due to travel and transaction processing times. Second, 
they monitor loan payments by providing a transaction history that is 
                                                 
24http://arc.peacecorpsconnect.org/view/279 
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automatically linked to a database without the need for manual entry required in 
traditional loan disbursements and payments. 
2.6. Future Predicted ICT-Enabled Microfinance Market Structure 
Microfinance has experienced incredible growth over the past decade. However, 
alongside the benefits of a growing industry to address the needs of the poor 
comes a multitude of risks. Microfinance Banana Skins reports that this high rate 
of growth is the cause of industry difficulties with respect to their clientele, 
management, back office, resource management, and mission (CSFI 2011). 
Washington, DC-based CGAP (Consultative Group to Assist the Poor) 
partnered with London-based CSFI (Centre for the Study of Financial Innovation) 
and has administered the Microfinance Banana Skins survey annually since 2008. 
Survey respondents include practitioners, investors, regulators, and deposit-takers 
in the microfinance industry. The breakdown of respondents is shown in Figure 3. 
Figure 3  Microfinance Banana Skins Respondents (source: CSFI 2011) 
 
Questions asked in the survey aimed to rank the severity of the greatest 
perceived risks (banana peels/skins) threatening the microfinance industry in the 
next 2-3 years. Banana peels have often been portrayed in cartoons and comedy as 
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an item that will cause an individual to slip and fall, thus the analogy with a risk. 
The annual report shares the top 24 banana skins and top 24 fastest rising banana 
skins (rise in rank position as compared with two years prior) that are replicated in 
Table 3. The 2011 survey had over 500 respondents from 86 countries. The 
Banana Skins survey focuses on large MFIs with more than $5M in assets. 
Table 3  Perceived Risks to the Microfinance Industry – Banana Skins 
Report Summary 2011 
Biggest risks Fastest Risers 
1. Credit risk 
2. Reputation 
3. Competition 
4. Corporate governance 
5. Political interference 
6. Inappropriate regulation 
7. Management quality 
8. Staffing 
9. Mission drift 
10. Unrealizable expectations 
11. Managing technology 
12. Profitability 
13. Back office 
14. Transparency 
15. Strategy 
16. Liquidity 
17. Macro-economic trends 
18. Fraud 
19. Product development 
20. Ownership 
21. Interest rates 
22. Too much funding 
23. Too little funding 
24. Foreign exchange 
1. Competition 
2. Credit risk 
3. Reputation 
4. Political interference 
5. Mission drift 
6. Strategy 
7. Staffing 
8. Unrealizable expectations 
9. Profitability 
10. Inappropriate regulation 
11. Corporate governance 
12. Management quality 
13. Ownership 
14. Liquidity 
15. Product development 
16. Macro-economic trends 
17. Managing technology 
18. Interest rates 
19. Fraud 
20. Transparency 
21. Back office 
22. Too much funding 
23. Too little funding 
24. Foreign exchange 
Source: (CSFI 2011) 
 
The research in this section uses the Microfinance Banana Skins report to 
frame my discussion and inform my predictions for ICT-enabled intermediation in 
the near future. I assume the players in the microfinance industry have a vested 
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interest in addressing their risks and changes to the intermediation structure is 
likely to be a part of risk mitigation. Many banana skins mentioned in the report 
can be mitigated with intermediation that is not enabled or enhanced by ICT. 
While these changes are of interest to the industry, the focus of this paper is on 
ICT-enabled intermediation and the discussion will be limited to those changes. 
My process to make predictions of future market structure changes was as 
follows. In my reading of the report, I recognized areas for new intermediary 
entrants, shifts in the roles of intermediaries, and for disintermediation. ICT plays 
a role with respect to addressing these problems. The report states, “Poor 
management information systems lead to ill-informed decisions and contribute to 
another set of risks; poor accountability and transparency” (CSFI 2011, p. 34). 
The industry is responding with technological advances. A respondent in 
Tanzania stated that MFIs “are moving more and more into acquiring affordable 
advanced technologies and building internal capacities to handle back office 
operations” (CSFI 2011, p. 34). I discuss seven predictions in the subsections 
below and show how they lead to my predicted future market intermediation 
structure. I narrowed down the list of 24 banana skins to 13 based on the 
relevance and applicability they exhibited with my predicted intermediary 
changes. Table 4 summarizes my predictions and which banana skins inform my 
predictions. Checkmarks in each cell show where a risk informed a prediction. 
For example, a checkmark in the top-left cell reveals that the Credit Risk banana 
skin informs my prediction of new Credit Rating Organization entrants. The lack 
of a checkmark in the bottom-right cell reveals that the Fraud banana skin fails to 
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inform my prediction that the MFIs will merge and conglomerate. The basis for 
these and other predictions are included in each of the following subsections. 
Table 4  MFI Banana Skins and Intermediation Prediction Matrix 
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Fraud        
 
A market structure diagram with my future predicted microfinance market 
structure is shown in Figure 4. In this model, several market players act as MFIs 
or provide services to MFIs that are not intermediaries to other players, so they 
are shown in the MFI box. I depict the shift from many, smaller MFIs to fewer, 
larger MFIs by the quantity and size of the MFI boxes. Finally, the breakdown of 
banking correspondents to mobile service providers is depicted by the size of the 
box dedicated to each intermediary. They both play similar roles, serving as 
intermediaries with funds and information between MFIs and borrowers. My 
predictions include a greater role for mobile service providers than banking 
correspondents; hence, less space is dedicated to the latter. 
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Figure 4  Future Predicted ICT-Enabled Microfinance Market Structure 
 
The future predicted market structure describes three new intermediaries and 
each of these plays different intermediation roles. Table 5 notes which of 
Spulber’s (1996) four intermediary roles are satisfied by each new entrant. 
Table 5  Future Predicted ICT-Enabled Intermediary Roles 
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2.6.1. Credit Rating Organizations 
Prediction: Countries will introduce new credit rating systems or extend current 
credit rating systems to microfinance end-users and providers. 
Risks. Credit risk is one specific type of risk informing this prediction. 75% 
of countries responding to the Banana Skins survey mentioned credit risk in their 
anecdotal responses (CSFI 2011). Credit risk was mentioned in respondent text 
responses more than any other risk. The risk is widespread and evident in all 
global regions. In the early years of microfinance, portfolio risk was largely due 
to macro level economic impacts. Developing economies are more prone to spikes 
and shocks than their developed counterparts. If the Honduran economy suffers a 
sharp downturn, citizens will delay purchasing new clothing for their families; 
therefore, a seamstress in Honduras is at risk for defaulting on her loan. Since 
developing economies are typically more agrarian than developed economies, 
weather patterns often lead to loan defaults for failed crops. Concerns over the 
macro economy and foreign exchange are low and declining (CSFI 2011), but due 
to increased competition, more borrowers that risk loan default due to 
overindebtedness. Multiple borrowing occurs when borrowers borrow from many 
lenders at once or acquire a loan from a second MFI to repay the loan from the 
first MFI. A managing director of a Columbian MFI reported that the number of 
MFIs servicing one customer increased from 1.5 to 4 in recent years and that 75% 
of their MFIs borrowers were also borrowing from other institutions. The risk is 
that MFIs across the globe are forced to write off these loans and suffer heavy 
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losses. Credit rating experiments in South America reveal that credit scoring can 
improve the accuracy of risk judgments while cutting costs (Schreiner 2000, 
1999a, 1999b). 
Many developing countries do not have formalized laws requiring citizens to 
repay personal loans. A respondent from Cote d’Ivoire said, “apart from calling in 
the bailiffs, there is no law that obliges borrowers to repay their loans” (CSFI 
2011, p. 28). A banking regulator in Rwanda described their microborrowers as 
developing a “culture of non-repayment” (CSFI 2011, p. 22). Another survey 
respondent said the industry is experiencing “increase delinquencies, program 
deterioration, and damage to clients’ well-being” (CSFI 2011, p. 21). A 
nationalized online credit rating system will assist an MFI determine if a client is 
at risk of over indebtedness. I expect to see this first adopted at the economy or 
country-level, but considering economies of scale and the ability for ICT to 
reduce the costs of coordination over a distance, this rating system could expand 
to the global-level. 
Another risk informing this prediction is a declining reputation due to the 
issues previously mentioned. If outsiders know that lending decisions are vetted 
with a credit rating system, MFIs will experience greater confidence by outsiders 
and an improved reputation. Xavier Reille, a CGAP manager in France, declared, 
“Previously, microcredit was seen as a good thing and money lending as a bad 
thing. With the increased focus on short term profit in several markets, the lines 
are blurring and the reputation of the sector is tarnished. The onus is on MFIs to 
show that they are following responsible practices” (CSFI 2011, p. 23). 
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Competition is yet another banana skin informing my prediction. In the early 
stages of microfinance, investors saw competition having a positive impact on the 
industry, viewing it as improving innovation and efficiency. Increased 
competition has several negative ramifications including (1) loan sharking 
behavior, (2) poaching of clients and staff, (3) deceptive advertising, (4) loan 
officers incentivized to acquire new clients regardless if the borrower needs the 
loan or not, (5) loans made for personal consumption instead of business growth, 
and (6) lending to customers that are urban and less poor. Loan officers often 
neglect to perform time-consuming background checks on clients for fear of 
losing commission. 
Other risks leading to credit rating system adoption include inappropriate 
regulation, since regulators will know which MFIs to regulate more heavily 
depending on the credit scores of their loan portfolios. This will save the good 
MFIs from time and difficulties dealing with unnecessary regulation. 
Transparency promoters can make the average credit ratings for MFIs publicly 
available and reveal which MFIs are most guilty of multiple lending. The risk of 
fraud will encourage adoption of a credit rating system since it will be more 
difficult for credit officers to manufacture clients if the MFI runs credit checks on 
each borrower. Finally, strategy risks are mitigated since additional adequate 
knowledge about customers will assist MFIs in developing their strategy, 
especially if credit scores can be aggregated by village or region. 
Credit rating organizations fulfill two of Spulber’s (1996) intermediary roles. 
First, they provide matching and searching services to MFIs and help them 
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analyze the creditworthiness of potential borrowers without the need for personal 
visits and interviews. Second, monitoring of borrowers improves with credit 
rating organizations, since MFIs report on the repayment of loans at the end of the 
loan term. In past market structures, loan repayment monitoring was limited to the 
databases and knowledge of individual MFIs. With the advent and prediction of 
more credit rating organizations, this data can be stored and accessed in aggregate 
across several lending organizations. 
Prediction explanation. Based on the risks facing the microfinance industry, 
I expect more countries to roll out credit rating systems of their own or extend 
current credit rating systems to microfinance customers and providers. This 
prediction is also held by Schreiner (2000, 2002).Lending institutions in 
developed countries benefit from databases that assess credit worthiness of 
individuals with a score or a grade. In the United States, the most commonly used 
score is the FICO score system which ranges from 850 (best) to 350 (worst) and 
takes into account payment history, credit utilization, length of credit history, 
types of credit used, and credit inquiries. An American bank’s request for a credit 
report of a potential borrower is immediate, easy, and low cost. Microfinance 
institutions on the other hand have to administer their own research to determine 
the creditworthiness of the potential borrowers including assessments of 
collateral, interviewing neighbors, shopkeepers, educators, and even liquor 
establishments within the borrowers’ communities. This process is time 
consuming, arduous, and more subjective than its process counterpart in 
developed countries. 
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Ecuador is the latest developing nation to implement a centralized risk 
database, Central de Riesgos del Ecuador. It is governed by the superintendencia 
de bancos (superintendent of banks) in the administrative unit of the Ecuadorian 
government. Access is granted to loan officers in the microfinance and 
commercial banking sectors, large business assessors, and property managers. The 
database already contains a majority of Ecuador’s population and stores name, 
address, spouse, phone numbers, occupations, and national ID numbers, among 
other fields. Credit scores are on a letter grading system from A+ (best) down to E 
(worst). 
2.6.2. Transparency Promoters Emphasizing Social Performance 
Prediction: Transparency promoters will shift toward presenting more MFI social 
performance information. 
Risks. Reputation risk informs this prediction because when information is 
presented publicly on an Internet platform, MFIs will be incentivized to protect 
their reputations. Similarly, dangers arise in competition because it can cause 
MFIs to take greater risks. Competition drives MFIs to explore untapped market 
segments, which is beneficial because it improves outreach. On the other hand, 
competition can be detrimental since little is known about these new market 
segments. Competition often “pushes MFIs to focus on parts of the market that 
are already well served and ignore those that are not, usually the neediest and 
those out in the country” (CSFI 2011, p. 24). A Columbian respondent stated, 
“MFIs concentrate on areas with good economic performance with aggressive 
credit offers” (CSFI 2011, p. 24). 
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Another risk informing this prediction is mission drift. MFIs may start out 
with intentions of social performance, but may drift toward serving individuals 
who are not among the neediest if enticed by financial incentives. In the presence 
of transparency promoters that provide more social performance data, 
disincentives arise for mission drift. Another form of mission drift is shifting 
lending from small businesses to general lending for consumption purposes which 
can harm the industry’s reputation. Daniel Schriber, director of investment 
analysis at Symbiotics in Switzerland, suggested that microfinance lending for 
consumption is “a huge reputational risk for the whole industry” (CSFI 2011, p. 
23).The industry suffers from bandwagon effects and promotes funder-
fashionable loans such as housing loans, education loans, green loans, sustainable 
loans, or clean water loans, sometimes at the expense of their overarching social 
mission. 
“More and more transparency is expected with the increasing attention of the 
international media” (CSFI 2011, p. 34). A respondent from the Netherlands 
declared that “the microfinance industry will increasingly have to prove the effect 
of its activities. More transparency will be needed towards MFI clients, investors, 
and the outside world (about the image of exploiting people)” (CSFI 2011, p. 
35).Investors choose to invest in the microfinance industry for profit and their 
decisions may relegate social performance to the wayside. 
Fraud risk can decrease with a role shift by transparency promoters. If 
transparency promoters employ a rigorous audit procedure for social performance, 
MFIs will be disincentivized for fraud and have more opportunities to be 
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uncovered. Finally, since the risks of liquidity and funding continue to decline for 
MFIs, social performance will be more financially feasible for MFIs and of more 
concern to donors and investors whose financial needs are already satisfied. 
Prediction explanation. Based on this discussion, I predict that ICT-enabled 
transparency promoters will shift to presenting more social performance 
information on MFIs. Transparency promoters like MFTransparency and 
MixMarket present ample financial and loan portfolio data of MFIs which they 
make publicly available to interested parties. These well-established organizations 
present information on thousands of MFIs worldwide. They harness Internet 
technologies as their primary method of communication to interested parties and 
liaise with reporting MFIs via e-mail and internal reporting tools. The industry 
relies on these organizations because “regulators worry that inadequate disclosure 
could erode the confidence of investors and customers” (CSFI 2011, p. 11).In 
their current state, they present very little data on social performance. The 
collected fields are often optional, self-reported, and difficult to vet. 
2.6.3. Operations Outsourcing Organizations 
Prediction: MFIs will outsource office tasks and logistics previously 
accomplished in-house. 
Risks. With increasing industry competition, interest rates decline and the 
economy is becoming more demand-driven. Borrowers benefit since lower 
interest rates result in increased consumer surplus, which they can use to educate 
their children, feed their families, and invest in other entrepreneurial ventures. For 
MFIs, however, competition challenges their ability to earn a profit with declining 
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interest rates. Competition also drives MFIs to poach informed staff from other 
MFIs since skilled labor is limited in developing countries where MFIs operate 
(CSFI 2011). 
Staff members are often ill-equipped with education and knowledge to make 
informed decisions at their respective MFIs. Small shops are especially at risk for 
efficiency loss due to staff quality. Respondents mentioned staff capability 
frequently in their responses, referring to a lack of talent and competent 
manpower. Alex Pollock, director of microfinance at the United Nations Relief 
and Works Agency (UNRWA) said, “MFIs must recognize that at some point 
their operations will reach an optimal level, at which point they will need to 
concentrate more clearly on maintaining their edge through customer service and 
improvement in their business processes that they may have neglected because of 
openness in the market” (CSFI 2011, p. 36). 
Internal operations technologies at MFIs are weak and the microfinance 
industry cannot afford technologies that enable efficient transaction processing. 
Larger organizations, conversely, have access to technologies and software that 
allow for efficient processing of large amounts of transactions. With respect to 
internal systems, an Indian respondent mentioned, “a significant ramp up is 
required”(CSFI 2011, p. 32). Staff lack IT skills; therefore, many respondents 
state that MFIs quickly outgrow their back office systems. Large organizations 
benefit from economies of scale in transactions processing that small 
organizations lack (Lacity and Hirschheim 1995). For example, the costs for a 
small business to increase their payroll processing from 10 paychecks to 20 
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paychecks are greater than the costs of a large organization to increase their 
payroll processing from 30,000 paychecks to 30,010 paychecks. Payroll 
processing at the large organization is more likely to be automated with lower 
marginal costs of adding one additional staff member on payroll. Large MFIs 
experience similar economies of scale benefits over their smaller counterparts. 
Operations outsourcers pool MFIs’ transaction processing tasks and allow small 
MFIs to experience similar economies of scale benefits. 
An increasing credit risk also informs this prediction. Since it is difficult to 
enforce repayment, MFIs could employ collection agents to locate delinquent 
borrowers with more efficiency than the MFI’s own loan officers. MFI Back 
office employees often lack appropriate skills. Respondents to the Banana Skins 
survey cited stories of poorly managed MFIs losing track of their borrowers and 
the repayment status of their loans. 
With respect to mission drift, many MFIs find their core competencies not in 
their operations but in their ability to communicate with borrowers and meet their 
needs. MFIs that outsource their operations can focus their efforts and energies on 
their mission and clients. Finally, respondents shared that MFIs can prevent fraud 
by tightening internal controls, centralizing staff records, and installing stronger 
systems. 
Prediction explanation. I expect to see the industry respond to these risks by 
outsourcing many of their operations tasks including background checks, 
transaction processing, payment collection, and fund disbursement. Outsourcing 
organizations could benefit from economies of scale, access to technologies that 
45 
would be prohibitively expensive to a small MFI, and staffed with experts in their 
respective area. Since few MFIs possess the financial resources to invest in these 
areas, operations outsourcing organizations will enter the industry to fill that gap. 
The efficiency gains from outsourcing would enable MFIs to succeed in an 
industry marked by growing competition. Although outsourcing typically 
conjures up images of wealthy Western organizations, like Dell Computer setting 
up call centers in a developing nation such as India, outsourcing is not uncommon 
among development organizations as well. The World Bank utilizes an 
accounting office in Chennai, India that handles all back-office processing for its 
worldwide operations. 
Technologies like the Internet, Voice Over Internet Protocol (VOIP), Virtual 
Private Networks (VPNs), remote desktop, and mobile phones enable this 
outsourcing to take place since they all decrease transaction costs. As more MFIs 
computerize their operations and set up client/server environments, the location of 
the person entering data into their computer system is irrelevant. While most 
organizations in the developed world outsource operations for lower labor costs, 
microfinance institutions will outsource due to efficiency gains and staff 
productivity. 
In cases where managing technology is the impetus for operations 
outsourcing, an alternative arises for MFIs to use software-as-a-service (SAAS) 
and business-process-as-a-service (BPAAS). SAAS is receiving increased 
attention among MFIs (Ashta 2011). With SAAS, no need develops for MFIs to 
make large capital investments in hardware and software since MIS software and 
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its respective databases are hosted online and accessed by MFI staff with Internet-
enabled clients. This reduces an MFI’s need for skilled IT staff since the hosting 
company handles maintenance, backups, security, and upgrades. 
2.6.4. Remote MFI Management 
Prediction: MFIs and their branches will be managed remotely. 
Risks. The main risk informing this prediction is management quality. 
Managers in developing countries are typically under-educated. A US-based 
microfinance analyst stated: “Finding the right people to promote the growth and 
sustainability of an MFI is very difficult. From consultants to managers, MFIs 
have a very small source to choose from” (CSFI 2011, p. 30). A survey 
respondent from Egypt concurs: “badly managed MFIs will feel more challenged, 
and mergers might be more and more common in the market” (CSFI 2011, p. 35). 
Risks of mission drift and strategy loss become mitigated with remote MFI 
management. A successful strategy “will depend on quality management, which is 
not abundantly available” according to an MFI director in East Africa (CSFI 
2011, p. 35). Managers spread their vision to employees at remote locations in a 
rich form and at lower costs. ICT also mitigates agency costs (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976) dealing with MFI management. An agent at a branch will not act 
in the best interest of the principal at headquarters, but since technologies allow 
the manager to manage remotely, these costs subside. 
Prediction explanation. Similar to challenges with staff at MFIs that process 
day-to-day transactions, challenges arise with inadequate MFI management. Julie 
Abrams, a consultant with Microfinance Analytics, said: “MFIs will have to be 
47 
impeccably run, laser-focused and strategically sound to thrive. There will be no 
room for sloth or sloppiness in operations, governance, risk management, and 
customer focus; being proactive in all of these will be key” (CSFI 2011, p. 35). 
Based on these risks, I predict that MFIs will utilize technologies that allow 
for remote management of organizations or branches. Remote management allows 
manager involvement in many organizations, or many branches of a single 
organization without physical presence at each branch. A skilled manager affects 
change with a broader scope than an under-educated manager at one MFI. Cost 
savings also take place with this arrangement. Many of the same technologies 
listed in the previous subsection that enable operations outsourcing also enable 
remote management. Increased bandwidth worldwide allows for richer (Daft and 
Lengel 1984, Daft et al. 1987) media communications between a manager and his 
or her staff at an MFI or a branch location.  
2.6.5. Mobile Service Provider MFIs 
Prediction: Mobile service providers will enter the microfinance industry as MFIs, 
providing loans directly to borrowers. 
Risks. The first risk that informs this prediction is the risk of managing 
technology. Small MFIs cannot manage technology as well as mobile service 
providers. Mobile service providers work primarily in technology and the 
technological cost of offering loans is minimal compared to the costs of an MFI 
entering the mobile services market. Mobile service providers already maintain 
established management information systems from their current operations. A 
US-based microfinance consultant disclosed that MFIs “won’t position 
48 
themselves aggressively enough to take advantage of branchless banking services 
and will be overtaken by mobile network operators and large banks who figure 
out how to get into rural areas and go down-scale” (CSFI 2011, p. 33). 
Furthermore, a US-based policy advisor said that mobile banking “has only been 
proven at scale in very few [MFIs]. The institutional capacity of the financial 
institution and the mobile phone provider and the quality of the partnership will 
be critical to more success stories” (CSFI 2011, p. 33). 
MFIs in many countries complain that they are more heavily regulated than 
commercial banks. Depending on local laws, mobile service providers may be 
treated as MFIs and face the same difficulties as their traditional counterparts. If 
mobile service providers remain unregulated as a provider of financial services, 
they could take advantage of their position over both commercial banks and 
traditional MFIs. 
Staff members employed at mobile service providers possess more experience 
with technology. As larger organizations, they hire more skilled staff. With the 
declining reputation of MFIs, mobile service providers could lead customers away 
from MFIs for financial purposes. Additionally, mobile phone providers possess 
greater brand awareness than MFIs. The marketing of the phone services will leak 
over to increase awareness of their mobile payment and microfinance services. 
Prediction explanation. Based on the risks discussed above, mobile service 
providers will realize that they can provide loans directly to subscribers in their 
pre-established and extensive networks, bypassing MFIs altogether to earn higher 
revenues. MFIs rely heavily upon on mobile phone service providers to process 
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loan payments and disbursements. Ashta (2011) considers mobile phones the 
single most important delivery channel for the poor. The services of mobile 
providers prove invaluable to MFIs since they reduce the time, communication, 
and transportation costs associated with servicing borrowers that are 
geographically distant or hard to reach. The mobile service providers benefit from 
this arrangement by earning revenue from a percentage of the funds transferred or 
by charging a fixed amount per transaction. The MFI, however, still retains all of 
the profits for themselves. 
2.6.6. Commercial Bank MFIs 
Prediction: Commercial banks will enter the microfinance industry as MFIs. 
Risks. MFIs experience aggressive competitive pressure from commercial 
banks. A Russian respondent stated that commercial banks are “aggressively 
moving ‘down’ to increase margins, bringing with them retail experience, 
instruments, and financial resources which microfinance organizations cannot 
compete with” (CSFI 2011, p. 12). Public banks are able to borrow from the 
public to raise funds unlike NGO or privately held MFIs. 
With respect to management quality, staffing, back office, and technology, 
commercial banks are better equipped than their MFI counterparts (Tucker and 
Miles 2004, Tchakoute-Tchuigoua 2010). Since the microfinance industry is more 
transparent with transparency promoting infomediaries, commercial banks will 
find ease in learning about their competitors positioning themselves to maximize 
profits. Finally, the laws in many countries regulate MFIs more heavily than 
commercial banks. Commercial banks can provide financial services to the same 
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clientele as MFIs without adhering to the same set of rules that traditional MFIs 
are required to follow. 
Prediction explanation. Based on the risks facing the microfinance industry, 
MFIs will not only experience competition from mobile service providers, but 
also from commercial banks. Commercial banks now realize the profit potential in 
microlending. They are shifting to the right in the long tail of banking25. The 
Banana Skins report referred to an “entry of well-heeled commercial banks armed 
with mass marketing skills and new banking technology” (CSFI 2011, p. 7). 
2.6.7. MFI Conglomerates and Mergers 
Prediction: MFIs will merge and form larger conglomerates. 
Risks. MFIs face challenges of competition and their shortcomings in staffing, 
management, technology, and back office. If several MFIs in a geographic region 
conglomerate, they will have a stronger infrastructure to efficiently deal with a 
large number of transactions. Larger MFIs benefit from more robust MIS, which 
was considered the single most important technology for scaling (Ashta 2011). As 
profitability risk and credit risk decrease, larger MFIs will be less likely to lend to 
the same individual than multiple, smaller MFIs. 
Prediction explanation. “Badly managed MFIs will feel more challenged and 
mergers might be more and more common in the market” (CSFI 2011, p. 34). I 
predict fewer, larger MFIs in the microfinance industry. This results from mergers 
and acquisitions among MFIs and conglomeration of several MFIs. I depict this in 
my future predicted microfinance market structure as fewer, larger boxes inside 
                                                 
25
 See section 3.2 
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the MFI intermediary container. “The [microfinance] industry is coming to the 
end of a period of rapid and easy growth, and will have to restructure to survive 
[by] consolidating smaller MFIs and specializing larger ones” (CSFI 2011, p. 36). 
ICT drives consolidation since ICT reduces coordination costs. Knowledge 
managements systems on centralized servers incorporate the knowledge of many 
MFIs and benefit from economies of scale. 
Larger organizations possess greater ICT capabilities (Evangelista et al. 
2005). Also, research shows that in other industries, organizations with higher 
ICT capabilities outperform those with lower ICT capabilities (Bharadwaj 2000). 
Assuming the microfinance industry responds to technology similarly, potential 
productivity gains from technology that can be realized through larger firms will 
serve as another impetus for MFIs to merge and form conglomerates. 
2.6.8. Other Microfinance Industry Intermediation Predictions 
I considered other intermediation predictions for inclusion into this discussion. 
While I do not delve into these further, I still find them important enough to 
mention. Other predictions include: (1) disintermediation of funders since funders 
are more of a requirement for startups, and MFIs find themselves attaining 
financial sustainability in a short period of time, (2) new intermediary entrants of 
deposit insurance organizations in developing countries like the Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) in America since the report states that credit risks 
could lead to massive withdrawals of deposits at MFIs, (3) new intermediary 
entrants of collection agents because many countries in the developed world do 
not enforce laws for loan repayment, and (4) new intermediary entrants of 
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standards-setting organizations (SSOs) for reporting to transparency promoters 
since currently much ambiguity exists across countries on how to report social 
performance. 
2.7. Implications 
The following subsections highlight the implications of my prediction to various 
players in the microfinance industry. Recommendations are supplied to market 
participants based on the anticipated market changes discussed earlier. 
2.7.1. Implications for MFIs 
With the entry of credit rating organizations, MFIs will need to make some 
changes to remain viable. Their loan officer staff will have more time to perform 
other tasks considering how credit score inquiries take less time than the 
traditional screening process. This leads to fewer loans officers and smaller firms 
(Brynjolfsson et al.1994) with attrition, or loan officers’ time shifted to other 
tasks. MFIs will need to employ staff trained on the credit rating system, invest in 
a membership if applicable, and have the correct technologies in place to be able 
to access the information presented by the credit rating organization. This allows 
MFIs to identify clients guilty of multiple borrowing and therefore may choose to 
adjust their loan portfolio accordingly. 
With an increased emphasis of social performance by transparency promoters, 
MFIs’ standards hold to a higher level. This shifts their business practices to align 
with what the industry finds acceptable or become less transparent. 
MFIs need to streamline their business practices and operations, possibly by 
outsourcing operations and management. This lowers costs and maintains 
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competitiveness in increasingly crowded markets. They may still be successful in 
remote areas with little competition, but conducting business with clients in urban 
centers will be difficult in a demand-driven market given many microfinance 
institutions’ poor efficiencies. Adoption technology through capital investment or 
through SAAS enables an MFI to streamline their operations and cut down on 
time-intensive paperwork tasks. 
MFIs need to emphasize core competencies that mobile service providers and 
commercial banks lack: relationships with villages, ability to communicate with 
the poor and understand their needs, flexibility, delivery channels and branches, 
and designing unique credit products. In this case, even if they do not offer the 
lowest interest rates, they will offer more customer value. 
Finally, MFIs need to assess when to conglomerate. Given my predictions, 
two MFIs working together may generate a greater profit and/or social impact 
than two separate entities. Along with financial motivation, members of 
conglomerates need to share similar social performance goals or else risk mission 
drift. 
2.7.2. Implications for Transparency Promoters 
Transparency promoters should work with credit rating organizations to 
supplement their analysis of MFIs’ loan portfolio riskiness with information on 
the credit rating system. 
As more mobile service providers and commercial banks enter the industry as 
providers of microfinance services, transparency promoters should pursue 
providing social and financial performance information. They could frame a 
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convincing argument to join by emphasizing the corporate social responsibility 
gains that a for-profit institution like a mobile service provider or commercial 
bank would communicate to its investors and customers. 
Transparency promoters should institute policies for how to address MFI 
conglomerates and mergers. When reporting historical figures, how does the 
information of the previously independent MFIs aggregate?  Do the profiles of the 
merging MFIs remain intact?  This is important given all the mergers I predict, 
and because MFIs care about their outward appearance to investors and donors 
visiting websites of transparency promoters. 
With an increased emphasis on social performance transparency, transparency 
promoters extend their clientele to service end-users of microfinance services. 
This is a recommendation for a few more years in the future when Internet use 
penetration is higher among individuals in poverty. If in ten years there are as 
many of the world’s poor with an Internet-enabled smartphone as there are with 
simple mobile phones today, transparency promoters could make known the 
services, products, and social performance of MFIs in the region of the mobile 
subscriber. Transparency promoters may offer this information in more languages 
than currently available and format their websites for accessibility and 
compatibility with low-bandwidth smartphone users. This will have the effect of 
making the market even more demand-driven. 
2.7.3. Implications for Donors and Investors 
Donors will have an increased ability to assess which institution should receive 
their donations due to entrants of credit rating organizations and transparency 
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promoters emphasizing social performance. This information can be made 
available to donors quickly and cheaply and therefore decrease a donor’s search 
costs. Given the prediction of MFI mergers and conglomerates, there will be 
fewer, larger institutions in the basket of possible donation recipients. Fewer 
options for donors interested in smaller MFI operations will be available. 
Investors interested solely in financial gain may oppose the predicted industry 
changes with respect to social promotion emphasis by transparency promoters if it 
causes MFIs to sacrifice financial gains for social gains. 
2.7.4. Implications for Logistics Providers and Operations Outsourcers 
Based on my prediction that competition will drive MFIs to seek out efficiency 
gains, logistics providers and operations outsourcers should advertise their 
services to microfinance institutions. Their marketing campaigns should focus on 
the cost and time savings that can be realized by MFIs who elect to outsource 
their operations. 
2.7.5. Implications for Banking Correspondents 
Banking correspondents will likely see their role diminish since mobile payments 
are even more cost effective than a banking correspondent. A banking 
correspondent is only more valuable to an illiterate borrower who does not own a 
mobile phone or does not have mobile service in his or her village. With 5.9 
billion mobile subscriptions worldwide, fewer borrowers will value the services 
of banking correspondents over mobile payment options. 
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2.7.6. Implications for Mobile Service Providers and Commercial Banks 
If mobile service providers enter the market as providers of microfinance services, 
they will require the same knowledge and skills unique to their MFI competitors. 
Where MFIs are strong (the core competencies listed in the implications for MFIs, 
most of which are related to effectiveness), mobile service providers are weak. 
However where MFIs are weak (staffing, management, economies of scale, and 
technological capabilities, most of which are related to efficiency), mobile service 
providers are strong. Mobile service providers may also determine that borrowers 
are unconcerned with effectiveness attributes of a lender provided the interest 
rates remain low. Therefore, they may elect to focus solely on acting as a price 
leader in the market. 
If commercial banks enter the market as providers of microfinance services, 
they must address the same issues as mobile service providers, since many 
currently lack the skills and knowledge necessary to meet the needs of poor 
customers. Historically, commercial banks solely served wealthier clientele. 
2.7.7. Implications for Borrowers 
The predictions I make on the microfinance industry can also be leveraged by 
borrowers. First, they must discontinue the practice of multiple-borrowing. Since 
credit rating organizations make this information known to MFIs, this puts a 
borrower’s credit-worthiness at risk. Second, they should invest in a mobile phone 
if they have not already. This allows for the expansion of MFI options, provided 
that the MFIs enable mobile coordination and transactions. They might also seek 
information on what other services can be provided via mobile phones and when 
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transparency promoters start offering information to borrowers. Borrowers should 
adopt a smart phone when the value of the services offered to them as a 
microfinance end-user exceeds the costs of the phone and its data connectivity. 
2.7.8. Implications for Researchers 
It is my hope that other researchers and academics understand the value and 
interest in the microfinance industry as a unique research context. I am attempting 
to add to a new stream of literature. The future predicted market structure 
provides a basis for suggesting new studies and determining if my predictions 
hold. Researchers can study countries like Ecuador where credit rating 
organizations are rolled out to MFIs and determine how they impact transparency, 
outreach, interest rates, and loan portfolios at participating MFIs. Additionally, 
researchers can evaluate the historical breakdown of banking correspondents and 
mobile service provider use among MFIs to conclude if there is a shift occurring 
and if so, what are the implications for MFIs and borrowers. Researchers can also 
determine how to best coordinate the information and data stored by transparency 
promoters and credit rating organizations to see if a mutually beneficial 
relationship can exist between the two. Another interesting study might explore 
the impact of social performance information on the investments and giving by 
investors and donors, respectively. Finally, researchers can determine if MFIs are 
utilizing efficiency and effectiveness gains from operations outsourcing 
organizations, remote management, and conglomeration to compete with 
commercial banks and mobile service providers. 
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2.8. Conclusions 
The research presented in this paper addresses questions related to the pre-ICT 
microfinance industry, the involvement of ICT, and how intermediation will 
change in the future given current risks. I use observation to determine that 
intermediation in the microfinance industry was quite rudimentary prior to ICT. 
With the advent of ICT, many new intermediaries and players are entering the 
market: lenders, P2P social microlenders, transparency promoters, banking 
correspondents, and mobile service providers. The flow of information and funds 
given ICT also changes. A perceived risk report (CSFI 2011) informs several 
predictions about the impact of ICT on the microfinance industry future. These 
predictions include (1) new entrants of credit rating organizations, operations 
outsourcing organizations, and commercial banks (2) role shifts of transparency 
promoters and mobile service providers, and (3) other predictions including MFI 
conglomeration and remote MFI management. In each of these three market 
structures, I graphically depict the changes along the value chain from donors, 
lenders, and investors through to the end-user or borrower. These predictions 
offer a basis for making recommendations and implications for market players 
affected by the future market changes. It is my hope that market players will find 
these recommendations valuable and that they will drive them towards turning 
microfinance into an exemplar industry for efficiency and effectiveness at 
creating value for the world’s poor. 
As ICT changes the market structure, I observe more complexity in the 
market. ICT-enabled intermediation is certainly adding more intermediaries and 
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players than disintermediating existing players. In the microfinance industry, ICT 
changes are not shifting the intermediary roles that each player fulfills. The 
intermediary roles that MFIs fulfilled in the 1970s are the same roles that they are 
fulfilling in present day and that I expect them to fulfill in the future. The same is 
true for P2P social microlenders and transparency promoters. While the future 
adds more complexity and market structure participants, the intermediation roles 
of these players will remain constant. 
A limitation of the predictions in this research is that I base them on a report 
of perceived, not actual risks to the microfinance industry. I may discover, for 
example, that multiple lending by poor borrowers does not lead to the perceived 
credit risk cited by many survey respondents. Since the growth of the industry has 
been so rapid, there is little empirical evidence of the long-term impacts of 
multiple lending on either poverty alleviation or MFI default rates and financial 
performance. Another limitation is that I base my predictions on a risk analysis 
and make the assumption that risk will drive market structure change, but the 
other elements may impact intermediation change as well, such as profit potential, 
legal changes, or even a technological change that is yet undiscovered. 
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Chapter 3. Breadth and Depth: The Impact of ICT on Outreach Capabilities 
of Microfinance Institutions 
“The shift toward social performance is occurring in response to some of the 
larger negative press stories of the last few years. Unquestioning support for 
microfinance is fading and industry players are under increasing pressure to adjust 
incentives toward [a] social mission first and foremost.” 
-JD Bergeron, Director of Social Performance at Kiva.org, January 20, 2012. 
3.1. Introduction 
Prior to the early 1980s, the world’s poor were disadvantaged with an inability to 
receive basic financial services of savings, loans, and insurance. In response to 
this disparity, Muhammad Yunus (2007a) founded the Grameen Bank26 in 1983 to 
provide basic financial services to a population of rural female Bangladeshis. 
Grameen Bank employs an unconventional approach to banking in the areas of 
loan approval, ownership, branch locations, regulation of loans, and loan interest 
(see Table 6). Since then, many developing countries have witnessed new entrants 
of microfinance institutions (MFIs) aimed at providing financial services to the 
world’s poor. Goals of MFIs may range from profit maximization to social 
poverty-reduction (Yunus 2007b). Despite, or perhaps because of, Grameen 
Bank’s unconventional approach to banking, it has profited in all but one of their 
years in business. 
                                                 
26
 Literally means “bank of the villages” in the Bengali language. 
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Table 6  Grameen Bank vs. Conventional Banks  
 
Conventional Banks Grameen Bank 
Loan approval Based on what has already 
been acquired by a person 
Based on the potential of 
a person 
Ownership Owned by rich men Owned by poor women 
Gender of borrowers More loans to men 97% of borrowers are 
women 
Branch location Urban centers and business 
districts 
Rural areas 
Banking location Customers go to the bank Bank goes to the door-
step of the customers 
Regulation Legal punishment for 
defaulted loans 
No legal instrument 
between lender and 
borrower 
Interest Loan interest has no cap Loan interest capped at 
the amount of the loan 
 
Today, the microfinance industry is comprised of thousands of organizations 
like Grameen Bank called microfinance institutions (MFIs). The microfinance 
industry was a $640M industry in 2004 and will grow to $20B by 2015 
(Dieckmann 2008). One of the “promises” of microfinance initiatives is self-
sustainability (Morduch 1999). This aspect makes microfinance a unique 
approach from most other charitable attempts at poverty reduction. MFI 
operational sustainability and financial sustainability is the extent to which an 
MFI can utilize its revenues earned from lending operations to cover their 
operational expenses and all expenses, respectively. This definition of 
sustainability may differ among other institution types, such as relief 
organizations, who define sustainability as the extent to which their efforts enable 
individuals or villages to operate independent of charitable donations. 
Unfortunately, the sustainability initiative led many MFIs to favor financial 
performance goals over social performance goals and neglect clientele with the 
62 
greatest need. Now the pendulum is swinging back toward social performance 
with “tools, methodologies, and assessment frameworks” (Bedecarrats et al. 2009, 
p.22) introduced to the industry in recent years (Copestake, 2007). The 2011 
Microfinance Banana Skins report stated, “microfinance has come of age, and 
with that, new issues have arisen. In an increasing number of markets, the rapid 
rate of growth and outreach means that microfinance is confronting the same 
forces of competition, credit cycles, and consolidation seen in other sectors” 
(CSFI 2011, p. 2). 
Lately, negative press stories that have led players about aggressive financial 
practices by MFIs have led players in the microfinance industry to give increasing 
credence to social performance. This change is evident at Kiva, one of the most 
recognizable brand names in the microfinance industry. They have adopted a 
system of social performance badges that field partner MFIs can earn by 
completing a due diligence process and demonstrating compliance to certain 
criteria. Badges include: anti-poverty focus, vulnerable group focus, client voice, 
family and community empowerment, entrepreneurial support, facilitation of 
services, and innovation27. Outside of Kiva, individual MFIs highlight their social 
performance on their websites and promotional materials. A French organization, 
Comité d’Echanges de Réflexion et d’Information sur les Systèmes d’Epargne-
crédit (CERISE), was founded to increase accountability among MFIs and rank 
them on twelve outcome measures using a refined survey instrument28. 
                                                 
27http://www.kiva.org/about/socialperformance 
28http://www.cerise-microfinance.org/-impact-and-social-perfomance- 
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MixMarket29, the largest transparency promoting infomediary in the microfinance 
industry, started a program in 2009 that awards MFIs with silver, gold, and 
platinum badges for high levels of social performance disclosure. Previously, 
MixMarket only awarded MFIs with one to five diamonds based on financial 
disclosure. 
While the primary motivation for this research comes from the need for 
outreach as mentioned above, this need is also validated by the New Structural 
Economics (NSE) theory (Lin 2012). NSE suggests that in order for developing 
economies to upgrade their endowment, they must strategically develop industries 
that maximize comparative advantages at any given moment in time. This 
approach is unique since it takes into account the special characteristics of each 
economy instead of classifying them all into a homogeneous category. NSE is a 
strong explanatory theory because it explains development miracles in East Asia 
and stagflation of the 1970s that previous Keynesian theory was unable to 
explain. Since the world’s unbanked are also poor and rural, NSE suggests that 
structural changes and technological innovations that enable reaching this 
population may be the key to maximizing comparative advantage. ICT enables 
MFIs to reach the local level where comparative advantages are the greatest. This 
occurred in the late 1990s with the World Bank when it decentralized many of its 
operations and placed more staff in the field where need was the greatest 
(McFarlan and Delacey 2003). The percentage of World Bank country directors in 
the field increased from 0% in 1996 to 66% in 2002. In the same time period, the 
                                                 
29http://www.themix.org 
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percentage of regional staff in the field increased from 38% to 50%. Despite their 
geographic distance from headquarter operations, field staff remained connected 
to colleagues in urban centers via videoconferences, satellites, e-mail, and 
centralized knowledge management databases. The World Bank decentralized 
their operations since opportunities for growth thrive among the poorest and rural 
borrowers. 
There is evidence of a trickle-up effect when working with the poorest 
members of an economy, often found in the most rural regions of a country. Sam 
Daley-Harris, Director of the Microcredit Summit Campaign shared the following 
story: 
“[sic] Several years ago two friends of mine were speaking with a group of 40 
clients at a micro-bank in South Asia. Through the translator, they asked the 40 
women what impact the bank had had on the husbands of the non-borrowers; not 
their husbands, but the husbands of women who are not with the bank. The clients 
said, ‘Before we took our loans, our husbands were day-[laborers], working for 
others whenever they could find work. When we took our loans our husbands 
stopped being day-laborers and worked with us bicycle rickshaw, husking rice, 
growing garlic on leased land. This caused a shortage of day-laborers in this area, 
so the husbands of the non-borrowers who were day-laborers their wages went 
up.'”30 
Lin (2012) and his NSE theory argue further that aggregating country-level 
data to produce models overlooks many important details. For example, a 
                                                 
30http://www.unfpa.org/gender/micro.htm 
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measure of Internet users per 1,000 population in a developed country will not 
reflect the whole country. It will overestimate the Internet penetration in a country 
like Libya since the majority of the Internet users in Libya live in the wealthiest 
section of Tripoli. To effectively evaluate the impacts of ICT, one needs to 
examine the ground-level and consider individual cases. My research acts on this 
advice by addressing the impact of ICT on social performance of individual MFIs 
around the world. 
Social performance can be costly since the poorest customers require smaller 
loans that are more expensive to administer per dollar lent, and the most 
geographically distant customers require MFIs to incur time and costs associated 
with travel to and from branch offices. One would think that there is a tradeoff 
between social performance and financial performance, which many refer to as 
the “microfinance schism” (Morduch 2000). Research suggests this is not the 
case. While MFIs with outreach strategies do have greater operational costs, other 
benefits such as staff productivity and portfolio diversification outweigh these 
costs. Bedecarrats et al. (2009) state that the reason for this is that MFIs with 
broader outreach strategies have greater client participation and work in markets 
with lower levels of competition. They also generate a greater social impact. The 
poorest individuals in the world, who lack access to clean water, are at the 
greatest risk for AIDS among other diseases, are at the greatest risk for violence, 
and are stuck in a generational cycle since they lack access to education (Sachs 
2005). MFIs greatly impact these global problems by focusing their efforts on 
these individuals. 
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Many industries adopt information and communication technologies (ICTs) 
for their various benefits, and the microfinance industry is no different. ICTs 
reduce coordination and transaction costs without increasing risk (Malone et al. 
1987). This partly explains the rapid adoption of technology in the past 20 years 
in industries worldwide. During the period of 2004-09, the ICT penetration in 
developing countries increased 3 to 4 times (WTI 2011). The microfinance 
industry, however, lacks IT skills and has been slow to adopt ICT. “Poor 
management information systems lead to ill-informed decisions and contribute to 
another set of risks: poor accountability and transparency” (CSFI2011, p. 34). In 
2004, 40 percent of MFIs used manual ledgers to manage their portfolios and 
track loan payments; as a result, these MFIs took on average 4.9 days to discover 
a missed loan payment (Ivatury 2004). A follow-up study in 2008 revealed 
negligible improvements over the following four-year period (CGAP 2009a). 
These systems are slow, inefficient, labor intensive, prone to human error, and 
lack redundant backup, while ICT “underpins an MFI’s ability to track loan 
repayments, sustain growth and product reliable reporting and data analysis” 
(Ivatury 2004 p. 25). A microfinance analyst respondent in the 2011 Microfinance 
Banana Skins survey of industry risks acknowledged the matter simply, “Invest in 
technology or cease to exist in five years” (CSFI 2011,p. 32). If MFIs neglect 
technology adoption, they “will be overtaken by mobile network operators and 
large banks who figure out how to get into rural areas and go down-scale” (p. 33). 
Research reveals that ICT offers several benefits. While much of that research 
is not specific to the microfinance industry, I might expect to notice the following 
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benefits realized through ICT use in the microfinance industry: (1) an increased 
ability for transparency due to electronic reporting and communication of 
financial and loan portfolio information (Granados et al. 2010), (2) more channels 
for communication between lenders and borrowers (Boyd and Ellison 2008, 
Wasserman and Faust 1994), (3) cost savings due to decreased coordination and 
transaction costs (Malone et al. 1987), (4) cost savings due to automation 
(Morrison 1997), and (5) an increased ability to serve clients that are poor, 
geographically distant, and/or socially marginalized (Mathison 2005). The focus 
of this study is on the last item in this list which I refer to as MFI outreach – the 
ability and focus of an MFI on providing financial services to clients who are 
poor, geographically distant, and/or socially marginalized (Schreiner 2002). 
Individuals who fall into these categories have a greater difficulty receiving 
loans, even from microfinance institutions, due to the higher cost of administering 
services to these clients (Bottomley 1963, DeYoung et al. 2008). I refer to these 
clients as residing in the long tail of banking – the rank ordering of a given 
population on their access to banking services. MFIs with a greater outreach have 
clientele further to the right of the long tail of banking. 
Through my research, I aim to understand the nuances of how ICT adoption 
impacts MFI operations and outreach. We employ case studies to explore this 
impact. I use grounded theory building, semiotics, and content analysis 
methodologies to develop a detailed research model depicting the relationships 
between primary conceptual categories in the context of ICT adoption and use in 
the microfinance industry. A qualitative approach allows me to ask how and why 
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research questions. The answers to these research questions (RQs) should explain 
present circumstances and trace operational links over time among MFIs (Yin 
2008): 
• (RQ1) How does ICT adoption impact MFI operations?  Which ICTs 
impact which MFI operations? 
• (RQ2) How does ICT adoption impact MFI outreach?  Which ICTs 
impact MFI poverty outreach?  Which ICTs impact MFI geographic 
outreach? 
• (RQ3) How do changes in MFI operations brought about by ICT 
adoption impact MFI outreach?  Which changes impact MFI poverty 
outreach?  Which changes impact MFI geographic outreach? 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows:  Section 2 discusses the 
theoretical background for this study and uses these theories as a basis for my 
propositions. Section 3 describes my research methodology, discusses why case 
study is the appropriate methodology to answer my research questions, and 
presents my research design. Section 4 explains my research materials and how I 
obtained them. Section 5 describes my analysis, findings, and tests for robustness. 
Section 6 contains three highlighted anecdotes from my research materials. 
Section 7 proposes an empirical study to test hypotheses in the same context using 
another method. Finally, section 8 concludes the paper and lists some of the 
study’s limitations. 
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3.2. Theoretical Background and Propositions 
Theoretical development occurs in a different manner with a case study 
methodology than traditional empirical approaches. Theories in quantitative 
studies generalize to make inferences on a population in a process called 
statistical generalization, while qualitative studies use existing theories as 
templates to explain reality. Case study researchers generalize findings to broader 
theories in a process called analytic generalization (Yin 2008). This research 
draws on elements of electronic markets, transactions cost theory, distance theory, 
and long tail theory in an analysis of ICT in the microfinance industry.  
Transaction Cost Theory. Williamson (1981) reports that the costs of a good 
or service is more than just the base cost. Transaction cost theory views the cost 
of a good as the all-in costs of economic exchange. The all-inclusive costs of an 
economic transaction include search costs, time costs, shipping costs, transaction 
costs, and coordination costs. Related to transaction cost theory is the electronic 
markets hypothesis, which suggests that ICT decreases search and coordination 
costs without increasing transaction risk (Malone et al. 1987). In other words, 
benefits are available to market participants who strategically employ various 
technologies (Hess and Kemerer 1994). In the context of the microfinance 
industry, the benefits of ICTs are realized in cost savings from transactions. Table 
7 suggests further costs associated with economic exchanges and how ICT 
reduces them. 
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Table 7  The Effect of ICT on Transaction Costs 
Type Effect of ICT 
Search Cost 
ICT-supported intermediation between buyers and sellers 
creates an e-marketplace that lowers buyer costs to acquire 
information about seller prices and produce offerings. This 
reduces buyer search cost inefficiency (Bakos 1997). 
Management 
and Control 
Cost 
Monitoring employees and trading partners ensure transactions 
can be performed electronically by the principal rather than the 
agent, reducing cost (Gurbaxani and Whang 1991). 
Shipping Cost 
ICT reduces coordination cost, which reduces shipping cost 
(Gurbaxani and Whang 1991). This reflects ICT-led cost 
reductions throughout the flow of goods in a supply chain. 
Time Cost 
ICT supports faster communication at lower cost; the marginal 
cost of communicating over a greater distance is essentially zero 
(Cairncross 2001). Technologies allow voice communication, 
document sharing, and messaging between parties to occur 
instantaneously. 
   
MFIs’ businesses are heavily transaction-based, with a large number of small 
loans. Poor and geographically distant clients have relatively larger transaction 
costs than wealthy, geographically close clients (Bedecarrats et al. 2009). 
Administering loans to distant customers requires increased travel and time costs 
to disburse the loan and enforce repayment. Each loan also has fixed costs such as 
labor for clerks entering information into their systems, screening borrowers, and 
processing disbursements and repayments. Variable loan costs change with the 
size of the loan. These costs cover default risk, which is greater for larger loans, 
and any bank costs of processing larger transactions (Armendariz de Aghion and 
Morduch 2007, Waterfield 2008). If the fixed cost and variable costs of 
administering a $100,000 loan are, for example, $100 and 2% respectively, then 
the total cost is $2,100, or 2.1% of the total loan amount. The financial institution 
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administering this loan must charge an interest rate greater than 2.1% in order to 
earn a profit on this particular loan. Conversely, the total cost of administering a 
small loan of $500 would be $110, or 22% of the total loan amount. In this case, 
the financial institution charges an interest rate greater than a massive 22% to 
begin earning a profit. This example explains why microloans require higher 
interest rates for MFIs to maintain financial sustainability. A reduction in 
transaction costs increases an MFI’s ability to serve poor and distant clients 
without as sizable of a sacrifice of increased costs. 
Distance Theory. People consider “distance” between two places in physical 
distance or geographic distance terms. For geographic distance, I consider either 
the physical distance a lender has to travel to visit a borrower or the amount of 
time it takes to travel between them. These measures of distance have 
implications in the economic marketplace. In the context of international trade 
flows, researchers concluded that for every 1% increase in physical distance 
between two countries, trade flows decrease by 1.1% (Frankel and Rose 2002). 
Other research suggested that the amount of trade that takes place between 
countries 5,000 miles apart is only 20% of the amount that would be predicted to 
take place if the same countries were 1,000 miles apart (Ghemawat 2001). 
Transaction costs increase with distance. Monitoring costs (Sussman and 
Zeira 1995) and information asymmetries (Hauswald and Marquez 2003) increase 
in a direct relationship with the geographic distance separating lender and 
borrower. Frances Cairncross (2001) dedicates a book on a phenomenon that is 
shaping the present information-centric world. She calls her theory the ‘death of 
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distance.’  Distance was previously an impediment to communication and trade. 
With advances in information and communication technologies, the concept of 
geographic distance and proximity becomes less of a barrier. The trans-Atlantic 
telegraph cable was one of such technologies making the concept of geographic 
distance irrelevant. After the cable was laid, it did not matter how many thousands 
of miles New York and London were separated since the communication could 
occur instantaneously (Chiles 1987, Garbade and Silber 1978). The cost of 
transmitting information over the cable one additional mile was effectively zero. 
In the microfinance industry, the poorest clientele reside far from urban 
centers. It costs more for MFIs to service distant borrowers for the reasons stated 
above. MFIs deal with these increased costs by charging higher interest rates or 
by decreasing the costs associated with serving distant clients. An analysis of the 
microfinance industry in Niger reveals that distant borrowers experience higher 
interest rates, more restrictive loan conditions, more intensive screening and 
greater delays to obtain a loan than geographically close borrowers (Pedrosa and 
Do 2008). The electronics market hypothesis and transaction cost theory 
discussed earlier theorize how ICTs mitigate these increased costs without the 
MFI having to resort to higher interest rates. 
Long Tail Theory was traditionally used to describe retail product offerings. 
The most common use of the long tail has been to describe consumer products, 
with mainstream high-volume goods in the wide section of the curve and low-
volume niche products in the narrow part of the curve (Anderson 2004, 2006). 
Internet retailers like Amazon.com create a market for niche products, 
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recognizing that digital goods have zero to low inventory costs. Amazon has 
opportunities to earn revenue by selling small quantities of a large number of 
goods in the skinny part of the tail in addition to selling large quantities of a small 
number of goods in the wide part of the tail. 
When applying this concept to the idea of microfinance, the interpretation 
changes, but the shape of the curve remains the same. In banking, the wide part of 
the curve represents the world’s population served by traditional banks while the 
thin part of the curve represents the population of the world that receives few 
financial services. The law of diminishing marginal returns states that each 
additional unit of input (say, labor or machinery) yields a smaller increase in 
output than the previous unit of input, ceteris paribus (Samuelson and Nordhaus 
2001). In the case of loan products, it means that the percentage return on a loan 
diminishes with each additional dollar lent to the same borrower. Therefore, 
assuming that the loan administration costs and transaction costs are minimal, and 
default rates are uniform across all loans, there is greater profit potential in 
microlending small amounts to many borrowers than in traditional lending of 
large amounts to fewer borrowers. 
Although charging higher microloan interest rates appears to be an unfair 
practice, as explained earlier, microloans require higher interest rates because 
MFIs need to recover their higher administration costs. While a $100K loan at 
40% APR interest is far from attractive, a $1K loan at 40% APR interest is more 
appropriate and is not uncommon. Also, it conforms to the law of diminishing 
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marginal returns; we can expect that the $1K loan will yield a higher percentage 
return than the $100K loan. 
To represent the long tail of banking, I plot the rank ordering of the world’s 
population against their access to financial services (Stutzman 2007, Serrano-
Cinca and Gutierrez-Nieto 2012, Hersman 2007). The result is a concave down 
curve with a decreasing slope, as shown in Figure 5. Three areas of the curve 
classify individuals. 
Figure 5  The Long Tail of Banking 
 
The leftmost area of the curve represents individuals served by traditional 
banks for loans. These loans have the lowest administration and transaction costs 
per dollar lent. The interest that the banks receive from these lenders is sufficient 
to cover their administration and coordination expenses. A traditional Pareto 
distribution suggests that 80% of all banking services in the world serve 20% of 
the global population. 
Rank ordering of borrowers
Individuals 
served by 
MFIs
Individuals not served by 
lending institutions
Individuals 
served by 
traditional banks
Outreach 
strategy
75 
The middle area of the curve depicts the individuals served by microfinance 
institutions. These individuals apply for loans that, according to traditional 
thinking, would not be profitable enough for lending institutions to cover their 
administration and coordination expenses. This is due to the perceived high risk 
of the loans. Since the borrowers are low-income and because the loans are 
generally small, traditional banks would have to charge high interest rates to 
recover their fixed expenses, which would end up being a large percentage of the 
loan principal (Waterfield 2008). These loans are high risk and low principal, so 
the aid-driven microfinance industry often relies on donations and other external 
funding to compensate for the loss. 
Finally, the rightmost section of the curve represents individuals not served by 
any lending institutions, either traditional or microfinance. The world’s poor fit 
into this category. According to the 2008 World Bank Development Indicators, 
half of the world’s population, over 3 billion people, live on less than USD$2.50 
per day (Povcalnet 2011). Yet these 3 billion people consume only 2.4% of the 
world’s resources. The poor population almost completely overlaps with the 
unbanked population; 2.7 billion unbanked adults live in the world (CGAP 
2009b). Loans to this population have the greatest administration and transaction 
costs per dollar lent. The high cost of lending to these individuals is due to 
administrative efforts, low principal amounts, or geographical remoteness; so, 
even MFIs find difficulty in lending to them. In addition to the higher costs, other 
deterrents such as perceived risks, portfolio quality, etc., exist in the minds of 
outside investors. When I previously introduced the concept of MFI outreach, I 
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referred to the extent to which MFIs lend to these individuals in the far right part 
of the tail. 
MFIs exist to bring financial services to those far to the right in the long tail. 
In the digital music business, retailers realize profit potential in selling goods in 
the long tail. The same holds true for microfinance. In theory, a lender can earn 
more money lending small amounts to many entrepreneurs than lending large 
amounts to few entrepreneurs. MFIs can take advantage of this profit potential by 
increasing their poverty and geographic outreach, thus bringing banking services 
to more of the world’s poor and extending to the right the vertical line separating 
those serviced by MFIs and those without access to financial services. 
Long tail theory informs my study and theory. ICTs possess the potential to 
increase access to financial services, especially to the population in the right part 
of the curve. Because ICTs reduce administration and transaction costs, the gap 
between costs per dollar lent in the wide part of the tail and the thin part of the tail 
is narrowing. Moreover, the law of diminishing marginal returns discourages 
lending to the already-served population and encourages lending to new 
borrowers in the long tail of banking. The risk perception of lending to the 
underserved population is also diminishing because of increased familiarity of 
doing business with this population, availability of transparent data regarding 
repayment rates, better monitoring of loans due to ICTs, and enhanced analysis of 
potential borrowers. These interrelated phenomena shift the dividing line between 
customers served by MFIs and those that are not to the right (see Figure 5). More 
people bank with MFIs who, in turn, earn a profit. Industry evidence for increased 
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competition exists in markets currently served by MFIs. A managing director of a 
Columbian MFI reported that the number of MFIs available to service one 
customer increased from 1.5 to 4 in recent years and that 75% of their MFIs 
borrowers were also borrowing from other institutions (CSFI 2011). Considering 
the perspective of the vendor, or MFI, lower risk is associated with lending to 
individuals in the long tail of banking. From my discussion of transaction cost 
theory and the electronic markets hypothesis, ICT permits lower search costs thus 
assisting MFIs in locating the ‘next unbanked person’ as they move to the right in 
the long tail. Borrowers who were not considered possible clients to traditional 
banks can now be considered and even yield profit potential for the lender. 
ICT-enabled MFI Outreach Theory. Each of the above theories seems to 
directly govern various components of the microfinance industry in the context of 
ICT’s progress. ICTs decrease transaction and coordination costs (electronic 
markets and transaction cost theories), which are the inhibitors of MFI operations 
performance. Also, smaller loans can be repaid at higher interest rates due to 
higher return potential (long-tail theory and the law of diminishing marginal 
returns). Furthermore, ICTs show the potential to mainly reduce the time and cost 
of communicating with distant and underserved populations (distance theory). 
Research using a case study methodology permits me to pose process theories 
that explain how, following a set process, events or occurrences result in input 
states leading to outcome states (Van de Ven 2007). 
Informed by these theories, I summarize a new ICT-enabled MFI outreach 
theory: ICT adoption among MFIs will result in direct improvements to MFI 
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operations (P1) and a greater capacity for poverty and geographic outreach (P2). 
MFI operations serve as a mediator between ICT adoption and outreach impact 
(P3). Case study methodologies employ propositions, not testable hypotheses with 
operationalized variables. The goals of these conditional propositions (Van de 
Ven 2007)are to direct attention to the elements of the study (Yin 2008), in this 
case ICT adoption, MFI operations, and MFI outreach. This logic suggests the 
research model and propositions in Figure 6. 
Figure 6  Research Model and Propositions 
 
Using this model, testing two rival theories is possible. One is a mediated 
effect theory, which suggests that MFI operations mediate all effects of ICT 
adoption on outreach. If analysis of my research materials determines that ICT 
adoption has no direct effect on outreach since all of the effect is mediated 
through MFI operations, I can then confirm the mediated effect theory. The 
mediated model is my first choice for testing, since there are a number of studies 
stating the impact of ICTs on firm operations (e.g. Barnes et al. 2002, Shiels et al. 
2003, Sigala 2005). ICTs are making fundamental changes to the way that MFIs 
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operate and this, in turn, affects outreach. ICT by itself may not directly impact 
performance (McAfee 2009), especially in developing countries (Dewan and 
Kraemer 2000). Instead, ICTs affect change in business processes and the way 
that staff members perform their tasks. Since no previous studies can confirm or 
deny direct impacts of ICTs on social performance and outreach, this research 
explores this possibility. The competing theory is a direct effect theory, 
suggesting that ICT adoption directly impacts MFI outreach independent of any 
mediating factors. If my findings reveal that MFIs are able to impact their 
outreach by adopting ICTs independent of changes to their operations, then I can 
conclude with evidence for a direct effect theory. The implications of these rival 
theories to MFIs are paramount to the practical application of this research. The 
results of this study will enlighten MFIs if a reason exists to initiate and expect 
operational changes in conjunction with ICT adoption if they intend to expand 
their outreach. 
3.3. Research Methodology and Research Design 
3.3.1. Case Study Research Methodology 
 In the context of MFIs and their adoption of ICTs, many decisions made in 
the midst of increasing reliance and dependence on technology. These decisions 
relate to which ICTs should be adopted, when these ICTs should be adopted, what 
impact will these ICTs have on operations and productivity, the cost savings of 
ICTs, and which staff should use the ICTs. ICT adoption and technological 
change does not simply occur over the course of time, but it is the result of a set 
of decisions that lead to change. These factors direct me to opt for a case study 
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research methodology since its purpose is to illuminate sets of decisions, 
specifically why certain decisions were taken, how they were implemented, and 
their final result (Schramm 1971). 
 MFIs’ decisions whether or not to adopt specific ICTs contain too many 
variables for a quantitative empirical research approach. Fortunately, case studies 
“cope with the technically distinctive situation in which there will be many more 
variables of interest than data points” (Yin 2008, xvii). Also, using multiple 
sources of data and multiple cases, results can converge into findings with a 
triangulation process, making my analysis and findings more robust (Yin 2008). 
 The case study methodology is part of the family of qualitative analysis. 
Yin (2008) states that this methodology is preferred when (1) how and why 
research questions are explored, (2) the researcher exhibits little control over 
events, and (3) the research focuses on a contemporary phenomenon in a real-life 
context. My research aligns with these qualifiers because (1) my research 
questions are posed as how and why questions, (2) my time in the field collecting 
interview responses and observing staff members had little to no impact on the 
events of interest - adoption of ICTs, performance of operations, or outreach 
capabilities of the MFIs I visited, and (3) members of the microfinance industry 
are technology adoption laggards; many real-life MFIs are in the midst of a 
technology adoption phenomenon. 
 The case study methodology permits me to use the multiple sources of 
evidence I collected in the field. My research materials include interview 
responses, e-mails, and personal observations. Cases studies analyze real-life 
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situations involving actual decisions and their ramifications (Yin 2008). 
Experiments, on the other hand, rely on artificially simulated scenarios devoid of 
real-life implications and do not capture the complexity inherent in real life. 
When analyzed, the observation of these complexities via case studies (1) explain 
causal links, (2) describe context and intervention, (3) descriptively illustrate 
topics within an evaluation, and (4) enlighten outcome intervention in different 
situations. For these reasons, the case study methodology can yield richer analysis 
and conclusions than rival methods. The methodology is not without its 
challenges and is “among the hardest types of research to do because of the 
absence of routine procedures” (Yin 2008, p. 54). I explore these further in the 
limitations section of this paper. 
3.3.2. Research Design 
 The three main constructs in my research model are ICT adoption, MFI 
operations, and outreach. My research materials converge on these constructs and 
allow me to show in detail the relationships between them. Each of these 
constructs has multiple dimensions as prior research suggests. For example, ICT 
adoption can be hardware and software related; it may result from a change in 
internal processes, and/or it may be a consequence of a country-level 
infrastructure policy. Initially, I planned to apply Kroenke’s (2012) elements of an 
information system to categorize ICT adoption changes, but not be restricted by it, 
as I expect new, meaningful categories to emerge from my field observations. 
Similarly, I expect the impact that ICT adoption may have on MFI operations to 
fall into common discernible categories such as those related to security, 
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transaction processing, data quality, communication, and loan application 
evaluation. Finally, I measured the impact on outreach in terms of poverty and 
geographic outreach, as stated in my research questions. 
My research design is intended to answer in detail how these specific ICT 
adoption changes impact particular MFI operations. ICTs can either impact 
outreach directly or through MFI operations as a mediator. I will map 
relationships between ICT adoption categories, MFI operations impacted, and 
MFI outreach categories by analyzing the quantity of ICT changes that impact 
specific outreach categories. After I compile my research materials, I expect these 
relationships to reveal themselves as patterns.  
 My research design employs a multiple case study approach. Single case 
studies are necessary in the context of a unique, rare, or critical scenario, such as 
an academic institution prototyping an innovative classroom technology (Yin 
2008). Multiple case study approaches result in studies that are more robust 
(Herriott and Firestone 1983). Research materials for this study come from 14 
different MFIs across 8 countries. While MFIs around the world exhibit many 
differences with respect to operations, technological capabilities, and clientele 
among others, the context of this study are MFIs around the world and not a 
specific subset of MFIs. I pool the findings from research materials and observe 
common patterns in order to test my theory through a clear set of propositions. 
The logic underlying the multiple case studies in my research design is termed as 
literal replication; it is advised against treating case studies as a sample of cases 
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or to treat a single case study as a respondent in a survey (Yin 2008). I detail the 
choice of the cases and collection of my research materials in the next section. 
3.4. Research Material Collection 
Items used for analysis in qualitative studies are considered research materials 
(Myers 1997), not data implying rows and columns of words, numbers, and 
figures. My research materials are from multiple primary sources (interviews, 
fieldwork, direct observation, written data sources, and e-mail messages). The 
unit of analysis for this study is the MFI. For interview and e-mail responses, the 
data collection source is a staff member at an MFI or a Kiva Fellow assigned to 
an MFI. For fieldwork and direct observations, the data collection source is the 
organization itself. The unit of analysis is synonymous with case in case study 
research (Yin 2008). According to the grid in Figure 7, the optimal case study 
method to determine how and why an MFI works occurs by collecting data from 
multiple individuals about the organization. My research falls mainly into the 
bottom left quadrant of Yin’s (2008) framework. 
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Figure 7  Data Sources, Units of Analysis, and Study Conclusions (Source:  
Yin 2008) 
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My research materials were collected from three types of sources. Between 
August 2011 and November 2011, I volunteered as a Kiva Fellow at Kredit 
Microfinance and VisionFund Cambodia, two MFIs headquartered in Phnom 
Penh, Cambodia. “Since 2007, the Kiva Fellows Program offered over 400 
individuals a rare opportunity to put their skills to work in support of global 
microfinance. Applicants chosen for the program serve as Kiva’s eyes and ears on 
the ground, working directly with microfinance institution (MFI) field partners in 
over 60 countries around the globe.”31  As a Kiva Fellow, I followed a work plan 
working alongside MFI staff, visiting borrowers in the field, and liaising between 
Kiva and their network of field partners. This opportunity permitted me to 
conduct extended face-to-face, in-depth interviews with staff at not just these two, 
but also other MFIs in Cambodia. The second set of research materials addresses 
                                                 
31www.kiva.org/fellows 
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the limited country-centric nature of my interviews. I employed the services of 
other Kiva Fellow colleagues stationed at MFIs in other parts of the world - South 
America, Central America, Eastern Europe, Asia, and Africa. I communicated 
with them extensively and gathered e-mail responses regarding ICT usage and 
MFI operations/outreach with respect to the MFIs where they were stationed. The 
third set of research materials consist of fieldwork and direct observations while 
closely working with, and performing tasks for, a subset of the interviewed MFIs 
in Cambodia. 
3.4.1. Research Material #1: In-Depth Interviews 
I personally conducted in-depth interviews with eleven staff members at six MFIs 
in Cambodia. The shortest interview I conducted lasted one hour and the longest 
spanned many conversations over the period of several days. The strengths of the 
interviews lie in the fact that they focus directly on the topic of a case study, and 
they provide unique insights on causal relationships and explanations (Yin 2008). 
In an ideal environment, a researcher will choose which cases “most likely 
illuminate your research questions” (Yin 2008, p. 19). I were not afforded the 
luxury of case study choice since my Kiva Fellowship was limited to Cambodia. 
During in-depth interviews, the researcher collects facts in addition to the 
interviewees’ opinions. Case study methodologists contrast this with focused 
interviews, which are characterized by questions with little deviation from the 
original list of questions for the purposes of fact corroboration. On the other hand, 
structured formal surveys collect quantitative survey data from participants in 
conjunction with other qualitative research materials (Yin 2008). The interviews 
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for this study consisted of many follow-up questions where the researcher 
explored the opinions and ideas of the interviewees such as, “What is a 
technology that you would like to see implemented to make you more productive, 
save you time, or make your job easier?”   
I approached these interviews with a prepared list of 13 multi-part questions 
created prior to arrival in Cambodia. This list of prepared questions is available in 
Appendix A. The actual interviews often deviated from my prepared list of 
questions upon discussing an interesting anecdote, company history, or staff 
member opinions. Interviews in case study research are recommended to be 
“guided conversations rather than structured queries. In other words, although [the 
researcher] will be pursuing a consistent line of inquiry, [the researcher’s] actual 
stream of questions in a case study interview is likely to be fluid rather than rigid” 
(Rubin & Rubin 1995). Not only are the direct responses an important part of the 
research materials, but also are the researcher’s inferences about how events 
transpired. Convergent evidence from multiple interviews, physical evidence, and 
common sense formulate the basis for these inferences (Yin 2008). 
During the interviews, I collected notes on interviewee responses. I did not 
record the audio of my conducted interviews, which is recommended by some 
case study methodologists for reasons including completeness, improved 
recollection, an ability to use quotes in publication, and because it frees the 
researcher from the distraction of typing notes during conversation. Other case 
study researchers do not recommend recording interviews for drawbacks such as 
making the interviewee more nervous, making the researcher less of an active 
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listener, difficulty in locating passages, and a high time and financial cost of 
transcription (Belanger 1999). The decision to use recording devices depends on 
several factors including the content of the interviews and company policy. 
Despite the arguments for and against the use of recording devices, it is a choice 
of personal preference (Yin 2008). 
One memorable interview resulted through a social connection at an event in 
Phnom Penh. A fellow expatriate aid worker mentioned that his local Khmer-
speaking church manages Our Farmers Fund in which church members and 
foreigners are owner-investors for microlending to poor church members and 
rural villagers. I requested the contact information of the fund manager and met 
him for an afternoon discussion. The fund manager is the only employee at Our 
Farmers Fund and manages a $15,000 loan portfolio. When I ascertained that he 
tracks the entire operation in a series of Excel spreadsheets, I asked for more 
information on his system’s capabilities. I was pleased to learn that he carried his 
laptop and subsequently volunteered to show me his spreadsheets. I observed how 
he added a new investor and loan to the system, and recorded a repayment. Each 
of these processes was a labor intensive task. I struck a good friendship, and he 
even volunteered to take me on the back of his motorbike to my next appointment 
in Phnom Penh. Following my discussion, we e-mailed back and forth on the 
topics of open source microfinance loan management software, profiles on 
MixMarket, and setting up web profiles to make Our Farmers Fund more 
attractive to outside funding. 
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3.4.2. Research Material #2: Kiva Fellow E-mail Responses 
Eight Kiva Fellows located in countries outside of Southeast Asia participated in 
collecting information from their respective MFIs on my behalf and 
communicated the information to me via extensive e-mails. These Kiva Fellows 
were embedded in their respective societies on similar assignments with similar 
responsibilities. They worked as closely as I did with their MFI staff, borrowers, 
and computer systems. Each had two to eight months of field experience before I 
gathered their input. To structure their approach, each was asked a simplified 
version of the open-ended question set I used in Cambodia. They were 
encouraged to describe any examples they might have observed with respect to 
ICT impacting poverty and geographic outreach. The examples they shared were 
from their respective geographic regions and assigned microfinance institutions. 
Responses from Kiva Fellows in seven different countries ranged from 171 to 
518 words with a mean of 326.25 words and a standard deviation of 99.04 words. 
The strengths of documentation research materials like e-mails include stability 
since they are unobtrusive, exact, and can be reviewed indefinitely (Yin 2008). 
The ICT penetration of the countries represented varies heavily. On the low end is 
Sierra Leone with 0.002 Internet users per capita (ranking order #206 out of 210 
countries)32. Turkey ranked the highest with 0.180 Internet users per capita (rank 
#103). The average penetration for the countries represented in my research 
materials is 0.056. 
                                                 
32http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/int_use_percap-internet-users-per-capita.  Data source: 
CIA World Factbooks from 2003 to 2008. 
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3.4.3. Research Material #3: Fieldwork and Direct Observation 
Another component of the research materials consist of researcher observations. 
These observations are a valid component since I employed ethnography, which 
requires a significant amount of field time immersed in the organizations I studied 
(Lewis 1985, p.380). Both the fieldwork I performed as a Kiva Fellow and the 
experiences of living and working among Cambodian MFI staff members 
complement the more formalized interview and e-mail research materials. I spent 
the weekdays of my 3-month Kiva Fellowship in the offices of MFI headquarters. 
The manager assigned me a desk, and I attended meetings, interviewed staff for 
positions, met borrowers in rural villages, visited branches, analyzed systems 
implementation proposals, edited web content, provided training on Kiva web 
tools and procedures, and wrote documentation. While these tasks did not result in 
documentable research materials for use in analysis, the tacit knowledge gained 
from these experiences indirectly influenced the questions I asked in interviews, 
the methodology used in data analysis, and other common sense logic (Yin 2008) 
used to relate ICT to MFI operations and finally to MFI outreach performance. 
The strengths of direct observation and fieldwork research materials lie in the 
fact that they cover events in real time, enhance the tacit knowledge of the 
researcher and cover the context of the case in a more complete fashion (Yin 
2008). I also developed personal relationships with my Cambodian colleagues at 
daily breakfasts and lunches, weekly staff devotional meetings, and the occasional 
game of volleyball after work. Phnom Penh also hosts an active expatriate 
community of which I was a part. Many personal acquaintances shared 
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connections and opinions on the microfinance industry that led to frequent casual 
conversations regarding the issues facing the microfinance industry in Cambodia. 
Table 8 summarizes the sources and content of all research materials used in my 
analysis. 
Table 8  Source Research Material Summary 
MFI Name Country 
In-Depth Interviews 
by the Investigator 
Interview 
Material from 
other Kiva 
Fellows 
Fieldwork / Direct 
Observation of the 
Investigator 
Banco D-MIRO Ecuador n/a yes n/a 
BRAC Sierra Leone Sierra Leone n/a yes n/a 
Center for 
Community 
Transformation 
Philippines n/a yes n/a 
Cooperativa San 
José (CSJ) Ecuador n/a yes n/a 
CREDIT World 
Relief Cambodia • Founder n/a n/a 
Hattha Kaksekar 
Limited (HKL) Cambodia 
• Environmental 
Social Officer 
• V. P. of Operations 
and COO 
n/a n/a 
IMON International Tajikistan n/a yes n/a 
Kredit 
Microfinance Cambodia 
• Reissue 
Coordinating 
Officer 
• Network Unit 
Manager 
• Partnership & 
Staff Loan Officer 
• Kiva Coordinator 
n/a Fieldwork and direct observation 
Maxima 
Mikroheranhvatho, 
Plc. 
Cambodia 
• Kiva Coordinator 
• Assistant IT 
Manager 
n/a n/a 
Maya Turkey n/a yes n/a 
Micro Start Burkina Faso n/a yes n/a 
Our Farmer Fund Cambodia • Fund Manager n/a n/a 
SMEP Deposit 
Taking 
Microfinance 
Limited 
Kenya n/a yes n/a 
VisionFund 
Cambodia Cambodia • Treasury Manager n/a 
Fieldwork and 
direct observation 
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3.5. Analysis and Findings 
I utilize a combination of grounded theory building, semiotics, and pattern 
matching to analyze my research materials. This section provides an explanation 
and justification of my analysis methodologies. The first of these, grounded 
theory building, suggests that data collection and analysis are interrelated parallel 
tasks as opposed to traditional methods where data collection starts and finishes 
before data analysis (Martin and Turner 1986). Grounded theory building 
suggests that an initial starting point is to “play” with collected research materials. 
It was through this process of reviewing and categorizing responses that led 
me to semiotics, where words and signs from research materials are assigned 
primary conceptual categories. These categories represent components to be 
tested (Myers 1997). In the responses to interview questions, interviewees spoke 
about (1) changes their MFI made in ICT, (2) the impact that those changes had 
on MFI operations, and (3) the impact that ICT and MFI operations changes had 
on poverty and geographic outreach. These three elements comprise the primary 
components of my theory and initial research model. These primary conceptual 
categories serve as building blocks fora pattern-matching mode of analysis. 
3.5.1. Pattern Matching Analysis 
Pattern matching is a process that aims to determine links between categories 
through anecdotal evidence or frequency of occurrences (Yin 2008). Researchers 
use this methodology to compare empirically based patterns with predicted ones. 
If the patterns collide, the results can help a case study to strengthen its internal 
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validity (Trochim 1989, Yin 2008). Pattern matching is a preferred case study 
analysis methodology when answering how and why research questions requiring 
full and rich explanations of phenomena occurring within a context (Yin 2008). I 
followed the six steps recommended by Miles and Huberman (1994) for pattern 
matching analysis: 
(1) Putting the information into different arrays. I tagged text within my 
interview and e-mail response notes with specific references made to the three 
variables of interest: ICT adoption activities, the impact of these changes on MFI 
operations, and the impact on MFI poverty and geographic outreach. I recognized 
25 different individual ICT adoption activities and classified these into seven 
categories of ICT adoption. In most cases, ICT adoption activities spanned 
multiple categories. Database change tracking, for example, fits in the Database 
category while call centers fit into the Hardware and Telephony categories. 
As mentioned earlier, I initially based the conceptual categories on Kroenke’s 
(2012) five elements of information systems: hardware, software, people, 
processes, and data, made modifications to this list to improve their applicability 
to the microfinance context while mapping my interview responses. These 
changes included breaking out Telephony (TEL) and Networking (NET) as 
separate elements from Hardware (HW) and Software (SW), removing Kroenke’s 
“people” element due to a lack of responses in that area, and adding Infrastructure 
as a new country-level element since the countries in which MFIs operate are in 
various stages of technological infrastructure maturity with many in infancy. 
Figure 8 shows the seven ICT adoption categories along with their two or three 
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letter abbreviations in the format that will be used in later figures and analyses. 
Table 9 lists the 25 ICT adoption activities and the category(s) that each fit. 
Figure 8 ICT Adoption Categories Template 
 
Table 9  ICT Adoption Activities and Categories 
 
ICT adoption activity DB SW POL INF NET HW TEL 
Role-based user-access-rights MIS    
    Interactive and flexible real-time financial 
reporting        
Nationwide centralized risk database   
 
 
   MIS evolution (paper-spreadsheet-in house-
client/server)        
Computerized market research   
     Integration between loan system and 
accounting system        
CRM software   
     Change tracking  
      Migration from faxing to scan/e-mail 
 
 
  
  
 Skype adoption and online conferencing 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Remote desktop 
 
 
  
 
  VPN adoption 
 
 
  
 
  Off-site data backup 
  
 
 
  
 ATM system adoption and expansion 
   
   
 Increased branch Internet connection 
   
  
  Improved bandwidth 
   
 
   Country-level infrastructure improvements 
   
 
   PDAs for loan officers 
    
  
 Electronic money transfers 
    
 
  Call center 
     
  
Mobile banking 
     
  
Replacing dated PCs 
     
 
 Digital photography of borrowers 
     
 
 Mobile communication between MFIs and 
borrowers        
ICT Adoption Categories
Database
(DB)
Software
(SW)
Policy
(POL)
Infrastructure
(INF)
Networking
(NET)
Hardware
(HW)
Telephony
(TEL)
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I similarly analyzed my tagged research materials for consistent patterns 
where respondents shared how they observed ICT adoption impacting MFI 
operations. Interviews, e-mails, as well as field notes, repeatedly mentioned the 
following nine categories of MFI operations impacted by ICT adoption. Table 10 
lists the nine MFI operations constructs along with the explanation of the positive 
impact the ICT adoption had through these operational improvements. 
Table 10  MFI Operations Change Constructs 
MFI operations 
construct Explanation of ICT’s impact  
Flexible Loan 
Products 
Allows MFIs to offer a wider range of loan products or more flexible loan 
products with advanced software and loan tracking systems 
Loan Monitoring Decreases late payments and loan defaults via real time reporting and linked branch databases 
Portfolio Analysis Prevents multiple-lending to borrowers and decreases portfolio risk 
Data Immediacy Allows for decisions and loans to be made more quickly 
Data Reliability Decreases mistakes, mitigates data loss through offsite data backups, affords less error-prone human intervention due to mobile banking 
Transaction 
Processing 
Allows electronic disbursements, computerization and automation of loan 
disbursements and payments 
Communications 
Increases communication frequency between borrowers with mobile-phones 
and loan officers without the need for a face-to-face visit at the branch or 
village 
Security 
Allows electronic fund transfers instead of cash manually carried by MFI 
staff and vehicles, prevents malicious access to data and allows user-rights 
based roles in internal databases/software, using firewalls, authentication, etc. 
Branch Banking Increases the ability to open or sustain branches in geographic regions distant from headquarters 
 
(2) Making a matrix of categories and placing the evidence within such 
categories. I consistently observed many interactions between the conceptual 
categories of ICT adoption and the impact of these ICT adoption activities on 
operations. Table 6 shows the resulting matrix of the direct impacts of ICT 
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changes on MFI operations as gathered from the research materials. The cells are 
populated with a designation of High (H) or Low (L) denoting the “strength” of 
impact that the ICT adoption activity had on each of the nine MFI operations 
constructs. This strength is a composite measure that includes: (1) the number of 
respondents that related the same impact, (2) the perceived intensity of the impact 
in their response, and (3) the investigator’s evaluation based on fieldwork and 
direct observations. For example, many respondents indicated a large impact of 
MIS upgrades on their MFI’s ability to expand their suite of loan products, thus 
deserving an ‘H’ designation in the cell for MIS evolution’s impact on Flexible 
Loan Products. Conversely, the impact that interactive real-time reporting has on 
flexible loan products is minor, given the weakness of research materials to justify 
this connection or minimal respondents noting this connection. Thus, I populate 
this cell with an ‘L.’ Finally, no respondents shared that adopting role-based user 
access rights in their MIS had impact on Flexible Loan Products, nor did I witness 
this connection in my fieldwork or direct observations. Therefore, this particular 
cell is left empty. One can see in Table 6 that each ICT adoption activity impacted 
at least one of the nine MFI operations constructs and each MFI operations 
improvement was resulted from at least 5 of the 25 ICT changes. 
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Table 11  ICT Changes and MFI Operations Relationship Matrix 
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Role-based user-access-rights MIS     H   H L 
Interactive and flexible real-time 
financial reporting L H H H L  L  L 
Nationwide centralized risk database  H H  L     
MIS evolution (paper-spreadsheet-in-
house-client/server) H H H H H H L L L 
Computerized market research H L H  L    H 
Integration between loan system and 
accounting system H   H H H L   
CRM software H L H    L  L 
Change tracking     H   L  
Migration from faxing to scan/e-mail    H  H L L  
Skype adoption and online 
conferencing    L  L H  H 
Remote desktop    H  L H  H 
VPN adoption    H  L H   
Off-site data backup     H   L  
ATM system adoption and expansion  L  H H H L H L 
Increased branch Internet connection    H L H H  H 
Improved bandwidth    H  H H  H 
Country-level infrastructure 
improvements    H  H H  H 
PDAs for loan officers    H H H H  L 
Electronic money transfers  L  H H H H H H 
Call center  L     H  L 
Mobile banking L H  H H H H H L 
Replacing dated PCs    L   L   
Digital photography of borrowers     L     
Mobile communication between 
MFIs and borrowers  H  H L L H L  
 
(3) Creating data displays – flowcharts and other graphics – for 
examining the data. In this step, I map (1) the direct relationships between ICT 
adoption categories and MFI operations, (2) the direct relationships between ICT 
adoption categories and MFI outreach, and (3) the mediated relationship of ICT 
adoption on MFI outreach through MFI operations. Rectangles in the top third 
represent the seven categories of ICT adoption, rectangles in the middle third 
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represent MFI operations impacted by ICT, and the diamonds in the bottom of the 
diagram represent MFI outreach. The resulting image depicting the three sets of 
relationships is shown in Figure 9. The next step examines my research materials 
through this template. 
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(4) Tabulating the frequency of different events, (5) Examining the 
complexity of such tabulations, (6) Putting information in chronological 
order or using some other temporal scheme. The rationale for the 
determination of mapping the relationships is laid out in this step. First, to 
determine if a relationship exists between an element of ICT adoption and an 
element of MFI operations, I considered the quantity of ICT adoption activities 
where I observed a relationship in my research materials. Consider the 
relationship between Infrastructure (INF) and Loan Monitoring as an example. 
Only one ICT adoption activity under Infrastructure, “nationwide centralized risk 
database”, exhibited a high impact on improving loan monitoring. Now consider 
Data Immediacy, which was impacted at a high level by four ICT adoption 
activities under Infrastructure. I recognized that my categorization of ICT 
adoption activities into elemental categories sacrifices some of the granularity of 
my visual model. The sacrifice was made for the benefit of visual simplicity; a 
complete mapping incorporating all relationships can be reconstructed using the 
data from Table 11. The quantity of relationships between the ICT adoption 
categorical elements and MFI operations are shown in Table 12. High (H) and 
low (L) Cell values are separated with a ‘/’. The table can be interpreted as 
follows: The ‘4/1’ in the top left cell reflects that 4 ICT adoption activities 
assigned to the Database category showed a high impact on Funding Access and 1 
activity assigned to the Database Category had a low impact on Funding Access. 
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Table 12  Direct Relationship Mapping 
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Database (DB) 4/1 3/2 5/0 3/0 4/3 2/0 0/4 1/2 1/4 
Policy (POL) 4/1 3/2 5/0 6/1 3/3 3/3 3/5 1/2 3/4 
Software (SW) 0/1 1/0 1/0 1/0 2/1 0/0 0/1 1/0 0/2 
Infrastructure (INF) 0/0 1/1 1/0 4/0 1/2 4/0 3/1 1/0 3/1 
Networking (NET) 0/0 0/2 0/0 7/1 4/1 5/3 6/2 2/2 4/2 
Hardware (HW) 1/1 2/2 1/0 5/1 5/1 5/0 3/4 2/3 0/5 
Telephony (TEL) 0/1 2/1 1/2 2/1 1/1 1/2 4/0 1/1 1/2 
Total High (H)  9 12 14 28 20 20 19 9 12 
Total Low (L) 5 10 2 4 12 8 17 10 20 
(note: High/Low)          
 
To map mediated relationships between MFI operations impacts and outreach, 
I followed a similar approach of research material analysis, i.e., based my 
inferences on convergent evidence from witnesses and field observation, as well 
as some “unspecifiable element of common sense” (Yin 2008, p. 58). In other 
words, I noted where responses connect an ICT adoption at their MFI with the 
changes that resulted from it. Rationale for these mediated relationships is shown 
in Table 13. 
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Table 13  Mediated Relationship Rationale 
MFI operations impact Mediated impact on poverty 
outreach 
Mediated impact on geographic 
outreach 
Flexible Loan 
Products 
Many, flexible loan products can 
meet the specific needs of the 
poorest borrowers better than 
few, specific loan products 
n/a 
Loan Monitoring 
Borrowers who repay loans do 
not put their collateral at risk and 
benefit from greater access to 
future loans 
n/a 
Portfolio Analysis 
Protects borrowers from 
accepting loans to repay other 
loans or loans they cannot repay 
n/a 
Data Immediacy 
Reduced loan application 
processing time leads to faster 
funds disbursement 
Electronic fund transfers allow 
MFIs to lend to geographically 
remote regions as quickly as close 
regions 
Data Reliability 
Ensures that the right loans are 
made to the right borrowers and 
market analysis reveals which 
borrowers to target. 
Market analysis reveals unbanked / 
low banked geographic regions to 
reach out to 
Transaction 
Processing n/a 
Lending to distant borrowers is less 
cost-prohibitive 
Communication n/a 
Lower time-cost of information 
exchange between MFI branch and 
distant borrowers 
Security n/a 
Electronic transmission of funds is 
just as secure over long distances as 
short distances 
Branch Banking n/a 
Borrowers have less distance to 
travel to conduct business at an 
MFI office 
  
I present my research model populated with our findings in Figure 10. The 
grid of numbers in Figure 10 reflects the quantity of high impact mappings from 
ICT adoption categories to an MFI operations construct. The set of seven numbers 
in each MFI operations construct represents the direct causal relationships from 
each of the ICT adoption categories. These numbers follow the same pattern as 
the template in the ICT adoption categories at the top of the figure. For example, 
the ‘4’ in the top-left cell of the Flexible Products operations construct represents 
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that four ICT adoption activities assigned to the Database category imposed 
impacts with a high (H) designation on Flexible Products. Similarly, the ‘1’ in the 
bottom right cell of the Branch Banking operations construct represents that only 
one ICT adoption activity assigned to the Telephony category resulted in a high 
(H) impact on Branch Banking. 
I employ categorical classification rather than using a numeric threshold to 
determine if a relationship exists between an ICT category and an element of MFI 
operations for several reasons. First, setting a numeric threshold would risk faulty 
interpretations of my findings. If I claim that two or three low impacts are 
equivalent to one high impact, I risk stating that a high impact is two or three 
times stronger than a low impact, which is an interpretation without any basis. 
Secondly, I avoid risking over-quantifying my qualitative data, which is a 
temptation when analyzing case studies and warned against in the methods 
literature (Myers 1997, Yin 2008). 
Because outreach contains only two categories, I use grouped arrows to depict 
the relationships between MFI operations and outreach. The leftmost seven 
elements of MFI operations impact Poverty Outreach, the rightmost six elements 
impact Geographic Outreach, and the middle four elements influence both. 
103 
Fi
gu
re
 
10
 
R
es
ea
rc
h 
M
o
de
l w
ith
 
R
el
a
tio
n
sh
ip
s 
 
 
104 
3.5.2. Findings 
The populated research model in Figure 10 provides an informed framework for 
analyzing the nature of the impact of ICT adoption on MFI operations and 
outreach. My first observation uncovered that all of the impact of ICT adoption on 
outreach is mediated through MFI operations. Although some respondents said 
that when their MFI adopted a certain technology, it allowed them to extend their 
geographic or poverty outreach, follow-up questioning revealed this was because 
the ICT has some impact on an element of their operations that, in turn, enabled 
outreach improvements. This finding is interesting as it suggests that ICTs do not, 
and perhaps cannot, directly impact outreach and MFIs must first realize changes 
in their operations by leveraging ICTs before they can realize changes in 
outreach. These findings also lead me to favor the mediated model over the direct 
effects model. Proposition 2, which suggests a direct impact of ICT adoption on 
outreach, is not supported by my qualitative analysis. Overall, a strong case exists 
for MFIs to make appropriate changes to their operational processes resulting 
from ICT adoption. This, in turn, enables extension of geographic and poverty 
outreach. 
Next, I determine from my model that different categories of ICT impact 
different operations and, in turn, different kinds of outreach. Database, Software, 
and Policy ICT adoption categories seemed to impact the five leftmost operations 
impacts more than the right four. These adoption categories strengthen financial 
flexibility and knowledge to a greater extent than the remaining four categories 
and thus lead to greater poverty outreach. The remaining ICT adoption categories 
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(Infrastructure, Networking, Hardware, and Telephony), conversely, impact the 
six rightmost elements more than the left three. These categories share an ability 
to enable coordination and connectivity to a greater extent than the other three 
adoption categories and lead to greater geographic outreach. Data Immediacy and 
Data Reliability were unique with strong impacts from all of the categories in my 
analysis. I visually set the order of the MFI operations elements in a way to 
emphasize the differences in these categories. This is evident when looking at the 
numbers in the top row compared with the bottom row. The leftmost MFI 
operations elements have relatively larger top rows and relatively smaller bottom 
rows. As one moves from the left to the right, the relatively larger numbers swap 
places from the top row to the bottom row while the relatively smaller numbers 
swap places from the bottom row to the top row. 
Similarly, I highlight areas for observation on MFI operations and outreach. 
The ICT adoption categories that I recognized as enabling financial flexibility and 
knowledge impacted the MFI operations that enable Poverty Outreach. One can 
relate to this finding because the greatest barriers of lending to poor clients 
include loan products that are not tailored to meet the needs of the poorest (such 
as disbursement and repayment schedules, interest accrual, penalties, collaterals, 
etc.). Likewise, ICT adoption categories I recognized as providing coordination 
and connectivity benefits demonstrated a greater impact on MFI operations that 
enable Geographic Outreach. This makes sense because the greatest barriers of 
lending to those who are geographically distant are difficulties in coordinating 
and connecting with these clients. 
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3.5.3. Tests for Robustness in Case Study Research 
Qualitative research methods lack numerical tests for quality and strength such as 
degrees of freedom, p-values, R-squared values, or tests of heteroskedasticity. 
Despite the lack of these quantitative approaches, I can still determine the quality 
and robustness of our study based on the following four tests (Yin 2008). 
Test #1: Construct validity. This is a test to determine if my study identified 
the correct operational measures. I took two steps to meet the test of construct 
validity. First, the nature of the initial change must be defined in terms of specific 
contexts. My study uses ICT adoption as the element of ‘initial change,’ and my 
method categorized these adoption activities using a version of Kroenke’s (2012) 
elements of an information system modified for my specific context and research 
materials. Second, the operational measures must match the concepts. I cite other 
theories and studies throughout my research that inform my theory building. Also, 
using multiple sources of evidence, like the 14 MFIs in my research material 
collection, promotes construct validity. 
Test #2: Internal validity. Since this research seeks to establish causal 
relationships between the elements in my model, a test of internal validity is 
critical (Cook & Campbell 1979). However, since I cannot directly observe all 
ICT changes and their consequences, I must develop inferences. Internal validity 
tests if I have made the correct inferences and if the evidence is convergent. I 
attempt to address internal validity requirements by specifically searching for 
some of the rival explanations. I acknowledge that other unobserved factors likely 
contribute to improvements in operations and outreach. ICT adoption is one of 
107 
several alternatives leading to improvements in the outreach capabilities of MFIs. 
One such rival explanation is that wealthier MFIs are able to invest in technology 
and dedicate more capital lending stock toward poor and distant clients, resulting 
in correlation between the two elements, but not necessarily causation. Another 
explanation is that outside funders share an increasing tendency to fund MFIs 
with a proven track record of strong outreach performance. In my research 
materials I did not observe support for these rival explanations. Interviewees 
responded that outreach came about by improvements in operations that were 
only possible through the adoption of certain ICTs. Part of my inference is based 
on not only what interviewees said, but also on what they did not say. 
Respondents did not openly declare that their MFI’s impetus for improving their 
outreach performance was due to pressure from outside funding agencies. A 
second method of establishing internal validity is to use a pattern-matching mode 
of analysis, like the one utilized in this study, where I relied on the frequency of 
observed cause-effect relationships (Yin 2008). 
Test #3: External validity. Through the research process, I determined how 
ICT changes flow to operations and outreach changes at the level of the MFI. I 
have evidence that this is true for the 14 MFIs I investigated, but what about the 
other thousands of MFIs around the world?  What about other industries that have 
geographic and poverty barriers to their client base?  This test reveals if my 
findings apply outside of my case study pool of MFIs (Yin 2008). The key to 
demonstrating external reliability is through generalizability. I collected research 
materials at several MFIs spread over multiple continents. When pooled and 
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placed into the framework of my model, the research materials fit into common 
patterns. Future research replicating my study may find results that deviate from 
ours, but given my sizeable and geographically diverse representation of MFIs, I 
anticipate more overlap from one replication to another. I address these concerns 
further in the limitations section of my conclusion. It is incorrect to treat case 
studies as records in a statistical dataset where a sample generalizes to a larger 
population since qualitative research relies on statistical generalization, mentioned 
earlier in Section 3.2.  
Test #4: Reliability. The goal of reliability is to ensure that future researchers 
should arrive at the same conclusions if conducting the same case study at a later 
time. The objective of this test is to minimize errors and biases within my study 
(Yin 2008). I address reliability by documenting my procedures, asking the same 
questions at each MFI and with each respondent, and assigning equal weight to 
each interviewee’s responses. Moreover, maintaining a case study database of not 
merely the list of the people and organizations visited, but also field notes, a 
narrative organizing findings, citations, and interview responses by question (as I 
have done) also contributes to reliability (Bickman and Rog 1997). 
3.6. Three Anecdotes 
This section narrates three anecdotes from my research materials to 
demonstrate how they led to the elements and relationships that exist in my 
research model. These anecdotes exemplify how a specific ICT adoption activity 
at an MFI impacts operations and outreach. 
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3.6.1. Anecdote #1: Daily data CD deliveries at HKL 
HKL has a mission of commitment to long-term social and financial sustainability 
to its Cambodian clients and accomplishes this by providing loans, savings 
accounts, and other financial services to women and low-income rural families. 
FAO-GTZ Microbanker Project, an international NGO, developed HKL’s MIS 
system in 2006, an upgrade from their previous Microsoft Excel-based system. 
The system, Microbanker Window, was offline requiring all data not entered 
directly on the server to be exported to CD-Rs and imported into the MIS server’s 
database. HKL’s network of 105 branches (48 of which are service offices and 
have no computer systems) wrote data to CD-Rs and sent the media with 
company drivers on a daily or weekly basis for transport to headquarters for 
import. 
In 2011, HKL replaced Microbanker Window with a core banking system 
from an American software developer. This new software allows HKLs branches 
to read and write MIS data in real-time, making the CD-R data exports obsolete. 
In terms of my research model, this particular ICT adoption activity consists of 
both database and software elements. I assign it to the Venn diagram intersection 
between these two ovals. Since implementing the new software, HKL is 
experiencing greater data immediacy and reliability. Managers at HKL’s 
headquarters in Phnom Penh have an immediate and accurate view of loans 
outstanding, and payments received. Branches also have a more immediate view 
into the MIS system of funds for distribution to borrowing clients. This has 
lowered the waiting period for borrowers. Immediacy of funds is more important 
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to the poorest borrowers since they have fewer funds available for emergencies. 
Their new linked database core banking system also allows HKL to open more 
branches in remote areas where the costs of regularly transporting CD-Rs were 
prohibitively high. Branch banking, in turn, enables MFIs to lend to clients who 
live in these remote areas, supporting geographic outreach. 
3.6.2. Anecdote #2: PDAs for loan officers at Cooperativa San José 
Cooperativa San José (CSJ) in Ecuador is a credit union giving borrowers 
membership and voting rights in organizational decisions. Investments in Ecuador 
are considered risky since the country experienced a $10 billion foreign debt 
default in 2008. As a result, MFIs like CSJ struggle to receive outside funding and 
asked to pay higher interest rates than their South American counterparts in other 
countries. 
Recently, CSJ invested in a technological initiative providing PDAs to their 
loan officer staff. These PDAs replace previous paper-based tasks associated with 
visiting borrowers in the field. Before this investment, loan officers prepared for 
an outing by collecting printed repayment schedules, payment receipt forms, and 
deposit forms at headquarters before departing to visit borrowers. If an 
unexpected encounter occurred with a borrower, the loan officer returned to 
headquarters to collect their documentation. After investing in the PDA 
technology, CSJ can receive payments, savings deposits, and withdrawals 
instantly without requiring their borrowers to visit a branch office. The PDAs are 
also equipped with embedded Bluetooth printers to provide receipts to customers 
on demand. 
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 With this new technology, CSJ experiences reduced transaction cost. The 
time and costs associated with completing transactions in the field both decrease. 
It increases communication between loan officers and their branch office or 
headquarters through real-time connectivity. Up-to-date and accurate data is 
available to loan officers during their meetings with clients revealing an 
improvement in data reliability and data immediacy. Whereas before, the data was 
only as up-to-date as the time of printing in the office, and any handwritten 
information was more prone to human error. Each of these operations impacts 
improves CSJ’s capacity for both poverty and geographic outreach for the reasons 
stated in Table 13. 
3.6.3. Anecdote #3: Increased Internet bandwidth at VisionFund Cambodia 
Developing countries suffer from poor Internet bandwidth availability. Even for 
those organizations willing to pay, service is either unavailable or slow and 
intermittent. VisionFund Cambodia recently increased their bandwidth from 
128kb/s to 512kb/s. (Compare this with standard home Internet service for 
personal use in America, which ranges from 12Mb/s to 20Mb/s.)  Since 
implementing the change, they can now provide more active and rich content to 
funders and on their Internet profiles. They communicate with their Western 
funders and partners on Skype videoconferences when previously they had to rely 
on expensive international voice-only phone calls with less media richness (Daft 
and Lengel 1984, Daft et al. 1987). 
In a developing economy like Cambodia where vehicles and gasoline are 
relatively more expensive than labor as compared with Western countries, 
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transportation costs account for a greater percentage of operational expenses. 
Skype replaced many face-to-face meetings between VisionFund branches and 
headquarters which previously required the time and expense of vehicular 
transport. Staff members now e-mail large attachments, reducing the costs of 
printing and shipping paper documents. Branches also currently receive 
information more quickly and by being more attractive to funding organizations, 
VisionFund has subsequently more funds to lend to poor and distant borrowers 
with shorter delays. 
These few examples of improvements caused by ICT result in broader 
outreach. Other interesting anecdotes worth mentioning include (1) adopting of 
new software allowing customizable loan products at VisionFund Cambodia, 
directly impacting the flexibility they offer to their poorest clients, (2) mining 
regional socioeconomic data at Kredit Microfinance to determine which regions 
and villages in Cambodia are the poorest and farthest from bank branches, (3) IT 
staff resolving branch computer issues remotely from headquarters using remote 
desktop networking, resulting in considerable transportation and time cost-savings 
at Kredit Microfinance, (4) equipping loans officers with camera-enabled 
cellphones ($20 more than a non-camera equipped mobile phone) instead of a 
separate, more expensive digital camera at Banco D-MIRO enabling them to 
conduct business in unsafe neighborhoods avoided by most financial institutions, 
and (5) implementing a nation-wide electronic credit risk database, Central de 
Riesgos in Ecuador, lowing over-indebtedness and providing documentable credit 
history accessible by MFIs operating within the country. 
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3.7. Future Research 
In this section, I propose a quantitative study at the level of analysis of the MFI 
informed by the findings of my qualitative study. If the data support the 
hypotheses suggested below, my claims strengthen through triangulation where 
two methodologies converge on the same finding (Myers 1997). The proposed 
research model, depicted in Figure 11, mimics the qualitative study, where MFI 
operations performance acts as a mediator between ICT adoption and MFI 
outreach. Hypotheses for this proposal stem from the same theoretical logic stated 
in the qualitative study and refined from the results of my qualitative analysis. My 
pattern matching analysis recognized patterns from policy, database, and software 
ICT adoption to poverty outreach and their respective MFI operations mediators. 
In the same regard, I recognize patterns from infrastructure, networking, 
hardware, and telephone ICT adoption to geographic outreach and their respective 
mediators. Table 14 shows these constructs and suggests variables for 
measurement. 
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Table 14 Qualitative Constructs to Quantitative Variable Mapping 
Qualitative construct Suggested quantitative measurement variables 
Flexibility and knowledge 
ICTs (ICT adoption 
categories: Policy, 
Database, Software) 
• Loan system integrated with accounting system (dummy) 
• MIS system maturity: paper, spreadsheet, in-house 
software, or off-the-shelf software (categorical) 
• # pages of IT documentation 
• Disaster recovery plan (dummy) 
Coordination and 
connectivity ICTs (ICT 
adoption categories: 
Infrastructure, Hardware, 
Networking, Telephony) 
• Internet bandwidth (kb/sec) 
• # servers per staff member 
• # computers per staff member 
• Branch connectivity with headquarters: paper, data dump, 
or active connection (categorical) 
• # phone lines per staff member 
• % of staff with e-mail access 
MFI operations: Flexible 
Products, Loan 
Monitoring, Portfolio 
Analysis 
• # of loan products offered 
• # of reports generated per month per staff member 
MFI Operations: Data 
Immediacy, Data 
Reliability 
• # days to recognize a past due loan payment 
• data errors per month / transactions processed per month 
MFI Operations: 
Transaction Processing, 
Communication, Security, 
Branch Banking 
• # days to process a transaction 
• # interactions with client per month 
• # of branches 
• % of funds transmitted electronically 
Poverty Outreach • % of borrowers below poverty line 
• % of loans which are ‘small loans’ (<= 30% GNI per capita) 
Geographic Outreach • % of clients from rural areas 
• % of clients from underdeveloped areas 
Note: level of analysis = MFI 
 
Based on the mediated relationships recognized in my pattern matching 
analysis of the case study research materials, I group ICT adoption constructs into 
two categories, and MFI operations constructs into three categories. The elements 
for poverty and geographic outreach remain unchanged from the original research 
model presented earlier. 
Hypotheses for the quantitative study are inferred from the theoretical 
justification for the propositions in this study along with the method by which the 
research materials fit my qualitative model. If the empirical model matches my 
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qualitative findings, I expect hypotheses one and three to be positive and 
significant. Since my qualitative model showed all impact of ICT on outreach 
mediated through MFI operations, I hypothesize that coefficient estimates for H2a 
and H2b will be insignificant. The proposed quantitative research model and 
applicable hypotheses are as follows in Figure 11: 
Figure 11  MFI Outreach and Performance Research Model and Hypotheses 
 
To the knowledge of the authors of this paper, there is no dataset with the 
required variables to conduct this quantitative analysis. Researchers would need 
to conduct surveys of microfinance institutions. For outreach impact variables, 
CERISE created a refined Social Performance Indicators (SPI) survey instrument. 
It has been administered to over 250 MFIs33. In addition, Kiva recently required 
                                                 
33http://www.cerise-microfinance.org/-impact-and-social-perfomance-#art_232 
H1a
H1b
H1c
H1d
H3
b
H3c
H3a
H3d
116 
all of its field partners to complete the CERISE SPI survey34. For ICT adoption 
and MFI operations variables, data needs to be collected and then matched. 
The quantitative analysis for this study requires a mediated model approach 
since the model suggests a set of variables (ICT capability) impacting an outcome 
(outreach) mediated by a second collection of variables (operations impact). A 
Sobel (1982) test reveals if the impact of ICT adoption on outreach is mediated by 
MFI operations. I recognize that other factors may influence MFI operations and 
outreach, so I propose including several control variables. Regional dummies and 
country-level ICT penetration (e.g. Internet users per 1,000 population, mobile 
phone subscriptions per 1,000 population, etc.) will account for certain regions 
that are wealthier or already have ICTs and infrastructure in place to make ICT 
adoption more feasible. MFI size variables (e.g. number of clients, number of 
branches, number of outstanding loans, size loan portfolio) will account for larger 
organizations with more capital to dedicate to social performance or more 
branches to reach a broader geographic client base. MFI classification (bank, 
credit union, NGO, non-banking financial institution, rural bank) will account for 
discrepancies with respect to organizational goals whether profit-maximizing or 
social performance maximizing. 
Future researchers can expand on my body of knowledge by addressing the 
exploratory research question, “How should MFIs adopt technology?” My 
research provides evidence for patterns connecting ICT adoption to outreach but 
omits discussion on what processes MFIs should follow in their adoption of ICT, 
                                                 
34http://kivanews.blogspot.com/2010/03/2010-social-performance-baseline-for.html 
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what structural changes need to be made, what partnerships should be forged, 
which ICTs need to be adopted and in what order.  The first essay in this 
dissertation illuminates some of these topics, namely how electronic-enabled 
intermediation has and will change how the data and funds flow throughout the 
microfinance industry. 
3.8. Conclusions 
This research contained herein demonstrates that ICT adoption enables MFIs to 
extend their outreach and provide financial services to very poor and very distant 
borrowers in the long tail of banking. The microfinance industry, if properly 
enabled by the appropriate technologies, holds great potential for reducing global 
poverty. This industry is in a state of change and is presently in earlier stages of 
ICT adoption than many other industry counterparts. Likewise, MFIs are also in 
the midst of an industry shift from a sustainability focus to an outreach focus. 
This final section summarizes my findings, lists some limitations, and suggests 
future research. 
3.8.1. Limitations 
One of the common concerns expressed by case study methodology critics is that 
it offers little basis for scientific generalization (Yin 2008). Case studies, by 
definition, are not samples that generalize to a population but are generalizable to 
theoretical propositions. My findings are based on research material collected 
from the 14 MFIs I studied. Another researcher could visit a different set of MFIs 
and arrive at conclusions that vary from the ones I present. I anticipate these 
differences would not be significant since my analysis revealed multiple MFIs 
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experiencing similar linkage between ICT adoption changes, MFI operations, and 
outreach. Another limitation is that of the 14 MFIs represented in my research 
materials, 6 are Cambodian MFIs and are also the only MFIs where in-depth 
interviews and fieldwork were personally conducted by one of the authors. Kiva 
Fellows in other countries were relied upon in other countries to collect similar 
research material and, to some extent, resulted in less detailed research material 
from those countries. Cambodia is representative of many other developing 
nations with an active microfinance industry; an ideal situation would have 
allowed for a less ethnocentric collection of first-hand research materials from 
more countries. 
 The sources of evidence used to collect my research materials came with 
their own limitations, which are quite common in case studies. Interviews can 
suffer from bias with poor questioning, responses of what the interviewer “wants 
to hear,” and recall inaccuracies. Observations are time consuming, resource-
intensive, and tend to bias outcomes when staff members know they are being 
observed. Documentation, like e-mail, suffers from selection bias, reporting bias, 
and deliberately withheld responses (Yin 2008). To overcome these limitations, I 
approached the case studies and performed my analysis using a thorough and 
structured approach based on accepted guidelines by experienced case study 
methodologists (Yin 2008, Myers 1997). 
Another limitation is that since these findings are pooled into a single research 
model, I cannot look at how the relationships differ for, say, African MFIs, MFIs 
with more than 100 staff members, or MFIs with loan portfolios under $100,000. 
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Finally, the model fails to designate the strength of relationships or specific ICT 
adoption activities. As an example, the model will not reveal which of two 
options for ICT investment will yield the greater measurable impact on branch 
banking or geographic outreach. 
A final limitation is that the ICT adoption activities and categories do not 
appear in isolation in reality. For example, networks and software must be in 
place before hardware PDAs can be utilized by field staff. An MFI will not adopt 
software without first adopting hardware. Similarly, country-level infrastructure 
must be advanced before MFIs can adopt mobile payment options for borrowers. 
This means that there are some conditional dependences between ICT adoption 
changes which are not fully modeled in our research. 
3.8.2. Implications 
Traditionally, researchers use large data sets to explain reality. While that 
approach nets coefficients revealing correlations and relationships, this approach 
often overlooks the ‘real stories’ associated with a change, such as ICT adoption. 
A qualitative approach enabled me to ‘dig into the weeds’ to understand what is 
happening at MFIs around the world. This approach also allows me to work at a 
very granular level with my findings to the point where I could trace the impacts 
of individual ICTs adopted at MFIs with their impacts on geographic and poverty 
outreach. 
To answer my research questions, I employ a qualitative case study approach. 
I collect and pool research materials from 14 MFIs in 8 countries. Through the 
analysis method of pattern matching, I map ICT adoption categories to MFI 
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operations change and outreach performance. This process reveals certain 
technologies that impact poverty outreach and others impacting geographic 
outreach. My analysis discovered that software, database, and policy ICT 
adoption impacts poverty outreach mediated through financial performance and 
loan portfolio improvements. On the other hand, infrastructure, hardware, and 
telephone ICT adoption impacts geographic outreach mediated through security 
and branch banking operations improvements. Furthermore, ICT-enabled 
improvements in transaction processing, communications, data immediacy, and 
data reliability impact both poverty and geographic outreach. 
These research findings offer many implications for practitioners involved in 
the microfinance industry. Policy makers who want to encourage greater outreach 
can establish programs making it easier and cheaper for MFIs to adopt and 
receive training on technologies. An MFI interested in improving its geographic 
outreach now has a basis for understanding that technologies related to 
connectivity and infrastructure are a better investment than technologies dealing 
with financial capabilities, flexibility, and information processing. MFIs also need 
to make concerted changes to their operations before they can expect to see 
improvements in outreach. MFIs should focus on their reporting and analysis 
capabilities, product flexibility, data processing and storage to maximize the 
impact on poverty outreach. I described this in the previous anecdote of HKL. 
They found that the ability to fund client loans more quickly improved their 
ability to reach poorer borrowers. On the other hand, a focus on transaction 
processing, communication, security, opening more branches, data processing and 
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storage will allow MFIs to maximize their impact on geographic outreach. 
VisionFund Cambodia experienced improved geographic outreach by opening 
more branches and increasing communication channels to remote branches and 
borrowers. 
Transparency promoters, like MixMarket and MFTransparency, are placing 
increased importance on social performance among MFIs in their databases. 
Knowing how much they impact operations and outreach, tracking the 
technological investments and capabilities of their MFIs should be an option. 
Commercial banks and mobile service providers considering entering the 
microfinance industry as MFIs can leverage their ICT advantages over smaller 
MFIs not only for financial gain but for outreach gains as well. 
Since this document suggests a new and creative means for modeling the 
relationships between technology and outreach performance, academics will 
benefit. I proposed future research to strengthen the claims of this research and 
build new knowledge. The industry shift toward a more socially-driven mission 
gives researchers in the IS discipline myriad opportunities for interesting studies 
on how the use of technology affects outreach change. I encourage similar studies 
among other disciplines including management (e.g. How can MFI leadership 
best align their staff to a new social mission?), finance (e.g. What assets can an 
MFI leverage to experience social performance alongside operational 
sustainability?), marketing (How should MFIs cost-effectively market their 
products to poorer and more distant clients?), and supply chain (How can 
resources be most efficiently allocated at MFIs with a large geographic scope?). A 
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new library of research on microfinance social performance from multiple 
business disciplines can serve as a strong instigator to industry improvements and 
poverty reduction.  
 Three anecdotes enlightened the research model with specific examples 
from the research materials. I modified my research model based on my 
qualitative findings and proposed a quantitative study with testable hypotheses. 
This proposed research suggests an alternative method to determine if the results 
triangulate and converge on the same findings as my case study research. 
It is important to note that poverty outreach and geographic outreach rarely 
occur in isolation. I recognize that many of the poorest MFI clients are also some 
of the most rural MFI clients. There are obvious exceptions to this: namely the 
urban slum dweller or the rural plantation owner. But for the most part, the more 
rural one is, the poorer one is. A simple linear regression between % urban 
population35 and logged GDP per capita36 for 168 countries reveals a negative 
coefficient with a 0.52 coefficient of correlation. This means that the more rural a 
country’s population, the poorer it is. Although this mini-analysis looks across 
countries, I would expect in-country data analyses to exhibit similar patterns. An 
MFI’s effort to expand their geographic outreach must, to a large extent, coincide 
with an effort to extend their poverty outreach and vice versa. 
Although the microfinance industry is very unique, the findings of my study 
could be generalized to other industries serving clients that are geographically 
                                                 
35http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/peo_rur_pop_percap-people-rural-population-per-
capita 
36http://www.nationmaster.com/graph/eco_gdp_per_cap_ppp_cur_int-per-capita-ppp-current-
international 
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distant or poor. I do this by bringing my theory, model and the findings of my 
research from the microfinance industry to another industry. One such example is 
Proctor and Gamble37 (P&G), which manufactures single-use packs of toiletry 
and cleaning products for clients who cannot afford a large purchase like a gallon 
of liquid laundry detergent or a quart of shampoo. They use various technologies 
to determine the pricing and quantity for these products to make them affordable 
to poor individuals and utilize a network of distribution centers and suppliers to 
sell their products to rural villagers in developing countries. One client I visited 
during my Kiva Fellowship operates a small shop in a rural village and sells 
several products from P&G’s single-use product line. P&G, among other goods 
and service providers, can be expected to exhibit similar patterns from ICT 
adoption to impact on operations and eventually outreach. Prahalad (2005) refers 
to this phenomenon in his book Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid. He posits 
that the world’s poor are a neglected market segment and with technological 
advancements, I should expect to see more global organizations marketing their 
products and services to a poorer market segment. This not only reduces wealth 
and opportunity variance between the wealthy and poor, but it can also be a 
profitable endeavor for the organizations providing these products. 
As the industry continues to face challenges and suspicion due to negative 
press stories and the actions of some profit-hungry MFIs, the industry must 
respond with increased social performance and outreach. I found in this paper that 
ICT adoption enables MFI outreach through operations mediators. Moreover, I 
                                                 
37http://www.pg.com 
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hope that research like this and those to come will guide MFIs in their quest to 
alleviate poverty and reach more of the worlds unbanked. 
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Chapter 4. The Impact of Information and Communication Technologies on 
Microlending Decision Rights 
4.1. Introduction 
Communication-enabling technologies like the Internet are changing the way 
people bank. They also afford new opportunities to the world’s poor population in 
developing countries by linking them to Western, philanthropically-minded 
microlenders. This new model, which I refer to as P2P social microlending, 
results in an increased level of personalization and allows lenders to specify who 
should receive capital for a loan request based on the description of the loan, an 
image, name, biography, and gender of the entrepreneur, along with the name and 
location of the MFI administering the loan. An MFI is typically located in the 
same city or village as the entrepreneur, and should therefore possess knowledge 
on the performance potential of loan requests with respect to (1) loan repayment 
rate – will the individual pay back his/her loan? and (2) poverty reduction – how 
successful is the loan in moving the borrower out of poverty? This knowledge is 
not known by or shared with the Western lender who makes the capital funding 
decisions on microloan requests. 
Prior to advanced Internet technologies, there was little need for 
intermediation in the microfinance industry, and players were largely limited to 
MFI organizations (lenders) and client borrowers. Today, as the industry has 
grown and technologies have advanced, the industry has witnessed new entrants 
of intermediaries. These intermediaries include regulators, infomediaries 
(information intermediaries), and P2P social lenders (Riggins and Weber 2011a). 
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Search costs, matching costs, transaction costs, and enforcement costs involved in 
P2P transactions have decreased in the wake of technologies like the Internet 
(Parameswaran et al. 2001, Oram 2001). With communication-enabling 
technologies, a couple in San Francisco can now lend money to an entrepreneur 
tailor in Vietnam at low transaction costs through P2P social microlenders and 
loan administering MFIs. As more of the world’s population becomes 
“connected,” I expect this P2P lending trend to grow. 
Problems arise when an MFI holds an information advantage over an Internet 
microlender. First, loans are not funded on the potential success of the loan being 
repaid and the success of moving the borrower out of poverty. Second, since 
MFIs have an opportunity to cherry-pick which loans to fund through Internet-
based social lending platforms, they have the opportunity to shift financial risk 
from their portfolio to the portfolio of Internet microlenders. These inefficiencies 
create a dead weight loss resulting in less economic activity and typically a 
reduction in total economic welfare. This paper proposes a new ICT-enabled 
social lending theory to explain the gap that exists between social loan funding 
decision-makers and microloan success. Explanations include: (1) information 
asymmetries between local MFIs and lenders resulting in opportunism for MFIs 
to select riskier loans to be funded through P2P social microlenders and (2) 
identification-biased funding decisions fueled by the Internet-based platform of 
social lending websites. In this paper, identification bias is defined as an affective 
influence on a microloan funding decision because of the emotional connection a 
lender feels with a borrower (Schervish and Herman 1988). The results of this 
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study demonstrate that identification biases due to gender and occupation are 
significant. 
The data for this empirical study are loans made in the past five years through 
Kiva38, an online lending platform connecting Western lenders with third-world 
entrepreneurial borrowers. Preliminary observations detected the existence of 
empirical irregularities leading me to look further into this issue. Table 15 
displays 99,138 completed Kiva loans from 2005 to 2010 with the average 
number of days lenders take to fund the loan, the average loan amount, and the 
default rate grouped by sector. One would expect to see loans that are fully 
funded in the shortest amount of time exhibiting the lowest default rates. The 
data, however, reveal that loans in the transportation sector have one of the 
longest average funding durations although they exhibit the lowest default rates. 
Loans in the agriculture sector fund more quickly than the average yet exhibit one 
of the highest default rates. Sectors with the largest discrepancies between 
funding time and default rate are in bold text. 
                                                 
38http://www.kiva.org 
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Table 15  Kiva Loans by Sector 
Sector  # Loans Avg. Amount 
Avg. Days 
to Fund 
Default 
Rate 
Agriculture 16,495 $637 1.54« 4.69%« 
Arts 03,044 $632 0.61« 2.63%« 
Clothing 08,516 $726 2.52« 4.72%« 
Construction 02,348 $714 2.14« 2.26%« 
Education 00,157 $866 0.36« 3.18%« 
Entertainment 00,093 $614 2.77« 4.30%« 
Food 29,748 $632 1.41« 3.21%« 
Health 00,961 $832 0.38« 3.54%« 
Housing 01,034 $621 2.59« 2.22%« 
Manufacturing 01,423 $651 0.55« 3.79%« 
Personal Use 00,198 $705 3.36« 0.00%« 
Retail 23,341 $715 2.35« 3.16%« 
Services 08,749 $790 1.93« 3.90%« 
Transportation 02,624 $651 2.54« 1.52%« 
Wholesale 00,407 $799 1.65« 1.72%« 
Total/Average 99,138 $682 1.81« 3.60% 
 
An initial cursory glance at the information above reveal that lenders are 
either ill-informed (they don’t have the right information to make an informed 
lending decision) or irrational. Irrational lenders will choose which loans to fund 
based on elements unrelated to potential loan success. The Kiva platform allows 
users to form lending teams or groups based on common interests, locations, and 
beliefs among others. Two of these groups that are exemplars of irrational lending 
behavior are Women in Hats! and Women Who Lend to Shirtless Men. The 
lending page for Women in Hats reveals, “We like women in hats, caps, scarves, 
veils, crowns, beanies – you name it! We like men wearing that stuff too!”39  
Similarly, the lending page for Women Who Lend to Shirtless Men states that “we 
loan because we can’t resist.”40  Group leaders enhance these explanations with 
clever emoticons. Unless there is a logical connection between hats and shirts to 
                                                 
39http://www.kiva.org/team/women_in_hats 
40http://www.kiva.org/team/women_who_lend_t_shirtless_men 
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loan success, I consider these loan funding decisions irrational. These are only 
two examples of lending groups where lenders choose loans based on physical 
attributes of a photograph instead of potential loan success. 
Data is derived from 167,000 loans over 5 years made on Kiva.org. I employ 
logistic regression models to test my hypotheses. The knowledge gained from this 
research can (1) inform MFIs and other peer-to-peer (P2P) lending services of 
information asymmetries and how to address them and (2) determine if 
technology microloans perform well compared with non-technology microloans. 
Although the context of this study is international social lending, the same 
concepts and theories benefit from external validity and can be applied in other 
P2P lending environments in the growing U.S. market with sites like Prosper.com 
and LendingClub.com. 
Research Questions 
• (RQ1)  Is there a gap between microloan funding time and the loan 
default rate? If so, what explanations exist for this gap? 
• (RQ2)  Does an information asymmetry exist between Western lenders 
and the MFIs that administer international P2P microloans? 
• (RQ3)  Does the amount of information provided to microlenders 
affect their ability to fund successful loans? 
• (RQ4)  Are microlending funding decisions biased by identification 
links between lender and borrower? 
The paper is organized in the following manner. In section 2, theoretical 
perspectives are used to build the ICT-enabled social lending theory and propose 
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hypotheses. Section 3 describes the Kiva research context and justification for its 
use. Section 4 presents the data and variables and Section 5 discusses estimation 
models and research techniques. Section 6 presents the results of the empirical 
study. And finally section 7 concludes with the contributions that this study 
makes to the literature and theory of ICT-enabled social lending. 
4.2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses 
Information asymmetry, agency theory, identification theory, and IT productivity 
form the theoretical bases for my analysis of technology microloans. These 
theories work together to build the ICT-enabled social lending theory. 
Information asymmetry and agency theories. Information asymmetry 
occurs when one party possesses more information than another in an economic 
transaction. The classic market for lemons (Ackerlof 1970) example of this 
involves a used car salesman who withholds information about a vehicle’s 
accident history to a buyer. This information is used to the seller’s advantage, 
who can sell the car for more than it is worth. The buyer, on the other hand, 
experiences adverse effects from this information asymmetry and purchases the 
car for more than it is worth. The seller is not always the party with greater 
information. Consider a buyer who is aware that a certain vehicle in a used car lot 
is a rare model sought by collectors. If the seller is unaware of this, then the 
adverse and beneficial effects are traded from the previous example. Agency 
theory and the principal-agent problem state that problems arise when the goals 
of the principal conflict with the goals of the agent. These problems are difficult 
and costly to resolve (Alchian and Demsetz 1972). IS researchers discovered that 
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information and communication technologies (ICTs) reduce principal-agent costs 
through electronic monitoring, timekeeping, and incentive programs (Gurbaxani 
and Whang 1991). 
Agency costs have unique implications in the microfinance industry. MFIs 
face a moral hazard problem – they cannot ensure that borrowed money will be 
used in a productive manner or that the use of the funds will align with the 
proposed loan request. Traditional lending institutions with wealthier borrowers 
rely on financial or asset collateral to mitigate these agency costs, but many 
microloan recipients do not possess traditional collateral. A second MFI agency 
cost is adverse selection problem – the MFI cannot determine the riskiness of its 
pool of loan applicants (Sengupta and Aubuchon 2008). This is due to the 
information asymmetry between MFIs and their clients. Traditional banks rely on 
credit scores and demographic data to assess risk. MFIs lack this approach since 
their clients do not have credit scores. MFIs mitigate these agency costs through 
different means of group lending and social collateral. Instead of financial or asset 
collateral, MFIs rely on social collateral, where assurances are not formed with 
financial means, but through group lending and accountability (Morduch 1999). 
To take advantage of social collateral, borrowing groups materialize voluntarily 
and agree to contract terms. Muhammed Yunus’ Grameen Bank in Bangladesh 
relies heavily on lending groups, and their contract terms include clauses stating 
that if one member defaults, the MFI will deny subsequent loans from all 
individuals in the group (Besley and Coate 1995). Table 16 summarizes 
approaches to agency costs by traditional banks and MFIs. 
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Table 16 Agency Costs at Traditional Banks and MFIs 
Agency Cost Traditional Lending Institution Microfinance Institution (MFI) 
Moral Hazard Require borrowers to produce 
proof of financial or asset 
collateral. In the event of a loan 
default, the lending institution can 
repossess assets from the borrower. 
In the absence of financial and 
asset collateral, MFIs rely on social 
collateral. Individuals within a 
group hold each other accountable 
for repayment since one member’s 
failure to repay negatively impacts 
all members of the group. 
Adverse Selection Analyze riskiness of loan 
candidates through credit scores, 
demographic data, and rating 
algorithms. This allows the lending 
institutions to either deny unsafe 
borrowers or charge them higher 
interest rates. 
With no means to separate the 
risky borrowers from the safe 
borrowers, the MFI would charge 
higher interest rates to safe 
borrowers relative to risky 
borrowers. Group lending practices 
pool individual borrowers with 
different levels of unobservable 
risk. 
 
The discussion up to this point has focused on agency costs between MFIs and 
borrowers. In the context of this study, I argue that information asymmetries 
result in agency costs between microloan lenders (principals) and the MFIs 
(agents) who administer those loans. In this relationship, adverse effects occur 
from information asymmetry. If microloans are funded on imperfect information, 
I can expect to see loans funded that do not end in repayment or poverty 
reduction. This, in turn, results in no capital returned to the lender and no interest 
earned by the MFI. A long-term pattern of microloan funding based on imperfect 
information results in fewer loans made and funded due to uncertainty. Finally, if 
the loan defaults, then it is likely that the loan will fail to move the borrower out 
of poverty. More effective poverty reduction occurs when capital decisions on 
microloans are made in the presence of better information. The local loan-
administering MFI holds greater information than the Western lender, yet it is the 
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lender making the capital investment decisions. In other words, decision rights for 
microloan funding can be held by either the MFI or the lender. The amount and 
quality of information shared from the MFI and lender vary. If funding decisions 
are made by MFIs, there is no need to transfer information. If funding decisions 
are made by lenders, inefficiencies will exist unless information flows exist from 
the MFI to the lender.  
The MFI also has opportunities to gain from their information-advantaged 
position. This is referred to as opportunism - “an effort to realize individual gains 
through a lack of candor or honesty in transactions” (Williamson 1973 p.317). 
Prior to the entrance of new P2P social microlending platforms, MFIs funded all 
loans through using available funds. While they may have had outside support, it 
is likely that the MFI still held decision rights for which loans to fund. Now, MFIs 
do not operate solely with capital provided from Kiva lenders, many of their loans 
are funded using internal accounts. At P2P social microlending intermediaries like 
Kiva, up to 25% of an MFI’s loan portfolio can be funded by Kiva, per Kiva’s 
regulations. MFI losses from internally funded defaulted loans consist of both 
principal and interest, but with loans funded by Kiva, financial losses are limited 
to potential interest earned. Since information about potential loan success is 
known to the MFI, but not shared with the lender, MFIs can selectively decide to 
fund their riskier loans through Kiva lenders and fund their less-risky loans 
internally. MFIs will not engage in recklessly risky behavior, since they are still 
interested in receiving interest payments on Kiva-funded microloans. Also, a high 
default rate on loans funded through Kiva would result in jeopardizing their 
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relationship with Kiva, which to them is an interest-free and risk-free source of 
funding. 
This situation poses a unique principal-agent dilemma. Typically the costs of 
the principal-agent problem are due to transmitting information from the principal 
to the agent so the agent makes decisions in the best interest of the principal. If I 
consider the principal to be the Western capital-providing lender and the agent to 
be the MFI loan administrator, information needs to flow from the agent to the 
principal to achieve optimal lending decisions. Traditional information agency 
costs are due to transmitting unique knowledge from the principal to the agent so 
the agent can effectively act on behalf of the principal. This maximizes the 
effectiveness of the economic activity, in this case business operations. The story 
changes when I consider Kiva’s information agency costs. The agent (MFI), not 
the principal, possesses unique knowledge. To maximize the effectiveness of 
microfinance and move individuals out of poverty, this unique information needs 
to flow from the agent to the principal, even though the MFI is working on behalf 
of the lender. 
Identification theory. Traditional economic literature on philanthropy finds 
that altruism, exchange, and warm glow (psychological benefit) are strong 
motivators for charitable giving (Munnell and Sunden 2003). Identification theory 
is a broader approach and is defined by Schervish and Herman (1988) in a study 
of 130 millionaires. The authors determine that (1) philanthropy is a manifestation 
of care and (2) the major impetus for philanthropy is identification with others 
and identification with the needs of others (rather than selflessness). Individuals 
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recognize that the needs or lives of others are similar to their own lives, needs, or 
experiences. This is also a motivation for P2P social microlending. Meeting needs 
of individuals where identification links exist elicits satisfaction on the part of 
charitable individuals (Havens et al. 2006). Identification theory has been 
empirically validated. Some example findings from the Boston Area Diary Study 
(BADS) included (1) donors to schools were involved in childhood education or 
university research, (2) donors to environmental causes were involved in outdoor 
and hiking activities, and (3) donors to oncology medical centers were more likely 
to have loved ones who died of cancer (Schervish and Havens 2002). 
While the majority of P2P social microlenders receive their capital 
investments returned to them in full, intermediaries like Kiva do not allow lenders 
to receive any of the interest that borrowers incur when repaying their loans to the 
administering MFIs. The time value of money states that one dollar today is worth 
more than one dollar tomorrow due to opportunity costs and inflation costs, 
among others.  So even though P2P social microlenders receive their payments 
back, their investments are still charitable and sacrificial. Although identification-
based charitable decision-making appears benign, my findings reveal that it does 
not align with the end-goal of microfinance – bringing individuals out of poverty. 
Identification theory offers an explanation as to why P2P microlenders may make 
suboptimal lending decisions. Identification theory states that identification with 
borrowers, rather than the poverty reduction goal of microfinance, is the most 
influential factor on borrowers making charitable lending decisions. P2P social 
microlending is a unique charitable model since it provides a direct connection 
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between donors (lenders) and the lives they wish to change (borrowers). In 
donations to other aid organizations like United Way or Salvation Army, the 
donor is usually uninvolved in determining where his or her donation will be 
allocated. With P2P social microlending, there is a greater opportunity for 
identification with borrowers and this is very likely to play a role in funding 
decisions. Lenders are given access to a name, location, biographical sketch, and 
photo of the borrower and requested loan use. Traditionally, lenders rely on 
signals such as interest rates to assess risk, but when interest rate information is 
unknown to lenders, funding decisions are more likely to be identification-biased. 
Following this logic, more money will be lent through P2P social 
microlending intermediaries, although used less efficiently until a point where the 
detriment of unsuccessful loans due to information asymmetries overshadows the 
identification benefit that lenders receive. Whereas other charitable organization 
models receive less money since donors do not benefit from strong identification 
ties with recipients, the funds are delegated to causes based on the decisions of aid 
workers involved with the aid recipients. 
Provision of personal information to potential donors is not a new 
phenomenon. Aid organizations such as World Vision41 and Compassion 
International42 have child sponsorship programs in which donors can choose a 
child from a selection of physical photographs after a public presentation through 
a website. The difference between adopt-a-child programs and Kiva loans is that 
                                                 
41www.worldvision.org 
42www.compassion.com 
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at the time the photograph of the child is made available for potential child 
sponsors, the child is already being served by the aid organization. The $30 per 
month that these organizations request to sponsor a child are not earmarked for 
the child, but used as general aid funds to assist children like the one selected 
from a set of candidates43. At P2P social microlending intermediaries like Kiva, 
funds are not made available to the borrower until the loan is fully funded44. 
Based on the way these aid models are set up, the impacts of choosing one 
microloan candidate over another are greater than the impacts of choosing one 
child to sponsor over another. 
Media richness theory (Daft and Lengel 1984, Daft et al. 1987) states that 
rich mediums reduce uncertainty and equivocality. Media richness ranges from 
unaddressed text-base documents (low) to face-to-face communication (high). 
Technologies like the Internet and increasing bandwidth allow for richer media 
consumption by end-users. P2P social microlenders benefit from rich media when 
browsing through borrower profiles. Images, and sometimes video, accompany 
the text descriptions of loan requests and borrower biographies. At Kiva, this 
media is captured by Kiva’s staff and volunteers, not by the MFI. Kiva recognizes 
the power of media and aim to photograph borrowers at their place of work since 
                                                 
43According to http://www.worldvision.org.uk/server.php?show=nav.2623, “the money you 
give doesn’t go directly to your sponsored child or family.” In addition, when a sponsor ceases 
their payments, “the [sponsored child] will still be included within the community projects until a 
new sponsor can be found.”  Similar statements can also be found on Compassion International’s 
web site. 
44
 Although this is not the case withpre-disbursed loans, which are loans whose funds were 
released to the borrower before the loan was posted on Kiva’s website.  It is important to note that 
pre-disbursed loans carry the same risk implications as non-pre-disbursed loans – borrower default 
results in no payment returned to the lender.  Kiva
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it is a preference of Western lenders (Flannery 2007). Rich media has greater 
potential to influence loan funding decisions based on identification links, since 
rich media is a more effective means of transmitting emotion-laden messages 
(Trevino et al. 1987, Lengel and Daft 1989). 
ICT-Enabled Social Lending Theory. In Internet-based social microlending 
platforms, since a rich media channel communicates personal information of 
borrowers that microloan lenders access along with a lack of local business 
knowledge, lenders will base their funding decisions on personal identification 
with borrowers, not on potential loan success. Western countries where microloan 
lenders reside are more technologically advanced. Individuals in these countries 
use technology more frequently for personal and business use than lesser-
developed countries. This logic suggests the following hypotheses: 
Information asymmetry hypothesis (H1). As loan description length 
increases between the MFI and the lender, lenders will be more successful in 
predicting loan repayment potential. This is measured by the relationship between 
(1) the amount of time it takes for a Kiva loan request to be fully funded and (2) 
loan default rate. 
Identification bias hypothesis (technology) (H2a). An identification bias 
exists in P2P social microloan funding decisions. Technologically advanced 
lenders will make more funding contributions to technology loans than less 
technologically advanced lenders. 
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Identification bias hypothesis (agriculture) (H2b).Lenders in agricultural 
careers will provide more funding contributions to agriculture sector loans than 
lenders in non-agricultural careers. 
Identification bias hypothesis (gender) (H2c).Female lenders will provide 
more capital to female borrowers than will male lenders. 
If these hypotheses are supported, the ICT-enabled social lending theory will 
be supported: A gap exists between social lending funding decisions and 
microloan success because (1) information asymmetries exist between local MFIs 
and lenders and (2) the Internet-based platform of social lending websites 
encourages identification-biased funding decisions. 
4.3. Research Context 
These hypotheses will be tested in the context of Kiva, the largest international 
social lending platform. Kiva, Swahili for ‘unity,’ is one of many Internet-based 
international P2P microlending websites that started over the past decade. Other 
similar sites include Global Giving, Wokai, Microplace, Zidisha and MyC4, but 
none of these have as large of a geographic scope or participant list as Kiva. Since 
Kiva’s incorporation in 2005, they have facilitated $300 million in loans to 
390,000 borrowers45 (Kiva 2010). 
Kiva’s lending operations are shown in Figure 12. Lenders that log onto 
Kiva’s website are presented with hundreds of brief bios, business plans, capital 
requirements, and photos of applicants around the globe collected by any of their 
112 field partners representing 53 countries. Kiva uses the term “field partners” 
                                                 
45http://www.kiva.org/about/stats 
140 
when referring to MFIs in their network. Kiva borrowers are all entrepreneurs in 
developing countries who require a loan to start or maintain their businesses. 
Lenders have the opportunity to lend money, in full or in part, toward the 
borrower’s entrepreneurial objective. As the borrower pays back the loan with 
interest to the field partner, the lender receives funds in accordance with a 
repayment schedule. Interest paid by the borrower to the MFI is not transferred 
from the MFI to Kiva or lenders46. MFIs retain all of the interest earned. Kiva 
lenders can then choose to relend, donate, or withdraw (via Paypal) these received 
payments. 
Figure 12  Kiva Operations (source: www.kiva.org) 
 
4.4. Data and Variables 
Data come from Kiva.org and date from its inception in March 2005 through 
January 2010. KivaData.org offers dumps of the database, which are imported 
                                                 
46This is due to current U.S. banking laws, but Kiva is applying for the privilege for lenders to 
earn interest.  The topic is debated heavily among Kiva participants and an 18-page forum thread 
is dedicated to the debate at Kivafriends.org, an online community for Kiva lenders. 
(http://www.kivafriends.org/index.php/topic,215.0.html). 
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into Microsoft Access and modeled with Stata47 data analysis and statistical 
software. The dataset contains 167,470 loans made in 53 countries funded by 
576,768 lenders and administered by 141 MFIs. All of the 53 countries in the data 
are developing countries with the exception of the United States, which only 
accounted for 118 loans. The loans in which the borrower was located in the 
United States were removed from the dataset. Loans in ‘fundraising’ status were 
also omitted from the dataset, since both duration of time to fund the loan and 
default status are unknown for these loans. The microloan is the unit of analysis 
for this study and the observed variables are listed in Table 17. 
                                                 
47www.stata.com 
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Table 17  Dataset Variables for Information Asymmetry Model 
Variable  Description Comments 
TECHLOAN Technology loan 0 = non-technology loan 
1 = technology loan 
AGRILOAN Agricultural loan 0 = non-agricultural loan 
1 = agricultural loan 
DAYSTOFUND Amount of time (in days) from when the 
loan was available on Kiva’s website until 
it was fully funded 
 
DEFAULTED Loan default status 0 = borrower repaid the loan  
1 = borrower defaulted on the 
loan 
DESCLENGTH Number of characters in the “Loan 
Description” field 
 
AMOUNT Amount of the loan in $USD  
GENDERB Gender of the borrower 0 = Male 
1 = Female 
0.00 to 1.00 = percentage of 
female borrowers in group 
loans48 
GROUP Group loan status 0 = loan administered to an 
individual 
1 = loan administered to a 
group 
R_AFRICA Africa region dummy (Benin, Cameroon, 
Cote D'Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, 
Mali, Mozambique,  
Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
Sudan, Tanzania, The Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Togo, Uganda) 
0 = Non-Africa region 
1 = Africa region 
R_ASIA Asia region dummy (Afghanistan, 
Azerbaijan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Nepal, 
Pakistan, Tajikistan) 
0 = Non-Asia region 
1 = Asia region 
R_EASTEUR Eastern Europe region dummy (Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Moldova, Ukraine) 
0 = Non-Eastern Europe region 
1 = Eastern Europe region 
R_LATINAM Latin America region dummy (Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Guatemala, Haiti, 
Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua) 
0 = Non-Latin America region 
1 = Latin America region 
R_MIDEAST Middle East region dummy (Armenia, 
Gaza, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine) 
0 = Non-Middle East region 
1 = Middle East region 
R_SEASIA Southeast Asia region dummy (Cambodia, 
Indonesia, Philippines, Samoa, Vietnam) 
0 = Non-Southeast Asia region 
1 = Southeast Asia region 
R_SOUTHAM South America region dummy (Bolivia, 
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Paraguay, Peru) 
0 = Non-South America region 
1 = South America region 
 
                                                 
48For loans in which the recipient was not an individual borrower, but a group of borrowers, 
the gender value is calculated as # of females in the group divided by total # of individuals in the 
group. 
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Tests of the identification link hypotheses (H2) use the loan funding 
transaction as the unit of analysis and consider additional variables of the lender. 
These are shown in Table 18. A loan funding transaction occurs every time a 
lender provides any amount of capital to a loan request. Most lenders choose to 
partially fund several loans rather than fully fund a single loan, resulting in many 
loan transactions for every loan request. While the database contains only 167,000 
loans and 577,000 lenders, there are 3.5 million loan funding transactions. 
Table 18  Dataset Variables for Identification Bias Models 
Variable  Description Comments 
PERSONALURL Existence of lender personal URL 
in profile 
0 = no personal URL exists in profile 
1 = personal URL exists in profile 
TECHOCCUP Lender lists a technology 
occupation 
0 = lender lists a non-tech occupation  
1 = lender lists a tech occupation 
AGRIOCCUP Lender lists an agricultural 
occupation 
0 = lender lists a non-agri occupation  
1 = lender lists an agri occupation 
GENDERL Gender of the lender 0 = Male 
1 = Female 
 
DAYSTOFUND is an appropriate outcome variable that can reveal both (1) the 
relative faith a lender has that the loan will be repaid and move the borrower out 
of poverty and (2) the identity link between the lender and borrower. Previous 
research using the same dataset reveals that “lenders showed unambiguous 
preferences according to region, gender, and business type: Africans first, women 
first, and agriculture first. A female African fruit seller? Funded in hours. 
Nicaraguan retail stand? Funded in days. A Bulgarian taxi driver? Funded in 
weeks” (Flannery 2007, 50). Kiva lenders give preferences to loans based on 
region, gender, group loans, and amount (Ly and Mason 2010), so these variables 
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(REGION, GENDERB, GROUP, and AMOUNT) are included as control 
variables. 
The same amount of data is listed for each loan (borrower’s name and photo, 
location, MFI, activity, and sector). The only fields that vary from loan to loan are 
the length of the loan use (USELENGTH) and loan description (DESCLENGTH) 
fields. These variables represent the variance in amount of information provided 
to lenders. Loan use is typically a one-sentence statement of what the loan will be 
used for (e.g. “To expand his pay phone business”), while loan description 
describes the borrower, his/her business, and plan for success (e.g. “Marcelo lives 
in his parent’s house on Marcelo Quiroga Santa Cruz Street in the Pasankeri area 
of the city of La Paz. Marcelo gets his income from an Internet stand, which is 
located in his own home. The loan he is asking for is to buy a server. That way he 
can improve service for his customers and also stabilize his source of work.”). 
The loan description field often consists of several sentences, but can also be 
several paragraphs long. I choose this field as my measure for information 
provision since (1) it varies from loan to loan, and (2) the field usually contains 
information that lenders can use to better assess the chance of loan success. For 
example, loan description fields contain valuable market information that would 
otherwise remain unknown (e.g. amount of competition, changes in market 
condition, timing of planting/reaping/tourist seasons). 
For the purposes of this study, a technology microloan is defined as a small 
amount loan administered to an impoverished entrepreneur for the purpose of 
purchasing, using, reselling, providing a service, or receiving training on 
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technologies (e.g. computers, phones, software, hardware, photocopiers, digital 
cameras, audio/video). Non-technology microloans are used for any other purpose 
(e.g. goats, textiles, tools, seeds). Determination of which loans in the original 
database were technology loans is not straightforward, since the activity sector 
field value for technology loans differ with respect to loan purpose. For loans in 
which the technology is a product to be resold, the sector is categorized as retail. 
For loans in which the technology is used to provide a service to paying 
customers (e.g. Internet cafes, phone booths), the sector is services. For loans 
where the technology is used to support an existing or new business, the sector 
can be any of the 17 possibilities, depending on the entrepreneur’s business. To 
overcome this and determine the TECHLOAN status of the loans in the dataset, a 
keyword search of 37 technology keywords49 was utilized on the [loan use] 
database field. Keywords which had no matches in the [loan use] field were 
removed in addition to most containing the keyword hardware, since upon visual 
inspection, most of the loans using the keyword referred to non-technological 
hardware. Technology loan classification was performed by a team consisting of 4 
PhD students in addition to two of the authors. A team collectively decided the 
category of the loans that classifiers marked as ambiguous. 
                                                 
49The initial 37 keywords included: phone, computer, hardware, video, printer, copier, 
internet, copy machine, digital camera, scanner, toner, audio, software, cyber, computadora, 
network, keyboard, web, technology, ordinateur, online, webcam, technologies, xerox, database, 
mp3, skype, A/V, hdd, lcd, crt, dvr, multimedia, linux, unix, ipod, and microsoft, 
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To determine the TECHOCCUP status of loans in the dataset, a keyword 
search of technology occupation phrases50 was performed on the 
[Lender.Occupation] database field. If the occupation field contained any of the 
phrases in the keyword list, the occupation was classified as technology 
(TECHOCCUP = 1). Determination of the AGRIOCCUP status used the same 
method, although with a different keyword list51. It is important to note that not all 
Kiva borrowers list their occupation in their profile. All data analyses that 
compare occupations considered only the borrowers with non-null occupation 
fields. 386,328 out of 576,768 (67%) Kiva lenders in the dataset list an 
occupation. Gender of the lender is not available in a database field, but filtering 
the name field with the 30 most common female names and 30 most common 
male names achieves a satisfactory alternative. For data analysis that involves the 
gender of the lender (testing hypothesis H2c), only names in the male and female 
list were considered. The 30 most common names in each gender accounted for 
106,474 out of 576,768 (18.46%) lenders in the database. A text field existed in 
the original dataset for location of the lender. Unfortunately, this text field was 
not validated and entries ranged from full addresses (e.g. 4260 College Ave.), to 
states (e.g. Arizona), to countries (e.g. Canada). Kiva publishes figures claiming 
that lenders reside in 218 different countries52. 
Table 19 below provides descriptive statistics for all loans in the dataset while 
Table 20 provides descriptive statistics for all lenders in the dataset. 
                                                 
50Keywords for technology occupations included: computer, software, programmer, database,  
web, blogger, IT consultant, ‘it %’, information technology, information systems 
51Keywords for agricultural occupations included: farm, agri, botany, botanical, landscape 
52http://www.kiva.org/about/stats 
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Table 19  Descriptive Statistics for Loans 
Variable  Min Max Mean StDev 
DAYSTOFUND 00.0008 00,084.01 001.813 004.159 
DEFAULTED 00.00 00,001.00 000.036 000.185 
DESCLENGTH 81.00 10,730.00 799.988 464.066 
AMOUNT 25.00 06,000.00 681.529 598.058 
GENDERB 00.00 00,001.00 000.795 000.397 
GROUP 00.00 00,001.00 000.108 000.311 
TECHLOAN 00.00 00,001.00 000.012 000.107 
AGRILOAN 00.00 00,001.00 000.167 000.373 
R_AFRICA 00.00 00,001.00 000.286 000.452 
R_ASIA 00.00 00,001.00 000.122 000.327 
R_EASTEUR 00.00 00,001.00 000.024 000.152 
R_LATINAM 00.00 00,001.00 000.128 000.334 
R_MIDEAST 00.00 00,001.00 000.013 000.114 
R_SEASIA 00.00 00,001.00 000.204 000.403 
R_SOUTHAM 00.00 00,001.00 000.224 000.417 
Notes: n=97,150 
 
The descriptive statistics reveal that my sample size to test the information 
asymmetry hypothesis is 97,150 out of the original 167,000. The majority of the 
non-included observations were either in fundraising or loan repayment status. 
For those observations, default rate and/or funding length is not yet observed. The 
average loan takes 1.81 days (1 day, 19 hours, and 26 minutes) from the time it is 
available on Kiva’s website until it is fully funded. For males, the average 
increases to 4.94 days. For females, the average is only 1.488 days. This 
difference is significant even after controlling for loan amount. Kiva loans to 
males average $692 while loans made to females average $607. 3.6% of Kiva 
loans in the dataset defaulted. Again these differ by gender. Males have a default 
rate of 4.6% while females only defaulted on 3.4% of their loans. Loan amounts 
ranged from $25 to $6,000, but very large loans are rare. Only 1.6% of the loans 
in the dataset exceed $3,000. 79.5% of all Kiva borrowers are female, which is 
typical for microfinance. 10.8% of the loans were administered to groups with the 
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remaining administered to individuals. Agricultural loans accounted for 16.7% of 
all loans in the dataset (n = 16,272) and technology loans accounted for 1.2% of 
all loans (n = 1,134). Descriptive statistics on the regional dummies show the 
geographic dispersion of the loans in the dataset. Africa, Southeast Asia, and 
South America are the largest of these and together account for 71.4% of all 
loans. 
Table 20 Descriptive Statistics for Lenders 
Variable  Min Max Mean StDev 
PERSONALURL 0 1 0.0538 0.2256 
TECHOCCUP 0 1 0.0341 0.1814 
AGRIOCCUP 0 1 0.0036 0.0602 
GENDERL1 0 1 0.3771 0.4847 
Notes: n=576,768 
1Gender of the lender is not representative of all Kiva lenders. Of the 30 
most common female names and 30 most common male names, 37.71% of 
these are females. Gender identification bias hypotheses had n = 106,474. 
 
Appendix B contains pairwise correlation matrices between the variables used 
in the models. The largest pairwise correlation between any two variables 
(GROUP and AMOUNT) is .558 and all correlations are within an acceptable 
range for OLS estimation (Greene 2003). Checks of the variance inflation factors 
and tolerance values revealed no values above 10 or below 0.1 respectively, 
suggesting that multicollinearity does not bias the parameter estimate results. 
Appendix C contains descriptive statistics on occupation, loan use, and gender for 
loan funding transactions. 
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4.5. Estimation Models 
The hypotheses are tested by several empirical estimation models. The 
descriptions and equations for these models are contained in the following 
section. 
4.5.1. Models to Test the Information Asymmetry Hypothesis (H1) 
A logistic regression model tests the information asymmetry hypothesis. An 
advantage of using logistic regression is it is not affected by the way the data are 
obtained. In this case the data are all retrospective. The outcome variable in this 
model is the probability that the loan will default. Statistical insignificance of 
DAYSTOFUND in the model provides further evidence to the information 
asymmetry hypothesis. This model is shown in Equation 1. 
(1)    	
	
 = β + β + β  + β!"##$% + β&"$' +
β("$) + β*#+, + β-$#") + β.#+#", 
 
The variable of interest is DAYSTOFUND while controlling for AMOUNT, 
GENDERB, GROUP, AGRILOAN, TECHLOAN, and REGION. The parameter 
estimates of β1 through β6 represent the relative change in the probability of loan 
default for a unit change in the explanatory variables certeris paribus. β7 is a 
categorical variable and a set of dummies for each of the seven geographical 
regions. β0 is a intercept and the model includes no error term, since it does not 
model the loan, but a probability. Data are stratified on the amount of information 
given to the lender, measured by DESCLENGTH. The information asymmetry 
hypothesis can be supported in one of two ways. First, if the parameter estimate 
for DAYSTOFUND is negative and smaller as DESCLENGTH increases, this 
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indicates an increasing ability for lenders to make funding decisions based on 
potential loan success. Second, if the parameter estimate for DAYSTOFUND is 
statistically insignificant in stratifications of low information, and negative and 
significant in stratifications of high information, this indicates that lenders are 
unable to accurately predict loan success with small amounts of information 
shared. This ability increases when lenders have access to more information. 
4.5.2. Models to Test the Identification Bias Hypotheses (H2) 
To test the identification bias hypotheses, I employ logistic regression techniques. 
The unit of analysis in these models differs from the rest and is the loan funding 
transaction. Logistic regression models the mean of a binary distribution. The 
binary distribution in this case is the probability of the loan being a technology 
loan versus a non-technology loan. 
(2)  /01	2/01	2 = β + β'#$$ + β#+,++' + β!"##$% +
β&  + β("$' 
 
Equation 2 states that the probability of the loan being a technology loan is 
dependent on an intercept, β0, which is the estimated logit of TECHLOAN=1 
holding all explanatory values at 0. It is also dependent on the PERSONALURL 
and TECHOCCUP. GENDERB and AMOUNT are controls. Each of the 
explanatory variables has a β coefficient. A positive and significant parameter 
estimate for PERSONALURL and TECHOCCUP will support the technology 
identification bias hypothesis. 
 The logistic regression that tests the agricultural identification bias 
hypothesis is similar to the model for technology but it (1) does not consider the 
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PERSONALURL variable and (2) uses the AGRIOCCUP variable in place of the 
TECHOCCUP variable. Determination of AGRILOAN comes from the [sector] 
field in the Kiva database. The model is shown in Equation 3. A positive and 
significant parameter estimate for AGRIOCCUP will support the agriculture 
identification bias hypothesis. 
(3)    	3451	2	3451	2 = β + β"$)++' + β"##$% + β!  + β&"$' 
 
A final logistic regression model tests the gender identification bias 
hypothesis. The dependent variable is the gender of the borrower, GENDERB.  A 
positive and significant parameter estimate for GENDERL will support the gender 
bias hypothesis. This model is shown below in Equation 4. 
(4)    32463246 = β + β"##$ + β  + β!"$' 
 
4.6. Results and Discussion 
This section provides empirical results from the models and discusses their 
implications. 
4.6.1. Estimation Results for the Information Asymmetry Hypothesis (H1) 
The base information asymmetry logistic regression model incorporates all loans 
in the dataset, regardless of loan description length. The model is significant, as is 
each variable within it with the exception of TECHLOAN. The base model 
excludes regional dummies for Asia, Eastern Europe, Middle East, and Southeast 
Asia, since these regions did not exhibit sufficient loan defaults to result in 
accurate parameter estimates. The included regional dummies (Africa, Latin 
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America, and South America) account for 63.8% of loans in the dataset. Table 21 
shows estimation results for the base information asymmetry logistic regression 
model. 
Table 21  Estimation Results for Base Information Asymmetry Logistic 
Regression Model 
Variable  Odds Ratio Coefficient Std. Err. 
DAYSTOFUND 000.9458 -0.0558*** 0.00788 
AMOUNT 001.0002 -0.0002*** 0.00004 
GENDERB 000.7672 -0.2650*** 0.04332 
GROUP 000.1928 -1.6460*** 0.10568 
AGRILOAN 003.0923 -1.1289*** 0.04705 
TECHLOAN 001.1001 -0.0954 0.14830 
R_AFRICA 699.2379 -6.5500*** 0.37920 
R_LATINAM 330.5348 -5.8007*** 0.38148 
R_SOUTHAM 195.5925 -5.2760*** 0.38051 
DESCLENGTH 001.0005 -0.0005 0.00003 
Notes: 
Model: Logistic regression 
Dependent variable:  	
	
 
N = 97,150, LR chi2 = 5,287.43 
AIC = 24,634, BIC = 24,739 
Significance: * = p < .1, ** = p < .05, *** = p < .01 
 
The negative coefficient for DAYSTOFUND reveals that for all loan 
description lengths, greater funding time is associated with a lower probability of 
loan default. This is a surprising finding. It suggests that the loans which fund 
more quickly (in other words, the loans that are more desirable to lenders) 
actually have a greater likelihood to default. Not surprisingly, the positive 
coefficient for AMOUNT reveals that larger loans are more likely to default. The 
negative coefficients for GENDERB and GROUP indicate that loans made to 
women and loans made to groups are both less likely to default. A positive 
parameter estimate for AGRILOAN reveals that agricultural loans have a greater 
default rate than non-agricultural loans. Positive estimates for each of the regional 
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dummies show that loans made to Africa, Latin America, and South America are 
more likely to default. 
To determine if the amount of information provided to lenders influences the 
ability for lenders to fund more successful loans, I stratified the loans according to 
the length of their loan description fields and analyze how the estimates compare 
each other and the base model. Rank orders were assigned to each loan based on 
the length of its loan description field, which ranged from 81 to 10,730 characters. 
Quintiles were created based on these rank orders. Loans in the top two quintiles 
were designated as “high information” (806-10,730 characters) loans in the 
bottom two quintiles were designated as “low information” (81-633 characters), 
and the middle quintile (634-805 characters) was discarded.  
This stratification allows me to test the information asymmetry hypothesis, 
which states that as more information is provided, lenders will be more successful 
in predicting loan repayment potential. In the presence of low information, I 
expect that lenders will be less successful in predicting loan repayment success. 
The data would show this finding with an insignificant parameter estimate for 
DAYSTOFUND, indicating that in the presence of low information, lenders 
cannot predict loan repayment potential. In the presence of high information, I 
expect that lenders will be successful in predicting loan repayment success. The 
data would show this finding with a positive and significant parameter estimate 
for DAYSTOFUND, indicating that in the presence of high information, loans 
with a greater assessed success potential by lenders will not default. Lenders 
reveal their preferences and success potential by funding these loans more 
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quickly, hence the use of DAYSTOFUND as a variable of interest. Table 22 
shows the estimation results for the low information quintiles and Table 23 shows 
the results for the high information quintiles. 
Table 22  Estimation Results for “Low Information” (81-633 Characters) 
Logistic Regression Model 
Variable  Odds Ratio Coefficient Std. Err. 
DAYSTOFUND 000.9789 -0.0213 0.0187 
AMOUNT 000.9980 -0.0021*** 0.0002 
GENDERB 000.7399 -0.3013*** 0.0969 
GROUP 000.0566 -2.8715*** 0.7108 
AGRILOAN 005.7570 -1.7504*** 0.1095 
TECHLOAN 000.4420 -0.8165 0.5841 
R_AFRICA 718.3542 -6.5770*** 0.7118 
R_LATINAM 835.2340 -6.7277*** 0.7161 
R_SOUTHAM 257.2367 -5.5500*** 0.7223 
DESCLENGTH 001.0003 -0.0003 0.0004 
Notes: 
Model: Logistic regression 
Dependent variable:  	
	
 
N = 38,934, LR chi2 = 1,350.15 
AIC = 5,216, BIC =  5,310 
Significance: * = p < .1, ** = p < .05, *** = p < .01 
 
In the low information stratification, the signs of the statistically significant 
coefficients remain unchanged from the base analysis. The key difference is an 
insignificant DAYSTOFUND parameter estimate. This suggests that in the 
presence of low information, there is no correlation between funding time and 
loan repayment rates. 
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Table 23  Estimation Results for “High Information” (806-10,730 characters) 
Logistic Regression Model 
Variable  Odds Ratio Coefficient Std. Err. 
DAYSTOFUND 000.9716 -0.02874*** 0.0187 
AMOUNT 001.0004 -0.00048*** 0.0002 
GENDERB 000.5548 -0.58906*** 0.0969 
GROUP 000.1507 -1.89262*** 0.7108 
AGRILOAN 002.4190 -0.88333*** 0.1095 
TECHLOAN 001.1369 -0.12828 0.5841 
R_AFRICA 447.0675 -6.10271*** 0.7118 
R_LATINAM 101.2300 -4.61740*** 0.7161 
R_SOUTHAM 076.5909 -4.33848*** 0.7223 
DESCLENGTH 000.9999 -0.00003 0.0004 
Notes: 
Model: Logistic regression 
Dependent variable:  	
	
 
N = 38,811, LR chi2 = 3,139.52 
AIC = 13,051, BIC =  13,145 
Significance: * = p < .1, ** = p < .05, *** = p < .01 
 
In the high information stratification, I again see no changes in the signs of the 
statistically significant coefficients. The key difference is a significant 
DAYSTOFUND parameter estimate. However, the sign is negative. As with the 
base case, I am faced with a puzzling conclusion: in the presence of high 
information, there is a significant negative correlation between funding time and 
loan repayment rates. I added another variable to the model to proxy for lender 
confidence in the loan. The variable was number of lenders per $1,000 funded. 
The idea is that fewer lenders per $1,000 funded means that few borrowers are 
contributing large amounts to fully fund the loan and are therefore more confident 
in the potential success of the loan, since risk is spread across fewer lenders. More 
lenders per $1,000 funded means that many borrowers are contributing small 
amounts to fully fund the loan and are therefore less confident in the potential 
success of the loan, since risk is spread across more lenders. This variable was 
156 
significant in the model, but had a negative parameter estimate, suggesting that as 
confidence increases, default rate increases. Other controls were considered, 
including the amount of competing loans available at the same time as the target 
loan and Kiva publicity events, such as a feature on Kiva aired on the Oprah 
Winfrey show in September 2007 (Ly and Mason 2011). Neither of these 
exhibited any significant changes in the model or other parameter estimates. 
Based on my analysis, I can confidently state that with Kiva’s current model, 
lenders are unable to predict successful microloan repayment. On the contrary, 
lenders fund more rapidly and show more confidence in loans that eventually 
default in the presence of more information, but not in the presence of less 
information after controlling for several factors including amount, gender, group, 
purpose, and region. The information asymmetry hypothesis (H1) is not supported 
by my analysis of the data. 
I conducted a sensitivity analysis on the results by running models containing 
the first and fifth quintiles independent of the second and fourth. Appendix D 
contains the tabled results of these two new stratifications. It is interesting to note 
that the fifth quintile reveals an insignificant impact of DAYSTOFUND on default 
rate in the ‘very high information’ stratified model, which deviates from the 
results from the top two quintiles. The first quintile had an insignificant parameter 
estimate for DAYSTOFUND, which aligns with the findings using the bottom two 
quintiles. 
There is a plausible alternative explanation for the inverse relationship 
between loan funding time and loan default rate. Not only does the loan 
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description field have the potential to reduce information asymmetries between 
lenders and MFIs, it can also strengthen identification biases. As an example, not 
only can a long description inform a lender about a change in the competitive 
climate that indicates the potential success of the loan, it can also describe that the 
lender is trying to increase their revenues to send their child to school. The text 
referring to the competitive climate indicates loan success potential to the lender 
and the text referring to the education of their child has no bearing on loan 
success, but it can lead to decisions influenced by identification biases. 
It is interesting to note that of the 97,150 loans in the dataset, 3,497 of them 
defaulted. This Kiva loan repayment rate of 96.4% is lower than the 98-99% 
microfinance repayment rates that other studies claim (Turnell 2005, Armendariz 
de Aghion and Morduch 2000, CSFI 2011). Grameen Bank in Bangladesh boasts 
a 98.35% repayment rate (Yunus 2007a). The average (weighted on loan portfolio 
size) loan repayment rate for 1,026 MFIs listed on MixMarket.org in 2009 was 
98.52%53. Since all of these repayment rates are greater than Kiva’s, this suggests 
evidence of opportunism: MFIs are taking advantage of their information-
advantaged status by selectively choosing riskier loans to list on Kiva. 
4.6.2. Estimation Results for the Identification Bias Hypotheses (H2) 
Separate logistic regression models were run to test the technology, agriculture, 
and gender identification biases. 
                                                 
53http://www.mixmarket.org/mfi/indicators 
158 
Table 24  Technology Identification Bias Logistic Regression Results 
Variable  Odds Ratio Coefficient Std. Err. 
TECHOCCUP 001.2346 -0.2107*** 0.0187 
PERSONALURL 001.1375 -0.1289*** 0.0002 
GENDERB 000.4410 -0.8188*** 0.0969 
AMOUNT 001.0003 -0.0003*** 0.7108 
GROUP 000.3822 -0.9617*** 0.1095 
Notes: 
Model: Logistic regression 
Dependent variable:  /01	2/01	2 
N = 2,544,571, LR chi2 = 16,504.47 
AIC = 386,370, BIC =  386,446 
Significance: * = p < .1, ** = p < .05, *** = p < .01 
 
Table 24 shows estimates for the technology identification bias model. The 
positive and significant coefficients for TECHOCCUP and PERSONALURL 
reveal that lenders with technology occupations and lenders with personal URL 
fields in their Kiva profile are more likely to fund technology loans. Lenders with 
technology occupations are 24% more likely to fund technology loans and lenders 
with personal URL fields are 14% more likely to fund technology loans. This 
finding supports hypothesis 2a. The control variables in the model indicate that 
technology loans are on average less likely to be requested by female borrowers, 
are larger in amount, and are less likely to be made to a group. 
Table 25  Agriculture Identification Bias Logistic Regression Results 
Variable  Odds Ratio Coefficient Std. Err. 
AGRIOCCUP 002.5128 -0.9214*** 0.020774 
GENDERB 000.5941 -0.5207*** 0.003904 
AMOUNT 000.9999 -0.0001*** 0.000002 
GROUP 000.9508 -0.0504*** 0.005173 
Notes: 
Model: Logistic regression 
Dependent variable:  	3451	2	3451	2 
N = 2,544,571, LR chi2 = 25,150.74 
AIC = 2,282,774, BIC =  2,282,838 
Significance: * = p < .1, ** = p < .05, *** = p < .01 
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Table 25 shows estimates for the agriculture identification bias model. The 
positive and significant coefficient for AGRIOCCUP reveals that lenders with 
agricultural occupations are more likely to fund agricultural loans. Lenders with 
agricultural occupations are 2.5 times more likely to fund agricultural 
entrepreneurs on Kiva. This finding supports hypothesis 2b. While all four of the 
explanatory variables are significant, they are together explaining only 1% of the 
variance in AGRILOAN. The control variables in the model indicate that 
agricultural loans are on average less likely to be made to female borrowers, are 
smaller in amount, and are less likely to be made to a group. 
Table 26  Gender Identification Bias Logistic Regression Results 
Variable  Odds Ratio Coefficient Std. Err. 
GENDERL 001.8472 -0.6137*** 0.008566 
AMOUNT 000.9994 -0.0006*** 0.000007 
GROUP 159.6318 -5.0729*** 0.007842 
Notes:  
Model: Logistic regression 
Dependent variable:  32463246 
N = 404,950, LR chi2 = 68,858.20 
AIC = 373,726, BIC =  373,769 
Significance: * = p < .1, ** = p < .05, *** = p < .01 
 
Table 26 shows estimates for the gender identification bias model. The 
positive and significant coefficient for GENDERL reveals that female lenders are 
more likely to fund female borrowers than male borrowers. The odds ratio 
indicates that female lenders are 1.85 times more likely to fund female borrowers 
than male borrowers. This finding supports hypothesis 2c. The control variables 
in the model indicate that loans made to females are smaller in amount and more 
likely to be made to a group than loans made to males. 
160 
All three H2 hypotheses are supported by the data with positive and 
significant parameter estimates. There is evidence that identification links 
between lenders and borrowers influence microloan funding decisions. To 
determine if the outcomes of loans funded with identification bias differ from 
those funded without identification bias, I compared sets of lender and loan 
characteristics from the technology identification bias hypothesis sample. Using a 
subsample of 1.05 million loan funding transactions, I found that loans funded by 
lenders with identification links to the borrowers experienced higher default rates. 
I also find that less technologically-savvy lenders fund more successful 
technology loans than technology-savvy lenders. The difference (5.48% to 4.80%) 
amounts to an improvement of 14.2%. These findings are presented in Table 27. 
Table 27  Default Rate Effects of Identification Bias 
Lender 
Characteristics 
Loan 
Characteristics 
ID Link 
Exists? 
Default 
Rate 
TECHOCCUP = 1 TECHLOAN = 1 Yes 3.80% 
TECHOCCUP = 1 TECHLOAN = 0 No 2.79% 
PURL = 1 TECHLOAN = 1 Yes 4.51% 
PURL = 1 TECHLOAN = 0 No 2.88% 
TECHOCCUP = 1 AND PURL = 1 TECHLOAN = 1 Yes 5.48% 
TECHOCCUP = 1 AND PURL = 1 TECHLOAN = 0 No 2.57% 
TECHOCCUP = 0 AND PURL = 0 TECHLOAN = 1 No 4.80% 
 
Identification bias in P2P social microlending introduces loan funding 
decision inefficiencies. Although Kiva could implement business model changes 
to eliminate identification bias, there are other factors to consider. Identification 
theory (Schervish and Herman 1988) states that identification with others and the 
needs of others is the primary motivation for charitable giving. If that 
identification bias is removed, donations will decline. Although identification bias 
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reduces effectiveness, it may result in a greater overall amount lent to borrowers 
on Kiva (Riggins and Weber 2011b). 
4.7. Conclusion 
This section summarizes the findings of the paper, presents contributions to both 
theory and practice, and notes some of the limitations of the study. 
4.7.1. Contributions to Theory 
The newly introduced ICT-enabled social lending theory draws from information 
asymmetry and information theories. The theory is supported by data from loans 
made on Kiva.org. Data fit to logistic regression models reveal that borrowers do 
not make lending decisions on the potential success of the loan. Lending decisions 
are biased on identification links between lenders and borrowers. The biases are 
occupation-based and gender-based. These findings are discouraging to the cause 
of microfinance. If the goal of microfinance is poverty reduction, then loan 
funding decisions should reflect that and the data would reveal connections 
between funding decisions and loan success. That is unfortunately not the case 
with Kiva, which may be a reason for its default rate which is higher than the 
microfinance industry average estimates. The findings in this paper permit me to 
make recommendations to Kiva and peer-to-peer social microlending. Kiva uses a 
unique approach to bringing Western participation to poverty reduction and some 
minor changes may help Kiva accomplish more global poverty reduction. 
The ICT-enabled social lending theory exhibits external validity to other 
forms of social lending, not just international aid-based microlending. Consider 
LendingClub.com, which is an online P2P lending site in which both lenders and 
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borrowers reside in the U.S. Similar to Kiva, lenders can make capital funding 
decisions based on loan use and a bio of the borrower. There is anecdotal 
evidence that identity theory plays a role in funding decisions at LendingClub. A 
recent article cites an example of a LendingClub borrower who surprisingly found 
that most of her lenders had ties to Davis, CA, where she attended college 
(Bogoslaw 2009). 
4.7.2. Contributions to Practice 
Based on these findings, I recommend that better information should be offered 
on Kiva’s website that allows individuals to base funding decisions on loan 
success or poverty reduction potential instead of mere personal identification with 
lenders. Simply adding more information would not mitigate the problem, since 
the data reveal that more information results in poorer loan funding decisions. 
What I suggest here would increase transparency in the microfinance market. 
Transparent markets are characterized by complete and unbiased information 
(Porter 2001, Granados et al. 2006, 2010). Organizations like MixMarket 
(www.mixmarket.org) have organizational goals to increase transparency among 
microfinance institutions, but I suggest that transparency should be a 
characteristic of other intermediaries like P2P social microlenders. Metrics could 
be made available based on past success of loans with respect to loan use, activity, 
sector, country, gender, and the administering MFI. This will have the effect of 
selecting loans that are more likely to be repaid and ultimately reduce poverty. 
Today, the only non-biographical information readily available and presented on 
the loan request page is the loan repayment rate of the administering MFI. Future 
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researchers can test if the diminishing of information asymmetries between the 
lender and the MFI reduce the influence of identification bias through 
experimentation and thus determine if reducing information asymmetries between 
MFIs and lenders aids lenders in making more effective funding decisions. I 
recognize that MFIs in particular may oppose a rating system. 
Also based on these findings, I recommend that Kiva should allow lenders to 
receive a portion of the interest paid to MFIs. This for-profit model exists at 
Denmark-based MyC4 (www.myc4.com). Not only would interest earned 
increase the incentive to use Kiva, but it also provides more incentive for a lender 
to make optimal capital decisions. Rates of return could vary from loan to loan 
with respect to risk-levels. This can differentiate lenders into risk-takers and risk-
averse, which would add value to future research. Also, 80% of payments to Kiva 
lenders are re-loaned to new borrowers. “This means that eight out of ten lenders 
choose to reinvest their loan funds into a new business after they are repaid by a 
borrower on [Kiva’s] site” (Flannery 2007, p53). If interest is earned by lenders, 
the re-loan amount can be higher still. This was a part of Kiva’s original business 
plan (a for-profit model) and still the desire of Kiva founder and CEO, Matt 
Flannery. Unfortunately, this desire is not shared among Kiva lenders. In a recent 
survey, Kiva revealed that 50% of current lenders would cease to provide capital 
for Kiva loans if they had the opportunity to receive interest payments along with 
loan repayments (Flannery 2007).  
An alternative to charging interest is for Kiva to regulate the portfolio of loans 
for which the MFI opts to fund through Kiva. Kiva can ensure that the loans that 
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the MFIs opt to fund themselves possess the same risk profile as the loans funded 
through Kiva. This would have the effect of reducing opportunism due to 
information asymmetries, while not punishing the MFIs in riskier markets who 
have larger default rates by nature. 
4.7.3. Limitations 
My study only tested the identification bias in select context. The identification 
link hypothesis could be tested by future research in areas other than gender and 
occupation. Nationality, race, income level, and geographic location of the lender 
among other traits may influence lending decisions. It could be determined that 
African-American lenders lend to African entrepreneurs or lenders in desert 
climates lend to entrepreneurs living in desert climates themselves. Another 
limitation of this research is a lack of data on the ultimate effectiveness of the 
loan on poverty reduction. Loan repayment rate acts as a proxy for poverty 
reduction success since only repaid loans have potential for poverty reduction, but 
the proxy is not a strong predictor of poverty reduction. Another dataset is 
required to incorporate elements of poverty reduction into the study. My data also 
lacks information on how funding decisions relate to loan performance in the 
presence of perfect information and lack of identification theory biases. A large 
effort of manual coding would be necessary to determine if the loan description 
field indicates loan success potential, enhances identification-biases, or both. 
Many of the technology loans are listed for multiple purposes (e.g. “To purchase 
more utensils, rechargeable phone cards, and clothes to sell”). The success of 
these loans is not solely dependent on the portion of the loan used to designate it 
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as a technology loan, but in my analysis, I treat them as if they are. A final 
limitation is that some loans listed on Kiva’s website are pre-disbursed, meaning 
that Kiva funds were already released to the borrower before the loan was posted 
on Kiva’s website for potential lenders to browse. Kiva discloses when funds for a 
loan are pre-disbursed, but this suggests that lenders are less responsible for 
capital funding decisions. 
Reviewers challenged my use of funding time as a variable of interest, 
pointing out that its variance is minimal and the practical difference to a borrower 
of waiting 1.2 days vs. 3.8 days for a loan to be fully funded and distributed to 
them is minimal. The larger issue is that the current market mechanism for 
funding P2P microloans has fallacies. The system favors loans which are more 
likely to fail. Another point to consider is that Kiva is working to add more field 
partners and incorporate more loans on their website due to their exponential 
growth. Loans may fund in an average of 1.8 days when there are only 100 loans 
available on the website at any given time, but consider if 1,000 loans were 
available at any given time. It is likely that the duration to fund loans would 
increase in a direct relationship with the number of loans available for lenders to 
browse. The suggested 1.2 days to 3.8 gap will increase to, for example, a 5 day 
to 40 day gap. In this case, the practical issues of a longer funding duration are 
more likely to be felt by borrowers waiting for their dispersed loan funds. 
4.7.4. Future Research 
In the development cycle for this paper, I recognized areas where additional 
research could benefit the microfinance industry. A manual coding effort of the 
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loan description text for Kiva loans could reveal how the quality of information 
provided to lenders alters loan funding decisions. On the lender’s side, P2P social 
microlending portfolio analysis can reveal patterns of lending and categorization 
of risk seeking versus risk averse lenders. There may be lenders who will fund a 
loan regardless if it is doomed to failure or lenders who are extremely selective in 
their funding decisions. Furthermore, lenders could be surveyed to determine their 
motivation for lending and motivation for lending to specific loans. P2P social 
microlenders could incorporate surveys of this nature on their websites and collect 
data from a sample of lenders who have just completed a lending transaction. 
Kiva itself recognizes that they do more than simply facilitate loans between 
lenders and entrepreneurs; they also create an experience for users browsing their 
site. Identification links are more likely to be an impetus for return visitors than 
poverty reduction. Kiva’s product philosophy states, “Every time you load our 
website, it should be different. Every minute, loans are being purchased and 
repaid, and stories are being told about the borrowers. This can lead to a dynamic 
where philanthropy can actually become addictive” (Flannery 2007).  Consider a 
Kiva user who spent a week in Phnom Penh and visited an Internet café daily. She 
browses on the site to a woman entrepreneur in Cambodia wishing to start up an 
Internet café. Identification-rich experiences like these will more likely lead to a 
flow (Csikszentmihalyi 1975) state of mind suggested in Kiva’s product 
philosophy than metrics about poverty reduction potential. I understand and 
accept that Kiva relies on identification links to create a rich experience and even 
fund loans, but I suggest that offering lenders more information on loan 
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repayment and poverty reduction potential can provide a necessary balance to 
loan funding decisions. 
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Chapter 5. Summary and Conclusions 
The three essays included in this dissertation aim to illuminate how changes in 
ICT impact the microfinance industry. Each study proposes and answers detailed 
separate research questions. These research questions build upon the general 
research question: What are the impacts of ICTs on the microfinance industry?  I 
understand from this research that the impacts are far-reaching and impact many 
different market players in different ways. 
5.1. Summary of Findings 
The first study occurs at the industry level and answers the question: What is the 
impact of ICT on intermediation in the microfinance industry?  Through an 
analysis of past, current, and future predicted intermediation structures, I find that 
the traditional market structure was simple. Information flowed from right to left 
and the market was supply-driven. ICTs cause the market to become more 
demand driven, shift intermediation towards information instead of only funds, 
and adds complexities and new players to the industry, such as mobile service 
providers, correspondent banks, transparency promoters, P2P social microlenders, 
and commercial banks. 
The second study is at the organizational MFI provider level and answers the 
question: How does ICT impact MFI operations? The study uses quantitative 
methods and pattern matching analysis of interview, e-mail, and observational 
research materials to determine how MFI operations mediate the relationship 
between ICT adoption and two types of outreach: poverty and geographic. Policy, 
database, and software-related ICT adoption activities impact poverty outreach 
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due to their support of flexibility and information. Infrastructure, networking, 
hardware, and telephony ICT adoption activities impact geographic outreach since 
these areas support connectivity. 
The final study is at both the microloan and microloan funding transaction 
level. It asks the question: How does ICT impact decision rights in P2P social 
microlending?  This study finds through quantitative empirical analysis that a gap 
exists between loan funding decisions and loan default rate, revealing that lenders 
are unable to predict potential loan success. Lenders also base their loan funding 
decisions with an element of identification bias based on perceived connections 
with borrowers. 
Collectively, these studies reveal that ICTs impact the microfinance industry 
at three levels of analysis (industry, organization, and loan). Theorists will benefit 
from this research since I proposed two new theories. First, I proposed the ICT-
enabled MFI outreach theory in Chapter 3. This theory states that ICT adoption 
among MFIs will result in direct improvements to MFI operations, which serves 
as a mediator between ICT adoption and outreach impact. In Chapter 4, I 
proposed the ICT-enabled social lending theory, demonstrating that in Internet-
based social microlending platforms, lenders access a rich media channel with 
personal information of borrowers. Since lenders have a lack of local business 
knowledge, lenders will base their funding decisions on personal identification 
with borrowers, not on potential loan success. 
Kauffman and Riggins (2012) recommend that future research is necessary on 
the impact of ICT in microfinance at the level of the customer, donor, MFI, and 
170 
industry. This dissertation addresses all of these areas of future research concerns, 
albeit with admittedly minimal content dedicated to the impact on customers 
(borrowers). Chapter 2 primarily addresses industry issues, Chapter 3 primarily 
addresses MFI issues, and Chapter 4 addresses lender, loan, and P2P social 
microlender issues. As end-user customers adopt more advanced technologies 
such as mobile banking and smartphones with Internet connectivity, research on 
their impacts will be of great importance. Figure 13 summarizes the dissertation 
with information on each of the three main chapters along with their findings. The 
inverted triangle graphically depicts the flow of my research from broad to 
specific with space left at the bottom of the triangle for future research on 
customer impact. 
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5.2. Future Research 
This research is by no means an exhaustive study of ICT’s impact in the 
microfinance industry. Since this is a newly forming topic among researchers, 
especially in the IS discipline, it can be used as a springboard for many other 
studies. 
The predicted model in essay #1 can be refined by utilizing sources beyond an 
industry risk analysis that would inform changes in intermediation market 
structures. Another future study could look at the spillover effects of ICT-enabled 
market structures changes into other related industries. The findings in essay 2 
can be triangulated with a separate quantitative study to determine the strength of 
ICT adoption activities on MFI operations and outreach. Future researchers can 
also expand on this body of knowledge by exploring how MFIs should adopt 
technology. Since the end-result of microfinance is poverty alleviation, the 
research presented in essay #3 can be expanded by exploring the impact of loan 
funding decisions on end-user impact. Another interesting study would look at the 
nature of the relationship between Kiva lender activity and the type and amount of 
information provided to lenders. 
5.3. Conclusions 
This research makes some initial and important contributions to several 
disciplines: information systems, IT value, development, philanthropy, and 
psychology. The main finding of this research is that ICTs have been a powerful 
force to many players in the short history of the microfinance industry. It has 
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increased the complexity of the industry, enabled MFIs to extend their outreach, 
and shifted decision rights to lenders. Each of these changes comes with its own 
benefits and challenges. 
Given the infancy of the industry and that many microfinance players are 
behind other industry counterparts in traversing stages of technology adoption, the 
timing is appropriate for a ramp up of academic research. I hope this will set the 
stage for a new stream of research that will provide value to theorists, academics, 
practitioners, and ultimately add value to the poor and aid the microfinance 
industry in its quest to alleviate global poverty though empowering the world’s 
poor. 
5.4. Reflections 
I found the dissertation process challenging, rewarding, and of course frustrating 
at times. I take great pride in what I have researched and discovered. Surrounding 
myself with a supportive committee and family were paramount to my 
completion. My wife spent the past four years as our breadwinner and as my 
‘sugar mama.’ She was a sounding board for my frustrations and even edited 
several of my papers. Although she did recently state that after seeing me go 
through this PhD process, she would never want the experience for herself! 
Prior to my dissertation research, all of the knowledge I possessed about 
microfinance was gleamed from books, articles, and conversations. I came to the 
realization that I needed firsthand experience in the microfinance industry to 
frame the literature I was reading. Due to this knowledge gap, I served in the Kiva 
Fellows Program in Fall 2011. This experience afforded me the opportunity to 
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work directly with two MFIs in Cambodia. Furthermore, this process allowed me 
to observe operations at MFIs, meet with borrowers, and build relationships with 
MFI staff. Regardless of one’s dissertation topic, I believe it is vital to understand 
problems from the perspective of industry participants and work with non-
academic outsiders. I see this strategy employed by my fellow PhD colleagues 
and I respect their approach to research. 
Frequent meetings with my committee members, Fred Riggins, Uday 
Kulkarni, and Jane Carey were another key component of my dissertation process. 
It often took me verbalizing my thoughts to one of my committee members to be 
able to understand and state my thoughts more clearly. They asked me thought-
provoking questions and each one of my three essays is shaped and positively 
changed as a result of their challenges and recommendations. There were many 
times when I thought my work was ‘good enough’ yet they challenged me to go 
further and improve my research in the process. 
I also found many technologies helpful in my dissertation. I shudder to think 
about writing my dissertation and citing as many sources as I did if each of those 
citations meant a trip to the library to check out a book or copy an article. I am 
coddled by statistics software, Google Scholar, Google Books, other web 
resources, and separate monitors for PDF viewing, web browsing, and document 
creation. Although I am biased as an information systems student, I would 
encourage other PhD students to learn and make use of technologies that save 
time and improve productivity. 
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The microfinance industry is truly unique and special, but there is much that 
academics and practitioners still need to learn about the microfinance industry. It 
is my hope that someday my dissertation will sit among thousands of other PhD 
student dissertations on microfinance, each providing unique insights to aid MFIs 
and other industry players mitigate poverty. Although I am glad that I only have 
to write one dissertation in my life, I am glad to have chosen my specific topic 
and will look back on the process as a life-shaping experience. 
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LIST OF PREPARED QUESTIONS FOR IN-DEPTH INTERVIEWS 
 
1. Do you feel limited by your MFI's technological capabilities?  In what 
ways? 
2. What internal processes are improved by investments your MFI has made 
in technology? 
3. What is a technology you would like to see used at your MFI?  What is it 
and how would it help? 
4. Which staff members at your MFI rely most on ICT and which ones rely 
the least on ICT? 
5. What changes in ICT have you seen in your tenure at your MFI? 
6. How has ICT enabled your MFI to lend to poorer borrowers? 
7. How has ICT enabled your MFI to lend to more geographically distant 
borrowers? 
8. How are you planning on using ICT to lend to poorer borrowers? 
9. How are you planning on using ICT to lend to more geographically distant 
borrowers? 
10. How do you anticipate your MFI's loan portfolio changing due to changes 
and investments in ICT? 
11. How has your MFI's loan portfolio changed due to ICT used at your 
branch? 
12. How has your MFI's loan portfolio changed due to your borrowers' use of 
ICT? 
13. How do you anticipate your MFI's loan portfolio changing due to your 
borrowers' use of ICT? 
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DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS FOR LOAN FUNDING TRANSACTIONS 
 
There were 2,545,226 loan funding transactions used to test the occupation 
identification bias hypotheses (H2a and H2b). Of these, 181,727 contained 
lenders with technological occupations and 39,020 were funding transactions for 
technology loans. The dataset has 3,507 occurrences of lenders with technology 
occupations lending to borrowers with technology-purposed microloans. 
Additionally, there are 7,586 occurrences of lenders with personal URL fields in 
their profiles lending to borrowers with technology-purposed microloans. 
Considering agriculture, there were 10,564 loan funding transactions with 
lenders in agricultural occupations and 428,757 agriculture microloans. The 
dataset has 3,588 occurrences of lenders in agricultural occupations lending to 
agricultural microloans. 
A different dataset was used to test the gender identification bias hypothesis 
(H2c) with 405,505 loan funding transactions. The table below summarizes the 
gender of the lenders and borrowers in this dataset. 
  Lenders 
  Male  
(n = 252,295) 
Female  
(n = 152,760) 
Borrowers 
Male 
(n = 96,006) 68,985 27,021 
Female  
(n = 264,181) 154,315 109.866 
 
This sample is biased toward male lenders, sice the determination of lender 
gender was based on a keyword search of the 30 most common male names and 
193 
30 most common female names. Since male names have less variety, the sample 
shows more males lenders than females. The converse is true for the population. 
There are actually more female lender participants on Kiva than males.  After 
normalizing the table to give equal weight to males and females among both 
lenders and borrowers, I summarize the data into percentages. The table indicates 
that females have a greater bias of lending to borrowers of their own gender than 
males. 
  
  Lenders 
  Male  Female  
Borrowers Male 29.3% 18.9% Female  23.8% 28.0% 
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SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS OF STRATIFIED MODELS 
Estimation Results for 1st Quintile “Very Low Information” (81-472 
Characters) Logistic Regression Model 
Variable  Odds Ratio Std. Err. 
DAYSTOFUND 1.0236 0.0243 
AMOUNT 0.9961*** 0.0004 
GENDERB 0.2832*** 0.0394 
AGRILOAN 5.1689*** 1.2558 
TECHLOAN 0.6073 0.4427 
R_AFRICA 125.0997*** 91.13211 
R_LATINAM 223.9053*** 170.8992 
R_SOUTHAM 125.5799*** 110.9546 
DESCLENGTH 0.9871*** 0.0009 
Notes: 
Model: Logistic regression 
Dependent variable:  	
	
 
N = 18,565, LR chi2 = 822.74 
Significance: * = p < .1, ** = p < .05, *** = p < .01 
 
 
Estimation Results for 5th Quintile “Very High Information” (1,054-10,730 
Characters) Logistic Regression Model 
Variable  Odds Ratio Std. Err. 
DAYSTOFUND 0.9910 0.0102 
AMOUNT 1.0004*** 0.0001 
GENDERB 0.4259*** 0.0324 
GROUP 0.1868*** 0.0274 
AGRILOAN 1.7872*** 0.1612 
TECHLOAN 1.1601 0.2611 
R_AFRICA 181.7482*** 81.8771 
R_LATINAM 62.7097*** 28.7625 
R_SOUTHAM 36.3607*** 16.4673 
DESCLENGTH 0.9999*** 0.0001 
Notes: 
Model: Logistic regression 
Dependent variable:  	
	
 
N = 19,457 LR chi2 = 1,508.52 
Significance: * = p < .1, ** = p < .05, *** = p < .01 
 
 
